This summer's migration crisis has once again placed Ceuta and Melilla at the center of the political debate between Spain and Morocco. In an interview with the Arab television channel Asharq News, the Moroccan Minister of Justice, Abdellatif Ouahbi, acknowledged on Wednesday that the claim of sovereignty over both cities "remains on the table," although he called for "calm" and a long-term solution through dialogue. "Inside Ceuta there are Moroccans and there are Spaniards, and we continue to hold onto our territories," Ouahbi stated.

The migratory crisis in Ceuta continues. Morocco's security forces frustrated a new attempt at a mass entry into the Spanish autonomous city this Saturday. Hundreds of people, mostly of sub-Saharan origin, tried to access it and were intercepted by Moroccan soldiers. This group was waiting for the moment to jump the border hidden in Fnideq, a city on the Moroccan side near the Spanish enclave. The massive jump attempt took place in a mountainous area, according to Moroccan sources reported to the Efe agency. In any case, the complex situation in the Spanish border town continues, which has caused an internal political earthquake and the clash of the Spanish government with Morocco by having questioned the Spanishness of Ceuta.

In recent days, anonymous posts have been appearing on social media promoting a new mass entry into Ceuta this Saturday. To prevent this, both Madrid and Rabat have mobilized. "By providing ourselves with more personnel and material resources, and with a deployment of the armed forces," explained the Minister of the Interior, Fernando Grande-Marlaska, this Thursday. "We will continue to implement the necessary personnel to help return to normality as soon as possible and to prevent events like those of July 30 from happening again," he added.

The situation in Ceuta is far from normalizing. This is a message that social organizations and entities in the autonomous city, as well as its population, have been repeating for days. Fifteen days after tens of thousands of people entered swimming from Morocco, triggering a humanitarian emergency, the Elín Association of Ceuta is focusing on people's health and their care: "We are on the verge of a health crisis," warns Ramsés Mohamed, a social educator and spokesperson for Elín, in statements to ARA. "We are talking about people with illnesses and infections that cannot be treated," he adds. Many of the migrants who arrived in Ceuta did so with significant trauma after the sea crossing.

The crisis in Ceuta is reopening the Pandora's box: the diplomatic relationship between Rabat and Madrid, always sensitive, could become strained and threaten to trigger a clash between the two countries, which joins the list of ups and downs that have marked the relationship bilateral. The cautious tone of the Spanish government with Morocco is beginning to differ from that used by the Alawite country, which in recent days has accused Spain of "hindering" the return of migrants, but has also questioned the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla. Although it is not the first time it has done so, in this context it generates more alarm. Rabat is now pressing with the extradition agreement it has with Spain and is opening the door to "suspend it". At the same time, however, it says it is willing to "develop a plan" with Spain, a "friendly" country, to "definitively resolve the migratory problem", according to the Moroccan Minister of Justice, Abdellatif Ouahbi, in an interview with Efe this Wednesday afternoon.

While in Ceuta they continue in a situation of humanitarian emergency hundreds of migrant people who entered swimming from Morocco on July 30, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Manuel Albares, has been forceful regarding their future in the autonomous city: "Up to the last person who has entered [irregularly] will be returned," he said at a press conference this Tuesday, after meeting with the president of Ceuta, Juan Jesús Vivas (PP). In fact, Vivas demanded the "immediate return" of the migrants on Monday, but also the opening of a center for the internment of foreigners (CIE) for the "confinement" of the migrants while the expulsion is processed. Albares has not specified any timeframe.

The PP has been forced to balance with Vox in the face of the humanitarian emergency situation in Ceuta. And the distribution of unaccompanied migrant minors who remain in the city since they entered swimming from Morocco is testing the complicity and understanding between Alberto Núñez Feijóo and Santiago Abascal. The far-right party announced on Saturday that its three vice-presidents with responsibilities in Childhood – in Extremadura, Aragon, and Castile and León – will not attend the meeting to be held on Thursday to begin addressing the distribution of minors. However, the PP will leave Vox alone because the regional ministries that depend on the Popular Party – in Andalusia, where there is also a coalition, and in the other seven territories where they govern alone – will attend the meeting.

