Catalonia 2025: Where are we?

BarcelonaIf a decade ago, on September 11th before the so-called plebiscite elections, the leaders of the Process had been explained how the film they were just beginning to play would end, they probably would have thought twice about starting that roadmap. We will never know if, had a time machine allowed them to see the Catalonia of 2025, they would have made the same decisions they made on the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th... The reality of the Principality, ten years later, is very different from what it was a decade ago: 2015 bears no resemblance to the composition of the Catalan chamber today. Now, there is no pro-independence majority in the Parliament, and it has been a year since Salvador Illa's government, which has pulled the PSC (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) out of its lowest ebb and flow to occupy power in the country's main institutions, from the Palau de la Generalitat (the Catalan Government's Palace)—for the first time alone—to Barcelona City Hall. What Gabriel Rufián said in Madrid ("in eighteen months I'll leave my seat" to return to the Catalan Republic) is a distant memory now that Junts and Esquerra hold the key to governability in Spain. What's more, now that the two main pro-independence parties have become a new driving force for state reform, thanks to the PSOE and Sumar. A political framework that resembles Jordi Pujol's early years of the hatching of fish than Pasqual Maragall's attempt to reform the Statute of Autonomy and the one that followed.

A return to the classics

In this context, the day of this September 11th, the national day, inevitably has a different tone than in recent years: the main pro-independence entities –ANC, Òmnium and the Council of the Republic– have called for a demonstration for the state itself in Barcelona, ​​​​Girona and Tortosa, but in a context of demobilization –"the independence movement is in depression, in an interview in the ARA– and at a time when the slogan is no longer "Free path to the Catalan Republic", as in 2015, but "More reasons than ever".

And the fact is that the entire independence movement, and that includes civil entities, has returned to the classicsAfter unsuccessfully attempting to jump the wall, they once again placed the situation of Catalan and the grievances they believe the Principality faces in being part of the State at the center of attention, and denounced deficits in infrastructure, funding, and powers. They have returned to the traditional demands of Catalanism, something that has also brought a segment of the independence movement—Esquerra—closer to the PSC. A PSC, on the other hand, which, despite aligning itself with the PP and Ciutadans during the Process in moments of greatest tension, has also repositioned itself on the political scene.

This is evident in the speech this Wednesday by the president of the Generalitat, which also featured the ingredients of traditional Catalanism: "Strengthen our culture and our language," said Illa, who also reaffirmed his commitment to "continue fully deploying the powers" that correspond to Catalonia. A way of seeking the "center" to gain a stronghold in the Generalitat. In fact, the prevailing tone in Catalan politics is far from the daily heat of Madrid. Issues that had been neglected for years have found their way into public debate: housing, security, and immigration emerge as the main concerns of Catalans.

The key to the state

The most illustrative example of this shift in the independence movement's agenda is its role in Madrid. To be precise, both Junts and Esquerra have linked the pillars of their political discourse to what happens in the state legislature and the concessions Pedro Sánchez might make, facing a constant impasse due to the right and the top leadership of the judiciary—the independence movement is no longer the main target of the state powers—but also due to his actions in Congress regarding the reduction of the working day. With the amnesty already approved—but still pending full implementation, especially with regard to the return of former President Carles Puigdemont—the main battleground for Oriol Junqueras's party is the new financing model, while Junts has made the official status of Catalan in Europe and immigration powers its most immediate aspirations.

The evolution of these demands – in addition to the return of Puigdemont, which will be key for Spanish and Catalan politics – will determine the state budget and the viability of Pedro Sánchez in the Moncloa, despite the fact that the head of the Spanish executive assures that he will remain until 2027.

The peculiarity of this change of agenda within the sovereignty movement is that both parties have done so with the same leaders at the helm, both renewed in recent months as captains of their political organizations. Junqueras with an internal dissidence in hibernation – after winning a fratricidal war against the Roviristas– and Carles Puigdemont, with a party well aligned with his leadership but with high-profile departures, such as that of former minister Jaume Giró – illustrating the latent discontent among the party's most pragmatic sector. The CUP has renewed its leadership, but is immersed in a debate about its role.

The far right

But the Catalonia of 2025, which already has more than 8 million inhabitants, is not only different from that of 2015 due to the change in majorities in Parliament and the political agenda, but also due to the emergence of new actors who, given the international context and the demographic reality, are on the rise: the consolidation of the Spanish far-right and the pro-independence far-right of the Catalan Alliance in Parliament with two seats. This emergence changes the balance of power in the independence movement. The most palpable evidence of this new scenario is Silvia Orriols' decision to attend the ANC demonstration. It remains to be seen how the protesters react after their first appearance at the Fossar de les Moreres square on Wednesday, without incident, in contrast to Oriol Junqueras's "personal" decision not to attend.

The Catalan Alliance not only contaminates the discourse of sovereignty with ethnicist rhetoric—which its leaders tried to reduce to a minimum during the Process—and anti-immigration rhetoric, which until now had not had a voice in that ideological spectrum, unlike unionism, which already had Vox. The existence of the ultra-right wing within the movement also makes it difficult to forge pacts between sovereigntists. The more force Sílvia Orriols has, the more unviable a pro-independence majority in Parliament will be, since so far neither Junts, nor ERC, nor the CUP have shown themselves to be in favor of reaching an agreement. However, the acid test on this point will be above all for Junts, as it was for the PP in Spain, which opted to reach an agreement with Vox; or for the CDU in Germany, which has chosen to isolate the AfD. With the Catalan Alliance making inroads into its electorate—according to polls, Junts would be the hardest hit, although it would also attract voters from ERC and CUP—the municipal elections will be the litmus test for Carles Puigdemont's party. First, to gauge whether they remain strong in their main strongholds; and second, because they will have to decide whether or not to reach agreements with Silvia Orriols. And, on this, mayors, councilors, and deputies have diverging opinions.

The Catalonia of 2025 is different from that of a decade ago, despite the fact that the cocktail that led to the revolt that was the Process—the lack of funding, the infrastructure deficit, and the poor health of the Catalan language—is still very much in evidence.