An advisor to Pradas says the alert was sent late because of a discussion between technicians at Cecopio.
He argues that the former councilor played a "very active" role and that she was asking for swift action.
ValenciaA Civil Protection Coordination Center (CECOPIO) that was launched after deaths had already occurred in several towns, a Minister of Justice and the Interior trying to contact a Valencian president who preferred to have a nearly four-hour lunch, and, in addition, a lengthy "discussion" between the Deputy Director General of Emergencies, Jorge Suárez, and the then-head of the Provincial Fire Consortium, José Miguel. These are three of the reasons for the delayed deployment of the ES-Alert on October 29, 2024, in the Valencian Community. This was confirmed on Friday by a new witness in the investigation into the DANA storm. The witness is Marco Presa, who was responsible for recording videos for the social media accounts of former Minister Salomé Pradas. According to eyewitnesses, Presa explained that he witnessed an argument between Suárez and Basset, and that Basset said he "didn't know what message to send. He would suggest something else, and it would be countered."
The advisor's account coincides with that of Pradas and Argüeso – the only two defendants – who have always placed the blame on the two high-ranking officials. According to Presa, the former councilor played a "very active" role, noting everything in a notebook and demanding swift action. "She always said 'it has to be sent,'" he asserted. He also explained that the debate on the ES-Alert took place in the Cecopio meeting room without the participation of either the Spanish government delegate, Pilar Bernabé, or the president of the Júcar River Basin Authority, Miguel Polo. Both attended the meeting remotely.
The spokesperson confirmed that Pradas and Argüeso were in contact with the Presidency of the Generalitat, although he said he was unaware of the phone calls between the former councilor and Carlos Mazón. However, he explained that at one point in the afternoon, the two high-ranking officials got up due to "a matter concerning the Presidency," without being able to elaborate further.
Presa acknowledged that he was surprised by the "delay" in sending the ES-Alert, because the head of press for the Emergency Service, Aurora Roca, had sent the text to him. 6:59 p.m. in a WhatsApp message. He also confirmed that at the start of the Cecopio meeting, around 5:15 p.m., Jorge Suárez explained the existence of this tool to alert the public, an option also emphasized by Miguel Polo, who before 6:00 p.m. had already requested the dissemination of the ES-Alert – the message was not sent until 2011. However, Presa denied knowing who proposed disseminating the alert. "I understand it was a technician," he replied, although he indicated that the final content was agreed upon by Basset, Suárez, and Roca.
From 5:00 p.m. to 8:11 p.m.
According to the reconstruction of events that allowed the magistrate to compile her investigation, initially, all attention at the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center) was focused on the potential breach of the Forata reservoir, which regulates the Magro River. The first thought was to confine the population. Then, to evacuate them. At 6:36 p.m., the decision was made to send the ES-Alert (Emergency Alert System). The concern about the reservoir led to the neglect of the Poio ravine and its tributaries, which had been overflowing since 5:00 p.m. This oversight occurred despite the fact that, between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. alone, the 112 emergency services received 2,438 calls alerting them to the situation. Overwhelmed, the technicians failed to notify their superiors of the fatal overflow of the ravine, which the River Basin Authority had also warned them about via email at 6:43 p.m. – this information is also available online in real time – nor did they adequately assess the rainfall data. The arrival at 7 p.m. of the first images and phone calls from mayors regarding the overflowing of the Poio ravine delayed the sending of the alert because it was necessary to broaden its reach. Then came the time to choose the new text, a moment in which Suárez and Basset debated extensively about the suitability, content, and geographical scope of the message. Afterward, the procedure had to be implemented, and so on. Finally, the alert was broadcast at 8:11 p.m.
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