[This article was first published in July 2022. We are republishing it in light of the humanitarian crisis in Ceuta]The two lions guarding the main entrance of the Congress of Deputies were made with the melted cannons of the Moroccans defeated at the battle of Wad Ras. This confrontation, along with the battles of Tetuan and Los Castillejos, led to Spain's victory in the first declared war against the Rif tribes from 1859 to 1860. The Sultanate of Morocco, the Riffian tribes, and, later, the Alaouite kingdom have been a constant source of conflict for the Spanish State for more than a century and a half. All in all, the armed contingents from this area of the Maghreb have constituted, by far, the foreign forces that have fought for the longest time against the Spanish army since the Peninsular War.

Approaching the El Tarajal border, which separates Ceuta from Morocco, these days means seeing more military personnel and Civil Guard agents than usual. Also, the maritime containment barrier installed by the Spanish government after the entry of thousands of people on Thursday, July 30th. Or that mobile phone coverage starts to fail.

In the newspaper ARA, a report about young people struggling to survive in Ceuta, who came from Morocco by swimming, gives a voice to a young man who “doesn’t want to return to Morocco, where he assures it’s impossible to earn a living. That the salary in his country is low”.

Nine years ago, a group of Moroccan citizens was demonstrating in Casablanca. They waved Moroccan flags and held up banners that read down with colonialism. Others were written in Arabic. The scene was captured by Efe photojournalist Karim Selmaoui. And the reason they were protesting was none other than the visit of the Spanish royal family to Ceuta. It was the first time Juan Carlos and Sofia had set foot on the African continent to visit this autonomous city – it took them 32 years from the start of their reign. It was also the last. In fact, since then, there has been no visit from the Spanish monarchy to Ceuta, nor to Melilla. It is Felipe VI's pending trip as king, although as prince he never went either.

An example of how the bilateral relationship with Morocco is one of Spain's most complex and sensitive foreign relations is the stance taken by the PP regarding the migratory crisis in Ceuta. Alberto Núñez Feijóo's party, from the opposition, has a harsher tone than the Spanish government on the role Morocco has played in the influx of thousands of migrants swimming into Ceuta. But at the same time, they avoid direct confrontation with the Alaouite kingdom, which has led to criticism from José Manuel García-Margallo (PP), former Minister of Foreign Affairs under Mariano Rajoy, who accuses his party colleagues of lacking "determination" and "firmness" with Morocco.

Morocco likes to recall that it was the first country to recognize the independence of the United States. A long-standing relationship that has accelerated dramatically under Donald Trump. The trigger was when, in 2020, Rabat adhered to the Abraham Accords, promoted by the Republican during his first term to normalize relations between Israel and Arab countries. In exchange, Washington recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This transaction laid the groundwork for the current triangulation of interests between the US, Israel, and Morocco in Africa.

Four days after the irregular entry of more than 60,000 people into Ceuta, the motivation for the umpteenth migratory crisis between Spain and Morocco remains shrouded in mystery. The Moroccan regime maintained strict silence until Sunday night, by which time dozens of bodies had already been found on the beaches of the area. The official version, transmitted in a note from the Ministry of the Interior, supports the same thesis as Madrid, that of a disinformation campaign by migratory mafias. However, several facts cast doubt on the veracity of their narrative. The Moroccan government's statement assures that, according to the information gathered, the events in Ceuta "were not the result of conjunctural or spontaneous factors", but rather of several connected events, with "the pernicious exploitation of digital networks, the dissemination of false information, and the role of human trafficking networks" as the main ones. Specifically, it cites the manipulation of the Supreme Court ruling that prohibits hot returns to make young people wishing to emigrate believe that they could cross the Mediterranean Sea without any problem. It also stated that days before the crisis, it had warned the Spanish government of the risk that this judicial decision posed for migration control.

