The technician who validated the DANA alert states that it had been talked about for an hour and a half beforehand.

ValenciaThe Emergency technician who validated the Es-Alert message sent on October 29 confirmed this Thursday before the judge investigating the consequences of the DANA (Dive into Floods) in the Valencian Community that he received the first communication regarding the dissemination of the alert at 6:36 p.m. At that time, the Poio ravine was beginning to overflow its banks in the Horta Sud region, and more inland towns, such as Chiva, had already been flooded. The technician, Miquel M., testified as head of the technological service of the 112 emergency line and of the communications section of the Valencian Agency for Security and Emergency Response.

According to sources present at the statement explained to ARA, the technician places the moment he received the call from the deputy director general of Emergencies, Jorge Suárez, at 6:36 p.m., who told him that they were considering issuing an alert about the situation at the Forata reservoir, which regulates the Barata River, which regulates the majority of the deaths. Twenty minutes later, at 6:57 p.m., the head of the 112 analysis unit, Juan Ramón Cuevas, confirmed that they had decided to send the alert, but finally at 7:08 p.m. the decision was postponed.

The reason for this change was that from 7:00 p.m. onwards, the Cecopio's attention began to focus on the situation in the Poio ravine. It was then decided that the alert should be sent to all towns in the province of Valencia, not just the municipalities affected by a possible burst of the Forata reservoir. This was confirmed by various witnesses present at the emergency committee, including the Spanish government representative, Pilar Bernabé. In her statement a few weeks ago, Bernabé explained that at 7:00 p.m. she warned then-Minister Salomé Pradas that flooding was already occurring in l'Horta Sud, and that the PP leader replied that she was already on the case. However, the alert did not reach the public until 8:11 p.m.

The last highlight of the technician's statement—who worked remotely on the day of the disaster—was the confirmation that a failure, possibly due to weather, disabled 30 of the 120 lines that make up the 112 emergency telephone line. However, the Generalitat received them near the start of the emergency committee meeting and well before sending the alarm. The volume would have been much higher if it included all the phone calls from citizens who were unable to reach due to the saturation of the lines.

Miguel M.'s statement adds to that of Rodrigo E., the second Emergency Service technician involved in drafting the message, on May 6. During his testimony, to which ARA had access, the Emergency Service worker acknowledged that he did not forward to any senior official the email sent by the Júcar River Confederation (CHX) at 6:43 p.m. warning of the Poio ravine's flooding. They merely "noted" it in the computer system without speaking to anyone specifically.

According to the transcript of his testimony, the technician did not inform his superiors because he lacked knowledge of the hydraulic capacity of rivers and ravines. Therefore, he was not qualified to assess the severity of the figures shown in the CHX email. He also noted that there is no "protocol" for interrupting Cecopio communications. Therefore, he simply logged the warning and focused on "the next step." "We had a very significant amount of work," he added.

Rodrigo E. also confirmed that approximately one hour elapsed between the moment he began considering sending a message and the moment it was sent. Regarding when he learned of the first deaths, Rodrigo E. explained that he does not recall, but that around midnight he received the order to call the director of the Institute of Forensic Medicine to activate the multiple-victim protocol.