Goldman Sachs and Barça: kind words and a hidden problem
Although the financing of Camp Nou does not put the club's ownership at risk, it is linked to interest, fees and renegotiations.
BarcelonaA few days ago, an interview with Jorge Alcover, CEO of Goldman Sachs, generated considerable debate. The main message he conveyed to Everything costs money. The report from Catalunya Ràdio was reassuring: according to the bank, the financing agreement with Barça does not jeopardize the club's ownership or its membership model. Formally, this is true. But focusing the debate solely on ownership is only scratching the surface of the problem.
The relationship between Barça and Goldman Sachs is based on two major transactions: the refinancing of more than €600 million in 2021 – of which almost €500 million is still owed – and the financing of the Espai Barça project through a dedicated fund. This fund was intended to cover not only the new stadium, but also the Palau Blaugrana and other infrastructure. However, it is now clear that, at best, it will cover the stadium, due to delays and cost overruns. A significant part of the initial project will no longer be carried out as planned.
This type of financing is not exceptional, but it is not innocent either. Investment banks don't enter into these types of transactions out of romanticism, but because they see a long-term business opportunity: interest, fees, and often, successive renegotiationsIt's legitimate. It's part of their model.
During the interview, a key question was raised: if Barça couldn't pay, could the bank end up controlling the club? The answer was clear: no. The financing structure prevents the creditor from acquiring ownership. And this is where an important clarification is necessary: the biggest risk isn't losing ownership of the club overnight. The real risk is losing its financial control.
Barça is currently the most indebted club in world sport, with a debt exceeding €2.5 billion. To reach this point, the club has had to advance future revenues—such as television rights and VIP box sales. VIP—and sell strategic assets, especially in the digital sphere. This means that a significant portion of the money it will generate in the future is already committed before it even arrives.
In this context, the new revenue from the new stadium will not primarily serve to strengthen the team or improve competition, but rather to pay off debts, interest, and existing commitments. The stadium, which was intended to be a major driver of growth, becomes primarily a tool to support the financial structure.
If the club cannot meet these payments, there is no immediate dramatic scenario. No one liquidates the club or changes ownership. What happens is slower and more dangerous: new renegotiations, more costs, more dependence. At each step, the margin for decision-making shrinks a little more. Less capacity to invest, less sporting freedom, and greater fragility. A progressive loss of real control over the project.
What alternative is there?
The solution is not to deny the problem or look for culprits, but reduce dependence and regain controlNo institution with the size and brand strength of Barça should depend almost entirely on a single creditor. When most of the funding is concentrated in one entity, the club is left in a weak position. It's not a sound strategy; it's dependency. The first step should be to spread the risks. Open up financing to more players, diversify sources of money, and prevent a single creditor from having a dominant position. This provides greater negotiating power and reduces short-term pressure. The second step is to strengthen internal management. Barça needs people with real experience in complex financing, capable of thinking long-term and negotiating with large entities without being rushed. It's not about having more ad hoc advisors, but about having independent judgment and continuity. There are viable alternatives: financing formulas distributed among different investors, more balanced structures, or mechanisms that allow for longer repayment terms and lighten the annual burden. These aren't magic solutions, but they are healthier: A clear example of a structural change would be to replace part of the current financing with a syndicated bond issue, with differentiated tranches: a long-term senior tranche, with lower costs and supported by recurring income; a tranche mezzaninewith higher profitability but limited risk; and eventually a tranche linked to sustainability criteria, which would capitalize on the international appeal of the stadium project.
Let's be clear: for an investment bank, the business isn't just lending money, but being involved in refinancings and restructurings for years. That's legitimate. But what's good for a bank isn't always good for a sports club with a social function and a unique model. That's why Barça's economic independence isn't a slogan or an ideological battle. It's a practical necessity. And only by reducing dependencies, regaining control, and seriously professionalizing financial management can we guarantee that the club's future won't be conditioned by interests that aren't its own.
Iván Cabeza is an economist and professor in the Department of Economics and Business at the University of Barcelona.