No matter how much the Moroccan regime tries to project an image of modernity and progress to the world, reality is stubborn and can make its presence felt at any moment. Almost a year ago, the major youth protests of the GenZ 212 group already highlighted the deep discontent of young people. The organization of the Africa Cup of Nations, football, last December, served to divert attention from social problems and showcase the new stadiums, which will be the stage for the 2030 World Cup. But the current migratory crisis has once again revealed that there is a Morocco, backward and hopeless, very different from the official one. If there is one thing the makhzen has excelled at, a name given to the monarch's council of advisors and the network of interests created around them, it is knowing how to sell the country abroad, often with the help of foreign lobbyists and a good handful of banknotes. One only needs to recall the scandal of the so-called Qatargate, that is, the bribery of MEPs and senior officials in Brussels to defend the interests of a foreign country within European institutions. Misnamed because, in fact, Doha merely used a network of corrupt politicians and officials created by Morocco. For this reason, the scheme should have been named Morocco-gate.The narrative they sell is that of a moderate and politically stable country in a region, the Arab world, which has been a real powder keg for decades. Furthermore, they point to the country's economic growth, with an average of 5% GDP growth in recent years, and the construction of major infrastructure, such as the new port of Tangier or the expansion of high-speed train lines. Internationally, they boast of their renewed alliance with Trump's USA. In line with this strengthening of its international projection, Rabat is undertaking a very costly modernization of its army – or a real arms race with Algeria – as its budget has gone from approximately 5 billion euros in 2023 to around 7 billion this year. Now, all these figures and arguments cannot hide the existence of another Morocco: that of precarious households overthrown by the 2023 Marrakech earthquake, that of extreme poverty in rural areas, that of public services in decline, or that of 30% of young people with a university degree who cannot find work and who have stopped believing in mobility in their country. It is from this unglamorous Morocco, from which the tens of thousands of young people who entered Ceuta wanted to flee, many of them risking their lives. This disconnect is so evident that even Mohamed VI has acknowledged it in his latest messages, in which he has committed to collaborating with the government to end the “Morocco of two speeds”. The political omnipresence of the king

In a democratic country, all these shortcomings should be able to be addressed in elections, but in the North African country, fewer and fewer citizens see the ballot boxes as a possible lever for change. All opposition parties that have won elections with promises of deep social reforms, such as the socialists of the USFP or the Islamists of the PJD, have crashed against the same obstacle: the makhzen. Morocco is not a parliamentary monarchy like the United Kingdom or Spain, but an executive monarchy, which means that the king, often through his advisors, has a veto right in all areas of political life. And this translates into the absence of any minimally ambitious wealth redistribution policy.For this reason, both the USFP and the PJD saw how, after one of their leaders held the position of prime minister without making any substantial changes, the ballot boxes punished them harshly and turned them into marginal parties. Once the parties of the moderate opposition to the regime were neutralized, in the last general elections, in September 2021, the RNI, led by Aziz Akhannouch, one of the richest men in the country and a close friend of Mohamed VI, prevailed.To vary, Akhannouch has not lived up to expectations, although, in his case, the promises, rather than political change, were more focused on management efficiency. Once his role is amortized, he will not run for re-election in the elections on September 23. Everything indicates that the candidate of the makhzen this time will be Fouzi Lekjaa, current Minister of Budget and president of the Royal Moroccan Football Federation, the man in charge of organizing the 2030 World Cup, which Morocco will share with Spain and Portugal.  It remains to be seen whether the successes of the Moroccan national football team are capable of drawing Moroccans to the polls and catapulting Lekjaa to victory. Many analysts are skeptical and predict record abstention. In the previous elections, only 50% of voters exercised their right to vote, according to official figures. The figure was even lower in urban areas, where clientelism is weaker. Young people, instead of voting, prefer to emigrate.

