Pedro Sánchez and the nun's pinches

MadridThe future of Spanish political life is currently being played out in two different scenarios, each with its own rhythms and liturgies, making it difficult to make accurate predictions. The first arena is the judicial and the second, the strictly political. I place justice first because, for now, if Pedro Sánchez's government falls, it will not be due to management problems, serious errors in key economic decisions, or foreign relations. The siege on the executive is not being achieved by the opposition, but by the specialized units for economic crimes of the National Police and the Civil Guard, along with the judges and courts involved in the criminal prosecution of the PSOE. I am not talking about lawfare, but about a de facto situation, in which political events are marked by the content of the police reports and court proceedings.

Consequently, when initiatives arise to try to precipitate the end of the legislature, the main argument of the proponents of these proposals has little to do with the general progress of the country, but rather takes as a starting point the accumulation of criminal cases and accusations against former socialist leaders. For the PP, this reason is more than sufficient. Feijóo describes the PSOE as a rotten political party and Sánchez as the link between the various corruption cases that undermine the credibility of the party that has governed Spain for the most years – almost thirty – since the death of the dictator, General Franco. For many people, it must be difficult to understand how it can be proclaimed that there is a parliamentary majority in favor of Sánchez leaving La Moncloa, while the parties that favor this end of the legislature find themselves unable to oust him.

Certainly, it is a Kafkaesque situation, which has turned any reflection on how to give coherence to what is said and what is done to end the mandate of a leader who is to be removed from power, without causing worse consequences than his permanence, into a puzzle. It reminds me of the first part of criminal law, on extenuating and aggravating circumstances, among which the one of preterintentionality was quite curious. This extenuating circumstance was appreciated when it was considered that the perpetrator of the crime had caused a greater harm than they actually intended to cause. One of the best criminal lawyers in Barcelona in the eighties, Juan Antonio Roqueta, ironically commented on this type of situation, saying that preterintentionality was equivalent to alleging that the perpetrator of a crime "wanted to kill his victim, but only a little bit".

Preterintentionality

What the PP, Vox, and especially Junts are doing is developing strategies of preterintentional political homicide. The first two do not lack the will to end Sánchez's presidency and his entire political career. But they lack sufficient strength. They don't add up, and the PP also doesn't dare to make a decisive move and present a motion of no confidence to urge the rest of the political forces to take a stand. This situation, combined with the rigor of the constitutional provisions on the mechanisms necessary to bring down a government, turns alternative initiatives into a catalog of minor annoyances. For their part, Junts does not want it to be said that their possible support for the nuclear button of censure led to the rise of Vox to power.

The result of this sum of impotence and reservations is the approval of motions like the one that this past week has represented the mere expression of a desire. What has gone through with 177 votes is a declaration in favor of Sánchez's resignation. The text states that the deputies supporting the initiative consider that "the accumulation of investigations into corruption cases" calls for the aforementioned resignation. In another point, it is added that "in the event that he decides not to call elections, Congress urges the President of the Spanish government to consider the opportunity to propose a vote of confidence, in accordance with the prerogative conferred upon him by the Constitution, taking into account the political, non-legally binding nature of the present initiative". As can be seen, this is not a proposal likely to shake any president of the government, especially if he has already said that he has no intention of asking for Parliament's confidence again.

At this point, we can consider whether the Constitution fell short when it designed the mechanisms to end an inoperative, undignified, or simply overwhelmed government by circumstances. But, of course, the fault for this supposed insufficiency does not lie with Parliament, nor even with the parties present in the chamber. These are the current rules of the game. We must adapt. But not chase rainbows. Everyone has a part of the responsibility in this situation where Congress and the Senate are little more than a sounding board for a situation of political and social frustration, in which the demand for responsible actions from one and all does not find efficient response mechanisms.

Some are playing at announcing the presentation of budgets that have had no possibility of being approved for three years, while others are performing spiritualism around round tables where symbolic motions are approved, which the government then throws in the bin without any remorse. To interpret that the voting of initiatives of this kind determines the existence of a majority against the continuity of the government is to delude oneself. What this type of calls for Sánchez to do an harakiri achieves is to give him a new opportunity to cling to his chair, realizing that it is not from the political stage that one works effectively to bring him down.

Something quite different may happen if the Spanish Prime Minister is personally affected by any of the ongoing judicial investigations, or by another new one, not yet known. Feijóo has hinted at it, and there is no shortage of volunteers to spread the word that this risk exists, with the argument that the Plus Ultra case and the investigation into Zapatero as the alleged leader of a corruption network is only a first approximation. But it must be borne in mind that the possible indictment of a sitting president is considerably more complicated than that of a former holder of the same office.