Pilar Bernabé: "Every night I think about what else I could have done on the day of the incident."
Delegate of the Spanish government in the Valencian Community
ValenciaThe Spanish government delegate in the Valencian Community, Pilar Bernabé, has become the leader in the last year de facto from the opposition to the Valencian president, Carlos Mazón. We spoke with her on the eve of the anniversary of the Dana disaster.
What will next week's state funeral be like?
— It will be an act of firm commitment by the president of the [Spanish] government to the victims and also of courage in a complex situation in this community where we live in a democratic anomaly such as having Carlos Mazón as president of the Generalitat Valenciana.
The majority of victims' associations asked that Carlos Mazón not attend.
— Protocol is just another part of the state funeral, which is a regulated ceremony. I've told them [the victims] how it works, and they understand.
Carlos Mazón has repeatedly requested a meeting with Pedro Sánchez. Should the Spanish president agree?
— Carlos Mazón's statements are always malicious, and I don't think it's necessary to give more space to someone who, in my opinion, is invalid. We work with the various ministries. The stagecraft, the artifices, and the grand, contrived phrases are outside of political work, which is necessary and crucial.
Should Pedro Sánchez visit the areas affected by the flooding periodically?
— The Prime Minister was there two days later and then returned [he has made four visits to the Valencian Community, but only one to the affected municipalities]. On two of them, he was with the President of the Generalitat. There was a moment when Mazón gave up and did not want to make statements with President Sánchez following the events that occurred in Paiporta – November 3– because he did not want to publicly condemn violence.
Is this the moment of breaking?
— [Mazón] from that moment on decided that his cause was to defend himself judicially and to do casus belli against the government of Spain.
Wouldn't a constant presence by Sánchez have conveyed a more worrisome message?
— The Prime Minister has been constantly on top of everything that was happening. He chaired more than 40 crisis cabinet meetings over two months and then put all the ministers to work and mobilized €16.6 billion.
On October 29, the Generalitat failed. Did the State fail in the following days?
— On the 30th, before sunrise, there were five battalions [1,300 soldiers] from the Military Emergency Unit. I asked that the soldiers be sent to all the municipalities and not concentrated in Paiporta and Picanya, but that was the decision of the emergency management. The army wasn't present in the rest of the municipalities, but there were a large number of troops—according to the Spanish government, a total of 30,000 soldiers and 10,000 National Police and Civil Guard personnel were deployed. I am fully aware that in the first 48 hours, many people suffered a feeling of helplessness.
Shouldn't the State have assumed responsibility, given that the Generalitat was overwhelmed?
— If you impose a situation on a territory where the main administration is against you, it is impossible to deal with an emergency.
Should they have been more proactive at Cecopio?
— We asked that the warning be sent to the entire province because they were planning to send it only to the Forata reservoir. What the Confederation should have done was focus on its responsibility, which was the dam. The Confederation did its job at noon—when it warned of the rising water level in the Poio ravine and the emergency department issued a hydrological alert. It said: "There's a problem here, and you must be on the lookout constantly."
What would you do differently now?
— Every night I go to bed and think about what more I could have done that day. I would have alerted all the media outlets that things weren't being done quickly and efficiently. The big problem is that at five o'clock it was so late that it was already chaos. The tragedy is that from the 24th—when the Special Flood Plan was activated—until five o'clock in the afternoon on the 29th, when the Cecopio began and when people were already dying, you did nothing [referring to the Generalitat]. There was a widespread lack of concern, and that's not solely the responsibility of Salomé Pradas, but of the entire Consell.
The Generalitat (Catalan Government) daily criticizes state aid because it "includes guarantees, subsidies, and financing, but not direct aid."
— Of all the money put on the table today, according to the State Intervention Office, nine out of every ten euros has been provided by the Spanish government.
Why has the State not granted the extraordinary liquidity fund this year in particular?
— The Generalitat will receive 70% more transfers from the State this year than it did when the PP was in power. A year like this has seen an extra for the Dana and a transfer of 8 billion euros – of the total of 16.6 billion planned, and which include compensation from the insurance compensation consortium.
The consequence of this scenario is that the far right is the one that benefits most from the Dana crisis.
— The first weeks of the Dana in Valencia were a testing ground for the extreme right and the influencers of hate. But all this has been dismantled. The rise of the far right is a global phenomenon. The survey published in Nou d'Octubre is not very different from the surveys we see at the national level.
What hasn't the PSPV done right that, despite the Dana crisis, the polls still show Carlos Mazón ahead?
— The PSPV is the leading party in the province of Valencia, according to the survey you cite. I'm convinced the PSPV will achieve very good results.
It's hard to believe that the PSPV ignored José Luis Ábalos's sexist behavior.
— This is a statement that he categorically denies.
Ábalos has a decades-long political career. Hadn't you received any information?
— Allow me not to pry into anyone's personal life, but what is crystal clear is that the PSOE, when it learned of the disgusting recordings, took half a second to act.