Venezuela: Are you sure it's oil?
At Saturday's press conference, President Trump was quick to assert that the profits from the oil market would be sufficient to offset the cost of a military intervention in Venezuela and that American companies would clearly benefit. However, despite the rhetoric—and the seizure of ships carrying crude oil—a closer look at the facts reveals significant inconsistencies in the president's argument. First, the oil companies themselves quickly expressed their doubts. Modernizing facilities severely deteriorated by extracting heavy, dense, high-sulfur crude requires substantial investment. Such operations are only profitable if accompanied by strong guarantees of political and legal stability—conditions that are currently lacking. Furthermore, Venezuelan crude is not considered a critical or essential asset for the global energy supply. The United States has sufficient domestic production and guaranteed access to both Canadian and Arabian Peninsula oil. In fact, the collective intelligence of financial markets seems to have reached a similar conclusion: in the last week, oil prices have remained virtually stable, without significant upward or downward pressure.
On the other hand, what has experienced a notable increase are the prices of assets linked to rare earth elements and strategic metals. Venezuela is also rich in these raw materials, key to the technology and military industries. And here the central question arises: who currently controls these supply chains? The answer is China, which enjoys a virtual monopoly in this area. It is also significant that in April 2025, at the height of the trade crisis, Beijing strengthened controls on rare earth exports as a means of exerting pressure against the tariffs imposed by the US. This context, coupled with China's potential alliances with Russia and Iran's involvement in Venezuela, offers a much more plausible explanation for US geopolitical interest.
China absorbs 80% of Venezuela's total oil exports. But its dependence is more financial than operational. Since 2007, the China Development Bank has injected more than $60 billion into Venezuela through a financing system based on future oil deliveries. By the end of 2025, the outstanding debt was around $18 billion. If the flow of oil barrels to China stops, the debt remains uncollectible.
If it were confirmed that controlling oil is not as profitable as Trump maintains, it could benefit the Spanish company with the most interests in Venezuela: Repsol. The company still holds stakes in two joint ventures and in the first half of last year was forced to record losses of €252 million following the revocation by the US of its license to operate in Venezuela, which prevented it from continuing to collect the debt through oil deliveries. Like China, but on a smaller scale. Lifting these restrictions would open the door to normalizing the situation, even if it means going through the American filter.
