The data that suggests Sánchez will be able to reach the end of the legislature
BarcelonaWho knows what the political wish of the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, was while he ate the grapes on New Year's Eve, but it wouldn't be surprising if the verb resist would have appeared (again). In 2025, he has been embroiled in a web of scandals at the head of the Spanish executive: Santos Cerdán and José Luis Ábalos, his right-hand men in leading the PSOE, have gone to prison; his family is under judicial investigation; and numerous other cases of corruption or sexual harassment are making headlines. Parliamentary defeats, often caused by the partners who facilitated his investiture, also added an extra layer of political fragility. The withdrawal of formal support from Junts, the crisis within the Sumar and Podemos coalition, and the failure to honor promises made to his partners have turned every negotiation into a parliamentary battle of attrition.
Given this context, one of the big questions of 2026 is whether President Pedro Sánchez will survive until August 2027, the deadline for calling general elections. The latest polls paint a picture in which the PSOE loses support, but the absolute majority of seats that gave them confidence in 2023 would vanish, mainly due to the decline of Sumar (losing around 16 seats), the meager gains of Podemos (achieving around 3-4 seats), and the rise of Vox (which could double its representation).
Incentives to break the parliamentary majority
Comparative research tells us that, although it may seem paradoxical, minority governments are more common when there is high polarization, a factor that also helps them avoid immediate collapse and endure over time. As the cases of Belgium, Norway, and Denmark illustrate, smaller coalition partners do everything possible to call elections when they conclude that collaborating with the government reduces their electoral support. In other words, when they believe that holding early elections would improve their results. Looking at the polls, these incentives do not appear to exist in the Spanish case. In fact, in the current scenario, formally known as a substantive minority government (in which the government lacks stable support and negotiates legislation on a case-by-case basis), this dilemma is more prevalent than ever, and comparatively, it is rarely the smaller parties outside the government that force an election.
This, however, also has another side to the coin, which puts presidents with the power to call elections (like Felipe González in 1993) in a difficult position. Is it advisable to wait for better times, or should we go to the polls now to mitigate losses and have a chance?
Having passed the midpoint of his term, the end of the tunnel is near.
Approximately 18% of governments in parliamentary democracies are minority coalitions, as in the case of Spain, and 31% are single-party minority governments without an absolute majority of seats (like the PSC in Catalonia). Looking at the trend since 1945, we see that we are in a period where governments fall relatively quickly. On average, in the last five years, executives have survived just over 50% of their term. Minority governments last even less: just over a third of the time they should. However, this average masks considerable variation. The paradigmatic example is Italy, where executives have lasted just over 34% of their term.
Governments with a single party holding an absolute majority tend to last the longest, followed by coalition governments with a majority of seats. Multiparty governments without an absolute majority rarely reach the halfway point of their term. Furthermore, if these governments lack a stable pact with parties outside the executive branch, they serve little more than a third of their allotted time. However, these comparative data also reveal another reality: almost all minority coalition governments that make it past the halfway point manage to complete their term. Sánchez has already served 57% of his term and, therefore, has defied the most pessimistic statistical predictions.
The week's curious chart
Spain, at the bottom of the employment rates
As the baby boomers As people retire, the debate about the sustainability of the pension system intensifies. Spain dedicates 13.5% of its GDP to paying pensions, and this is projected to reach 17% by 2050, the highest figure among OECD countries. The fact that three out of every four euros allocated to pensions come from working people, and that the rest are transfers financed by deficit spending, has opened a Pandora's box of generational conflict. The book "The Cannon Life: The History of Spain Through the Eyes of the BoomersThe article by journalist Analía Plaza is the latest flare-up in this political conflict. However, one of the (traditional) problems of the Spanish economy is that, across all age groups, especially among young people, the employment rate is among the lowest in Western Europe. It's difficult to pay pensions if people aren't working (or earning a decent wage).
