Just in the last ten days, we've learned of the creation of three new political parties in countries we consider "consolidated democracies." The first is in France. François Ruffin has announced the creation of the Debout! party. He comes from the radical left, has been linked to Jean-Luc Mélenchon's La France Insoumise, and positions himself between it and the likely Social Democratic candidate, Raphaël Glucksmann. The second is in the United Kingdom. Jeremy Corbin, former leader of the Labour Party and particularly critical of the current Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, is forming a new party with a group of MPs gathered under the name Independent Alliance. To complete the picture, in the United States, Elon Musk—who was expected to end up in a bloodbath with Donald Trump—has just announced his new party, America. And this is just a small, early glimpse of what's to come.
All these movements show the extent to which the classic political coordinates by which the electorate recognized itself are changing, as well as the attempts to find new points of reference with which the current grumpy citizen could be identified. The lack of response from the traditional parties to the new challenges, aside from the mistakes made, is glaring. And above all, there are the changes in the social composition of the electorate, both in their fears and their aspirations, which have disrupted the maps of political representation, dismantled conventional narratives, and plunged the party system into total disarray.
In Catalonia, the aspiration for independence has already caused a radical mutation of the political landscape. I am referring to the disbandment of the old Catalanism of the PSC (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party); the relatively fleeting, but absolutely lethal, appearance of the anti-Catalanism of Ciutadans (Citizens); the setbacks in the Comunes (Comuns) space; the loss of the CUP's political charisma; the shake-up of the old Convergència (Convergence) party and the glassy, unfinished traffic of Junts (Junts); and even the progressive loss of an identifiable profile of ERC (Republic of Catalonia), which has gone from the failed expansion of its base to handing the presidency of Catalonia to the most autonomist socialist party of all time. And, of course, not to be outdone in the rest of the world, we must reckon with the emergence of the Catalan Alliance, as threatening as it is uncertain of its future. This is the current map, but now, without a clear pro-independence challenge, it has once again become unbalanced.
As things stand, the voter in Catalonia can certainly choose between the stability currently offered by a government with, for the moment, only supposed management capacity—whatever that may be!—and a loyalty that can only be blind to the now hesitant and confused profiles of the old parties. Therefore, it is an electorate that is, at best, expectant and waiting for the next ruptures, disaffections, and new and uncertain adventures. And of course, in these circumstances, voting intention surveys that fail to take into account the fickle and unstable nature of the political scene only add confusion to the current chaos.
I began the article by mentioning the emergence of new parties, an unequivocal sign of a profound change in the old coordinates and the search for new reference points. However, I have the impression that they want to put new wine in old bottles. It won't work. As in the Spanish case, where the pharisaical debate about corruption—it's obvious that the PP can't be the one to give lessons in alternative exemplarity to the PSOE—cannot hide the underlying keys to the political crisis in which the system will remain trapped. In Catalonia, there's an unstable framework of political dependence that makes everything more complex, true. But it would be a mistake to ignore many of the general circumstances affecting our entire environment. Moreover, as I wrote at the time, the independence process was also possible within the framework of the general political crisis. It was never—and is not—a merely internal matter.
In conclusion, the political landscape in most Western countries, and especially ours, is once again extraordinarily open and unstable. What will remain of the current socialist government in a Spanish framework governed by the PP? What will ERC and Junts do in the face of the impossible fulfillment of government pacts here and there? Where will Junts end up when it realizes that the return of President Puigdemont isn't having the expected restorative effects? And so on, everything else. However, I don't think we should expect a new political map or a new framework in the medium term. A new model of political decision-making will emerge, without a map and with citizens guided only by a browser with an algorithm designed specifically for each new election. This also applies to the independence movement.
