The DANA judge sees "overwhelming evidence" of Pradas' negligence.

ValenciaA new and forceful ruling from the judge investigating the management of the DANA (National Hydrographic Confederation of Júcar Rivers), who considers that the case now contains "overwhelming evidence of negligent conduct" on the part of the former Valencian Minister of Justice and the Interior, Salomé Pradas. This is stated in a ruling made public this Friday, rejecting the dismissal of the proceedings requested by the former PP leader, who had argued that the recent testimony of the president of the Júcar Hydrographic Confederation, Miguel Polo, as a witness, demonstrated that the Generalitat did not have sufficient information to warn the public.

Judge Nuria Ruiz Tobarra justifies her refusal by considering that Pradas is responsible for "gross negligence," not only because of the extremely serious fatal outcome, but also because of the slowness in adopting the measures and their erroneous nature. The judge highlights "the evident delay in calling the Cecopio," the lack of "control of the ravines," and the "unbearable delay in alerting the population."

In her brief, the judge dismantles one by one the exculpatory arguments put forward so far by the former minister. First, she points out that state jurisdiction in emergency management has proven to be "absolutely uncertain." According to the judge, the "nonexistent" Information blackout of the Júcar Hydrographic Confederation (CHX) and the Spanish Meteorological Agency (Aemet) repeatedly denounced by the People's Party (PP), which the Valencia Provincial Court also dismissed. In this regard, she recalls that the Aemet warnings "occurred in several areas and with sufficient advance notice."

To complete her presentation, the judge devotes a large portion of her brief to listing the tools the Generalitat (Catalan Government) had at its disposal to understand the danger of the situation and, consequently, its obligation to warn the public. She emphasizes that, as established by the Valencian Country's Special Flood Plan, the Emergency Department was responsible for coordinating the participation of other agencies. These included the Civil Guard, the forest fire service and police of the Generalitat (Catalan Government), environmental agents, resources from the Preventive Surveillance Service, brigades from the Valencia Provincial Council, and the integrated water cycle services and irrigation communities that inform the city councils. In this same vein, he emphasizes that it was the responsibility of the Generalitat (Catalan government) to "call the various affected populations, to heed media reports, and to analyze the thousands of calls to 112." "Forest firefighters were deployed and then withdrawn. It's difficult to attribute to the CHX (City of Xavier de la Frontera) or its president the withdrawal of firefighters, the failure to control the flooding [of the Poio ravine], and the resulting overwhelming number of deaths," Ruiz Tobarra gives as an example.

A senior official proposed sending the ES-Alert three hours earlier

In parallel with the judge's brief, it was also revealed this Friday that a video of the October 29th emergency committee meeting, recorded by a production company hired by the Generalitat (Catalan government), reveals that at the start of the Cecopio (Cecopio) emergency call (at 5:00 PM), the Deputy Director General of Emergencies, Jorge Suárez, raised the possibility given the critical situation experienced at the time in towns such as Utiel and Requena, affected by the flooding of the Magro River. This witness confirms that the regional government was aware of the dangers of the situation long before the public warning (which was issued at 8:11 PM). This was also suggested by other previous revelations, particularly the fact that from 5:00 PM to 6:00 PM alone, 112 received 2,438 calls from citizens in trouble or who were in danger. Initially, all attention was focused on the possible rupture of the Forata reservoir, which regulates the Magro River. First, they considered confining the population. Then, evacuating it. At 5:45 p.m., they decided to send the ES-Alert, but the Generalitat was not sure what message to send. Concern for the reservoir meant they ignored the Poio ravine and the gullies that flow into it, which were alreadyThey were overflowing from 6 p.m. In Horta Sud, overwhelmed by a large volume of work, the technicians failed to notify their superiors, who were gathered in an adjoining room. At the Cecopio, the department's senior officials were unaware of what was happening until after 7 p.m. when the first images and phone calls from mayors began to arrive. This forced the postponement of sending the alarm—which was still being debated by Emergencies—because it was necessary to expand its radius. Then came the selection of the text, the initiation of the procedure, etc.

The last notable testimony today was the statement of a forestry technician from the Valencia Provincial Fire Consortium who was at the Cecopio and explained that Salomé Pradas was leading the emergency committee meeting and that the head of the Council, Carlos Mazón, was not summoned until he arrived at the committee. He also said that from that moment on, he had the "feeling" that Mazón was taking over.