Eleven lies told by Carlos Mazón regarding the management of the DANA storm.

"Everyone was where they were supposed to be," argued the president, who did not arrive at the Cecopio until 7:30 p.m.

The president of the Valencian Generalitat, Carlos Mazón, during his official visit to Paiporta, which ended with boos and mud being thrown. CARLOS LUJÁN / EUROPA PRESS
Upd. 14
5 min

BarcelonaA year after the devastating storm, President Carlos Mazón has still not clarified the details of his controversial handling of the most virulent storm to hit the Valencian Community this century, which left more than 200 dead. Details about his actions on the day of the storm are still emerging piecemeal and often contradict previously reported information.

1.

Mazón reportedly accompanied Vilaplana in the parking lot

As reported this SundayThe LevanteAnd ARA confirmed that, after having lunch with journalist Maribel Vilaplana at the El Ventorro restaurant, when the catastrophic storm was already causing havoc, the head of the Consell did not say goodbye to the journalist at the same establishment, as had been initially reported: I would have accompanied him to a parking lot where she had parked her car. This occurred at 6:45 p.m. The new version of events in Mazón comes after this SaturdayEldiario.esandThe CountryThey will publish, based on witnesses, that after finishing lunch with Vilaplana, the Valencian president went home, instead of being at the Palau de la Generalitat to follow the evolution of the emergency.

2.

"Everyone here was doing their job. Everyone was where they were supposed to be."

The president maintains that he was where he should have been during the storm. But the facts contradict him. Mazón did not cancel any events on his schedule on Tuesday, October 29, even though the first alert had come on October 25. At nine in the morning, Mazón presided over the plenary session of the Consell (Island Council). Afterward, he accepted a sustainable tourism award—a photograph of him biting the prize remains—and then met with unions and employers' associations. At midday, he went to lunch with journalist Maribel Vilaplana. This lunch lasted until 6:45 p.m., and he did not go to the Integrated Operational Coordination Center (CECOPI) in Eliana until 8:28 p.m., even though the meeting had been scheduled for 5:00 p.m. When he arrived, with the situation already completely out of control, the technicians had to brief him.

3.

"I went to a private luncheon"

The Valencian president and his team avoided revealing with whom he had lunch on October 29th, but after a few days Mazón simply stated that it was a "private" lunch. On Thursday, November 7th, he changed his story, saying it was a "working lunch," without specifying the details. The following day, several media outlets revealed that had eaten with Vilaplana According to the Presidency's version of events, the meeting was to offer him the directorship of À Punt. In any case, this "working lunch" was not on an agenda that was blank after the meeting with unions and business leaders. In fact, the president of the Valencian employers' association, Salvador Navarro, revealed another contradiction: he explained that he met with the government at 1:45 p.m., not at 3:00 p.m. as the Generalitat had stated.

4.

"I didn't receive the minister's calls because there was no coverage in Cecopio."

Mazón attributed Minister Teresa Ribera's failed attempts to contact them to a lack of coverage at the Cecopio (the regional emergency response center). Ribera explained that she called him up to three times without receiving a response, and Mazón, who had initially denied receiving any calls from her, accused her of "manipulating" the situation by providing a text message from the minister received at 8:20 p.m.

The lack of coverage at the Cecopio (Center for Coordination and Prevention of Mass Disasters) is called into question by the statements of the Minister of Justice and the Interior, Salomé Pradas, who spoke with Mazón from that center at 5:37 p.m. to inform him that the situation had worsened. "I was kept fully informed on Tuesday, despite the significant communication disruption we faced because the main telephone terminals were already starting to go down," said the president, although service did not fail in the city of Valencia. It is true, however, that in some recently released recordings The footage shows Mazón, upon arriving at the Cecopio (the central communications center), explaining to Pradas that he was having coverage problems. However, according to sources from the ministry headed by Teresa Ribera, the now former minister tried to contact Mazón between 7:48 p.m. and 8:17 p.m., when Mazón was not yet at the Cecopio, where he arrived at 8:28 p.m.

