Another world was possible, yes, but not the one expected. Instead of a more just and free world, more prosperous and at peace, this second quarter of the 21st century opens up a harsher, more threatening, even wilder one. The images of a chainsaw to illustrate a policy of administrative reform, that of a resort The threat of a luxury tourist project to "pacify" the Gaza Strip or the threat of a plundering of natural resources to compensate for the weapons sent to Ukraine to defend its sovereignty, are devastating for any minimum moral and democratic conscience.
Europe and the rest of the world do not invite optimism either. The growth of the extreme right, the harmful ideological influence of the extreme left, and even the scheming role of what we could also call the extreme center, besides being dangerous, is deeply disappointing. And neither in Latin America, nor in the Arab world, nor in China, India or Africa are there signs of a political intelligence whose leadership invites us to confront this other possible world, but which has veered in the exact opposite direction to that desired.
And yet, not all is lost. But to see it, it is necessary to look to the future and not focus on the latest outburst or the latest criminal barbarity. I am sure that the present that has us desolate now does not in any way foreshadow the future that will result. The current moral devastation in global politics should not lead to a catastrophism that can leave us trapped. Quite the contrary. From my point of view, it would be good to take into account three considerations that can offer a more hopeful look at a more edifying future.
First of all, we must not lose sight of the fact that this is an extremely unstable world. I do not know how long the madness will last or how much damage it will do, but it is an accidental period, led by characters with unbalanced minds, with gestures that are more histrionic than effective, deeply inconsistent, that will not last nor will they have a replacement at the level of their megalomania. I would not be surprised at all if they ended up having tragic endings. How long will the coincidence of interests between Trump and Musk last, competing for who says it and makes it bigger? Should it be scary that Trump's Spanish hope is called Abascal, or should it make you laugh? Can Trump's understanding with Putin be solid, and where will the dispute with China take him?
In Europe, the fragility of extreme positions may not be so evident – yet – and even less so when their electoral growth suggests otherwise. The German AfD can aspire to be the leading force in 2027. And in Catalonia, the Catalan Alliance can dream of a large representation in 2028. But we already have experience of how reactive political movements die in Catalonia: the one who was the leading political force in 2017 is no longer a success. How long will Meloni, Le Pen, Weidel and, sorry, Orriols last? They are organisations and discourses that withstand their extreme nature well, but as they abandon it to get closer to effective power, their contradictions grow. If they live off instability, won’t that same instability be what will take them away?
Secondly, this world can only be fought by thinking about it with new schemes, with new concepts. The categories with which we have responded to the current threats have not stopped them politically. Nor have the media battles been effective. Clinging to the old words that have allowed them to be born and grow is paving the way for them. We know the uselessness of cordons sanitaires that, rather than excluding the parties in question, belittle the citizens who vote for them. And when the extreme right is frivolously linked to conservative parties for electoral calculations – it has happened in Germany, and it is happening in Spain and Catalonia – it does nothing but whitewash them. This execrable new world, profoundly unstable, must be thought of with new ideas that are up to the challenges it claims to want to resolve.
Finally, it seems obvious to me that we will only emerge from this disaster with democratic radicalism. On the one hand, because we have ended up precisely because of the democratic weakness to which we had become accustomed and which has caused so much anti-political distrust. And on the other, because responding to the threat we speak of – on the right, left and centre – in an authoritarian manner would do nothing but legitimise the strategies that are those of the adversary. We must analyse this new world critically, without concessions, rather than demonising it by the easy way. We must understand the reasons for the current popular support rather than condemn it without listening to it. And much more self-criticism is needed and not so many efforts at self-exculpation. Only in this way will we accelerate the awakening from this nightmare.