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It is opportune to recall that Morocco, as a political regime, is an authoritarian monarchy – a dictatorship – and that the current monarch, Mohamed VI, besides being an eccentric millionaire, has also proven to be a business shark, much more ambitious and greedy, and also more skillful, than his father, Hassan II, a bon vivant who got along very well with Juan Carlos I. Mohamed VI (and now also his heir, Mulai Hassan, who each day assumes more power, due to the absences and health problems of his father) has gotten down to business, and possesses a fortune that Forbes calculates to be over 5,000 million euros, the first in Morocco and the fifth on the African continent. The Alaouite monarch is richer, for example, than the British one. Just in terms of known official residences, Mohamed VI owns twelve palaces with more than a thousand servants that cost more than a million euros each day. Needless to say, these are, from his perspective, merely current expenses. With all this, it means that we are talking about a deeply corrupt regime that intends to perpetuate itself. A royal lineage from which hangs the vast and powerful investment fund Al Mada, which controls key sectors such as banking, mining, agriculture, telecommunications, and distribution.The Alawite regime uses its country's resources for its own benefit, starting with its geostrategic situation and the Moroccan population itself (more than eighty deaths in this latest crisis in Ceuta). It should not be forgotten that the geopolitical maneuvers of this regime are directly linked to the enrichment of the royal family and its extensive network of partners, accomplices, propagandists, and flatterers. For this reason, as Tesh Sidi (a Sumar deputy born in a Sahrawi refugee camp) has recalled, migratory crises like the current one or the one in 2021 cannot be understood without the triangulation of interests between Morocco, Israel, and the US. With Spain playing the role of a pawn that goes from colonization to the recognition of the Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara, the hardest and lowest moment of Pedro Sánchez's foreign policy.Even harder and lower because it has served no purpose. Morocco continues to use migratory crises as a tool to destabilize Europe through Spain whenever it suits them, which strengthens xenophobic or populist discourses such as those advocated by Vox and, in their own way, the PP. One only needs to see a recent interview with Abascal in which he emphasizes that Morocco “is not the enemy,” contrary to what has been traditionally preached. Solutions? Few. As diplomat Joan Manuel López Nadal has said, one possibility for the Spanish state, in the long run, is to decolonize Ceuta and Melilla (and ask, in return, for the decolonization of the Sahara by Morocco), but this, indeed, would be major words. A lesson? As Cristina Mas wrote in an analysis in this newspaper, “we have known for a long time that it is not a good idea to subcontract a regime without democratic guarantees to monitor your borders, and now it is being demonstrated again”.

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The 241 million followers he has on his X network have seen Elon Musk compare the massive influx of immigrants, mostly Moroccans, into Ceuta with the zombies from World War Z. Italy has announced border migration controls that will almost certainly affect Moroccans above all, including those born in Europe or those with papers, which will deepen the stigma against a population that has always suffered institutional racism in all EU countries. And most importantly: the death toll attempting to cross the border, many of them minors, climbs every day, and it is assumed that it will far exceed a hundred people, making it the most serious tragedy of its kind in recent times. Some young people have preferred to try everything and risk dying rather than stay in their country. What does this say about Morocco?

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The Spanish right and far-right – and also the European ones – have found in the migratory crisis in Ceuta a vein to harden the anti-immigration discourse and, consequently, to push for stricter border control. In fact, it represents an opportunity to isolate the president of the Spanish government, Pedro Sánchez, and his migratory policies with respect to the rest of the EU member states, who on Tuesday are called to a meeting to address, precisely, this matter. The leader of Vox, Santiago Abascal, has not only welcomed the position of countries like Italy, which after the migratory crisis has put more controls on the border, but has also stated that Donald Trump has "fallen short" when he speaks of Spanish policies "of the extreme left [which favor migration]". Abascal, who this Sunday has moved for the first time to Ceuta, has demanded to "permanently militarize" the border, close it and that the army can act with "the necessary forcefulness".

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The Mediterranean Sea is heading, once again, to become a larger cemetery. The migratory crisis in Ceuta is already the most tragic in recent years at the southern border: "We believe that the number of [fatal] victims will far exceed 100," anticipates Helena Maleno, founder of the organization Caminando Fronteras, who has been based at this border for years, where she works to defend the rights of migrants.

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The diplomatic relationship between the Spanish State and Morocco has been marked by a series of ups and downs. That is to say, by moments of tension that have led to a clash between the two countries, even for months. It is a Pandora's box that the serious migratory crisis in Ceuta has once again brought to the table and that, although the Spanish government does not want to open – at Moncloa they maintain that it is a "reliable partner" –; other voices are fully entering it. Not going any further, Sumar. The minority partner of the coalition government has asked the United Nations to "examine" Morocco's responsibility in the migratory crisis and some of its members have openly pointed to a geopolitical dimension: "This is not a migratory crisis, but political decisions," stated the deputy in Congress, Tesh Sidi.

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