Who's who at Cecopio, the agency that failed to prevent the DANA catastrophe?
Former councilor Pradas, the deputy director of Emergencies, and the fire chief were instrumental in the agency's actions.
ValenciaThe judge investigating the handling of the DANA (National Emergency Plan) on October 29 in the Valencian Community has spent weeks focusing her investigation on the "glaring lack of warnings to the public." She believes the alert was sent late and was "incorrect in its content," given that it recommended avoiding travel, when "many of the victims died without leaving the ground floor of their homes, going down to the garage, or simply being in public." Therefore, she denounces the "avoidability of the overwhelming number of deaths" and emphasizes that "the material damage could not have been avoided; the deaths could have been."
Nuria Ruiz Tobarra, who has not yet charged anyone, holds the Valencian Generalitat (Generalitat Valenciana) responsible for this malpractice because "the alert level maintained at all times [level 2] did not imply the central administration's acceptance of the emergency." And the responsibility for sending the alert fell to 112, also the Generalitat (Catalan government). However, the Cecopio (Cecopio), which encompasses several administrations, was the coordination center during the crisis, and those who played a more important role could end up being investigated in an investigation being conducted for the alleged crimes of homicide and reckless injury.
Although the Valencian president is not part of the Integrated Operational Coordination Center (Cecopi), his status as the highest official in the Generalitat could lead to his indictment. The "starting from seven o'clock," as he had previously stated, could respond to a strategy to distance himself from the late alarm. According to legal experts specializing in criminal law, such as lawyers Raúl Vidal and José Vicente Gómez Tejedor, consulted by ARA, Mazón's presence or absence at the Cecopio "is not decisive" in defining his responsibility. "In decision-making," Vidal points out. Gómez Tejedor disagrees, arguing that "justice does not provide for the conviction of a superior for the actions of his subordinates." On the contrary, he "does believe" a conviction of the administration is likely, and the administration could have to compensate the victims' families for his absence.
She is, at this time, the main suspect, given that she was the head of the Cecopio (Cecopio). "I am aware that I was the representative of the Generalitat (Catalan Government) that day, and I accept that," she admitted this week. Regarding the sending of the ES-Alert message, she has released Carlos Mazón of responsibility, guaranteeing that he was not expected to make decisions. She holds public employees responsible for the content of the alert and its delay. "It's a system that was being tested, that isn't protocolized, and we sent it without guidelines, without knowing what texts to include for each emergency situation. That's why the technicians hesitated and debated its content," she argued. She added: "I could only listen to the technicians, coordinate, and carry out some institutional management, such as requesting assistance from the EMU (Union of Emergency Mechanisms), but all the decisions were made by the technicians," she insisted.
Graduate in law, criminology, advertising and journalismThis former Ciutadans leader had no experience in the field of emergencies. In Mazón's absence, he shared the political direction of the catastrophe with Pradas. Like her, he was dismissed for his management of the DANA. Since then, he has not made any public statements.
He is the only senior official on Salomé Pradas's team who was not dismissed by Carlos Mazón. A firefighter specializing in forest fires, he shared technical direction of the emergency with José Miguel Bausset, head of the Provincial Fire Consortium.
According to various witnesses present at the advanced Cecopioby ElDiario.esand confirmed by the ARA, was the one who raised the possibility of using the Es-Alert system, although the president of the Júcar Hydrographic Confederation, Miguel Polo, had also suggested it. He was also the one who drafted the message with an official.
The Valencian government has blamed him for halting the assistance offered by several police and fire departments from other regions in the days following the DANA. "We politicians didn't know what was being offered. It's a matter that remains at the technical discretion of the operational management," reiterated Susana Camarero, vice president and spokesperson for the Consell (Consell). On October 29, Basset and Suárez reportedly disagreed over the content of the message. Specifically, over whether the text should be more or less alarmist and order citizens to go up to the first floors of buildings.
Present at the Cecopio since its formation at 5 p.m., he has played a key role in the PP's account of what happened during that fateful day. At various times, he has provided information that Carlos Mazón has not provided.
State officials
Although Judge Nuria Ruiz Tobarra has clarified that the responsibility for issuing the alert falls within the regional government, she is also examining whether the Júcar Hydrographic Confederation (CHX) and the Spanish Meteorological Agency (Aemet), both state-run agencies, provided adequate information. The Valencian government denounced that the CHX failed to issue a timely warning about the Poio ravine's overflowing and that all eyes were on the possibility of the Forata reservoir overflowing. The Consell (Consell) has also accused the Aemet (Spanish Meteorological Agency) of not sufficiently warning about the extraordinary nature of the rainfall.
She attended the Cecopio meeting remotely. She was criticized for not assuming responsibility for managing the disaster on the 29th or for rescuing those affected in the days immediately following the incident, after observing the inaction or lack of resources from the Generalitat (Catalan Government). The Socialist leader defended herself by reminding the regional authorities of the emergency and pointing out that the Valencian government had suspended the meeting on several occasions, leaving the state authorities unable to do anything. She also defended her commitment to offering assistance from the state and the Military Emergency Unit from early in the morning.
He heads the body that manages the Forata reservoir, which regulates the Magro River, whose rupture would have caused a greater catastrophe. The PP accuses him of leading an agency that failed to send alert emails about the Poio ravine from the Hydrological Information Service (SAIH) for two hours. In other words, no emails were sent during that interval., However, the status of the situation was accessible online at all times. He also recalled that the Valencian government withdrew the firefighters tasked with surveying the Poio ravine at 3 p.m., and that the Valencian Government's emergency helicopters remained at the base without working during the afternoon.
His agency was accused of failing to forecast, given that, according to Carlos Mazón, "four times more" rain fell than the agency had predicted. It predicted 180 liters per square meter in two or three hours, when in the areas with the most rain, in the municipality of Turís, 771 accumulated. Núñez accused Mazón of "lying" and recalled that his agency had declared a red alert. This Friday The Country has published some of the WhatsApp that he sent to his colleagues at Aemet on the afternoon of October 29, while participating telematically in the Cecopio: "The Júcar is rising a lot. There are people trapped. I think they don't even know what the situation is right now," he criticized in reference to the Generalitat in one of the WhatsApp at 7:28 p.m.