The future of a disastrous present

I think we would soon agree that the world, not just Europe, is going through a difficult time. It's not just the shaking of the stock markets, the stagnation of certain conflicts, or a combination of other specific things, but rather a widespread collective mood that has reacted with reasonable calls for hope but also with apocalyptic visions. Popper believed that it's dangerous to aspire to a perfect world, but entirely legitimate to pretend that what we have isn't so imperfect. An open society must embrace the tensions inherent in its complex and heterogeneous nature—its imperfection—otherwise it would cease to be open. In the United States, there has been a heated debate in recent years around issues related to the family model, the scope and limits of the state, migratory flows, etc. We already know the outcome of all this: the clear victory of Donald Trump. The immediate consequences of this victory are also known: the tariff war, for example, is causing a significant financial shock. The most difficult thing to predict, obviously, are the long-term effects of all this. I don't believe in futurology, but I have a certain confidence in foresight, that is, in the reasoned analysis of different future scenarios. In this case, there are at least three.

In the first instance, the impact generated by the Trump administration's erratic decisions is only being redirected toward normalcy, inertially, both in terms of international policy and in terms of internal institutional frameworks in the United States. Crises have existed throughout history, and in most cases—not always, of course—they have accommodated themselves to the limits imposed by reality itself, whether economic or otherwise. I mean, for example, the tariff fever is fine as a joke or as a primary demonstration of imperial dominance, but it has a limited run. If això fos així, the frenètics cops of Trump's steering wheel will not only not report in cap guany, but will greatly erode his mandate (60% of the North-Americans have a good part of his seus invested in stock). companies that impose conditions on six exports and many other sectors (some of which, such as farmers, voted for him massively) are beginning to mobilize.

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In a second possible scenario, the tariff policy, administrative reforms restricting social spending, and even the culture wars associated with his electoral victory would create a tense climate at first, but politically manageable in the medium and long term. It is likely that this normalization of the rupture he himself has orchestrated is also part of his calculations, if they exist. The domestic political debate and international political tension would continue, of course, but Trump would find himself in an advantageous position. Victory would actually consist of having imposed a new political agenda, a new language, and a new style that would then become institutionally "normal," or at least acceptable.

There is a third scenario that goes beyond, much further than, mere normalization. In this case, the measures implemented so far would bear fruit, that is, the tariff war, the administrative restructuring measures, the part pris In certain international conflicts or internal culture wars, they would represent a clear and tangible success. It is likely that in this case, and only in this case, a maneuver to perpetuate power would occur that would substantially change the nature of American democracy and, indirectly, the red lines of what would be considered politically tolerable in the West in matters of international politics. In such a scenario, the rules of the game would be altered, with unforeseeable consequences.

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I think all three of these scenarios are possible. The third is perhaps the most unlikely. The first is also, although it's what I personally would prefer. The idea of standardization Unfortunately, the one that seems most plausible to me in the long term is a language and a style. Social media, generative artificial intelligence, the docility of some intellectuals, and the tangle of economic inertia will do the rest. Remember that this is only an exercise in foresight, not futurology, and I would be immensely happy if I were wrong.