The Dividing Line and the Transition
Whether or not the current legislature runs its course, Spanish politics is already anticipating the next general elections. I reflect on two related aspects that will significantly influence them: the rise—or fall—of Vox, and the continued relevance of the Catalan issue in the general Spanish debate.
Vox has Spanish roots. The nostalgia for Francoism among some older generations, its idealization by some young people, and the territorial model as an obsession. But it also draws from a global wave deeply hostile to democracy and supranational sovereignties. If these forces prevail in Europe—that is, if, in addition to Italy, they enter or influence the governments of France, Poland, and Spain—it will be the end of the European project for one—or perhaps two—generations. The failure will be sealed by a defeat in Ukraine, blessed with a fraternal embrace from Putin and Trump. But I think it is this international connection that can help contain Vox. Its alignment with Trump is its weak point. It is not credible that a Trump who wants to destroy the EU would respect the sovereignty of European states. Nationalist voters who might vote for Vox will hardly feel comfortable with a political option that offers them the chance to be Trump's subjects. If the PP plays its cards right—if it confronts Vox and stops pandering to them—these voters could be theirs.
Seen from Catalonia, the continued relevance of the Catalan issue in the general Spanish debate is disheartening. In 2017, my hope was that if, for two terms, we had governments in Catalonia pragmatic enough to learn from the experience of the Process that we had to proceed with caution, the Catalan issue would lose its centrality and become a minor topic in the electoral contest, simply because its impact on votes throughout Spain would be minimal. I believe we have had these pragmatic governments and that, overall, they have acted prudently. But even so, we'll be back in the next elections. The PP—following the lead of Vox and Ayuso—hasn't been able to resist opposing Sánchez's government by attacking any measure that would satisfy Catalan demands, even if, as in the case of the financing model, they were very favorable to the autonomous communities they govern. They think, and they may be right, that this wins them votes, more than they lose in Catalonia. We'll see in the elections.
Having registered this rock-solid and likely majority opinion regarding Catalonia in Spain, I ask myself: how is it possible that we have a Generalitat with a degree of self-government that doesn't satisfy us, but is greater than what this majority would like and than what we had during the Republic? It must be because these things only happen in extraordinary circumstances. The Transition period, following the end of Franco's regime, was a time when these extraordinary circumstances existed. They didn't exist, however, during the Process, despite a popular push comparable to or even greater than that of the Transition. I fear that polarization has led a segment of the left and Catalan nationalism to undervalue the Transition. In light of the present, it seems clear to me that, in the negotiations between those who wanted to hold back—Armada's people—and those who wanted far-reaching changes, a balance was reached that opened a period of democratic progress in Spain and progress in self-government in Catalonia. Today, Armada's heirs are gaining strength, and I believe the sensible policy is to try to establish a dividing line that is not between right and left, but, again, between Armada's heirs and the heirs of those who made the Transition possible. This line unequivocally leaves Vox on the other side. It also leaves a part—which I cannot quantify but is far from the whole—of the PP on the other side. I think it would be wise, between now and the elections, to make strengthening this line the guiding principle of policy. What will we gain from promoting agendas or actions that increase the likelihood of Vox being in government? If things go badly and we enter a difficult period, there will, sooner or later, be a resumption. Who will remember then the small tactical victories or defeats generated by electoral competition with neighboring political groups? A job well done in government is more likely to be remembered. That is what should motivate us now.
I have referred to Vox, but not to Aliança Catalana. This is not a danger to democracy. It is simply irrelevant to everything, except for Catalan nationalism. The "alone, pure, and few" mentality is a mortal danger.