5.

"It is a standardized system coordinated by the Civil Protection agency of the Spanish government."

Carlos Mazón blamed the Moncloa Palace for not sending mobile alerts in advance through the Directorate General of Civil Protection. The Ministries of the Interior and Ecological Transition reminded him that the management of civil protection plans is "exclusive competence of the communities"Mazón defended the fact that the Generalitat followed all protocols: "It is a protocolized system coordinated by the Civil Protection of the Spanish government," said the president.

6.

"We asked the Spanish government for help from the beginning."

The Spanish government delegate, Pilar Bernabé, called Pradas three times on the morning of October 29, in her capacity as the political head of Emergency Services, before requesting the intervention of the Military Emergency Unit (UME) due to the rising waters of the Magro River near Utiel and the forecast of torrential downpours. However, The Generalitat did not request the assistance of the UME until 3:21 p.m.and only in Utiel and later in Requena. The request for assistance from the UME for the rest of the province of Valencia was not made until 8 p.m.

7.

"Once the activation of the UME has been requested, it is not necessary for any regional government to request further reinforcements."

Mazón insists that this unit operates independently. The head of the UME denied this: "At alert level 2, the regional government is in charge of the emergency response. I cannot enter until the Generalitat's director of emergencies authorizes me." Mazón contradicted himself on November 1st: "As we update the needs assessment, we request additional resources," he admitted in a press conference in which he ended up requesting more military personnel and resources from the Spanish government.

8.

"When the hydrological alert is activated first thing in the morning, it is then deactivated three times. And it's not until 6:45 p.m. (...) that they say everything has changed."

The Júcar River Basin Authority (CHX) maintains that it regularly provided "objective measurement data." CHX reiterated that its role is to inform, not to issue alerts. To support its claim, the ministry presented a statement detailing the hourly updates it provided to the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center). In fact, at 6:43 p.m., the Emergency Services were aware of the sudden increase in flow in the Poio ravine, but did not issue a hydrological alert, unlike what they had done at 12:20 p.m.

9.

"When we were informed of the possible breach of the Forata dam, that's when we decided to send the alert."

Mazón has attempted to link the delayed issuance of the alert to the situation at the Forata intake, about which the Ebro River Basin Authority (CHX) had already been reporting since the start of the emergency response at 5:00 PM. In any case, sending alerts is not within the CHX's purview. Furthermore, when the Generalitat (Valencian regional government) sent the alert to mobile phones at 8:11 PM, it contained incorrect information. It requested that people avoid travel, but not that they stay at home and in higher areas, as a second message at 8:57 PM did.

10.

"The forecasts we gave early this morning did not foresee the subsequent meteorological upheaval."

Mazón attributed the storm's devastation to a "major meteorological upheaval" that was difficult to predict, but there had been prior storm warnings and real-time information, and Aemet (the Spanish State Meteorological Agency) had already issued an alert at 7:30 a.m. "The red alert was in place, regardless of what happened later. And that means taking significant measures in all the affected regions, especially in flood-prone areas or those near rivers, streams, torrents, or ravines," says Xavi Segura, a meteorologist with the ARA (Valencian Regional Government). Mazón even appeared at 1:00 p.m. to announce that from 6:00 p.m. onward, the storm would spread and "move toward the mountainous area of Cuenca." The Generalitat (Valencian regional government) published the video on social media, but deleted it when the situation spiraled out of control.

11.

"Thanks to the activation of the red alert, we notified all the municipalities."

The Valencian president insists that at 7:30 a.m. on Tuesday, October 29, the 112 emergency services issued a red alert and that "thanks to this foresight," the town councils were able to warn residents and suspend classes. This version differs greatly from that given by the mayors of the municipalities most devastated by the storm. These mayors have complained about the lack of information from the Emergency Services, which prevented them from reacting in time to warn residents, as they were only advised to stay away from the streams.

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