If President Pujol was not interested in opening the Pandora's box of independence, it was for several reasons, among them, surely, that he did not see it as opportune or prudent, but the fact is that he himself embodied the repressed impulse (or the latent conflict). The fact of having a nationalist presiding over the Generalitat caused special tension and attention, a constant edge of the precipice that forced everyone to express themselves, at least to express themselves, on the fit or misfit of Catalonia within Spain. It was the recurring theme, the unavoidable elephant, the eternally pending subject but on which everyone said their piece: Pujol was a kind of embodiment that the solution of '78 was insufficient and that it was necessary to delve much deeper into self-government and national recognition, under the threat (never explicit) that everything would overflow. Well, everything, in effect, did overflow: Maragall was not a nationalist, but he was the grandson of Joan Maragall and had an entire reform of the Statute as his project. The rest of the story we already know: explicit conflict until 2017 and beyond, and it has only been two years since the Generalitat decided to become a government without conflict. Without a pending issue. Without a cause, without national debate beyond administrative management.This transforms us, in effect, and more than ever, into a province. Into a branch. The Parliament of Catalonia no longer captures anyone's attention because neither Illa has any solution to the conflict other than to ignore it, nor can Sílvia Orriols avoid becoming repetitive with her Islamophobia, nor do Junts or ERC seem to show signs of being able to reawaken the movement created during the Procés (or, at least, obtain significant concessions from their commitment to dialogue with the PSOE). The blame is, we would say, shared. Nevertheless, it is the governing majority that sets the pace of the legislature and, therefore, it is convenient to admit that it is this one that opts for administrative, legalistic greyness, allergic to conflict (not to its approach, but to its very existence), the still prevailing domain of fear and threat, the association of common sense with passivity, and the reference to an abstract, confusing, and barren dialogue. "The Government of Everyone" simply does not include in this "everyone" half of Catalans who declare themselves independentists and, with this, it trusts that the sovereignist boredom with Catalan politics will make the intention, the movement, and the cause fade away. It is not a bad idea: the problem is that the price is the almost absolute disappearance of Catalan politics.

Pío Cabanillas' outburst is often cited, who in the years of the Transition, leaving a stormy UCD congress, said “We have won, but we don't know who”. Something similar happens to current Catalan politics when talking about unity. We want unity, but we don't know whose. We know we have to unite, but we don't know what or whom we are referring to when we talk about us.Unity is one of those big words that, like progress or freedom, become empty concepts when they are mishandled by the political class. In general, when a leader advocates for union, they conceive of it as a concentration of forces around themselves. And that, of course, has little to do with authentic unity, which implies mutual approach, concession.I am one of those who think that unity is a false dogma that is often contrasted with division, when its opposite, in fact, is plurality. And in democracy, plurality is necessary. It is the inevitable starting point for reaching consensus, broad majorities: another type of unity, which does not imply uniformism and does not generate vetoes.In Catalonia, this kind of unity based on pluralism is necessary. Because the country has very serious problems and demands far-reaching reforms, which are impossible with a too atomized Parliament, and with a growing presence of the far-right. And this implies forming transversal majorities, which overflow the boundaries between left and right, and between sovereigntism and Spanish nationalism. I will be more precise: there are a series of issues (language, health, education, infrastructure) that should be based on a strategic agreement between the PSC, Junts, ERC, and Comuns. They are the formations that can guarantee an operational parliamentary majority.

Politics is the struggle for power. And in a democracy, it's governed by the principle of a simple majority, which grants a parliamentary majority. It's the civilized staging of what we call the class struggle, with the right/left dichotomy as the system's axis, often with a tendency towards caricature, the demonization of the adversary, and rhetoric that operates on the logic of "us versus them," turning the rival into an enemy. It's a brawl that transcends ideas, proposals, and decisions, often devolving, on each side, into expressions more akin to the psychopathology of petty differences.

One year ends and another begins. These are times, both personally and collectively, to take stock and formulate new goals. For our country, Catalonia, 2025 presents a mixed picture. Some aspects are clearly positive, others less so, and some are frankly adverse.

If a good doctor attacks the causes of the disease and not just the symptoms, a good politician should study the roots of a conflict and not limit himself to repressing it and then granting the right to a fair trial. funny of forgiveness. This politician does not exist in Spain, or he is in ostracism, and therefore the case of the Catalans, as it was called in the 18th century, is still very much in force despite the fact that the PSOE proclaims that the conflict known as the Process It can be considered closed. The process will not remain closed until the amnesty has been extended to everyone. But what is certain is that the conflict remains, and those of us who believe in it have work to do.

Shall we make a little story?