The dangers of Catalanism's 'demographic' shift

For some time now, Catalan nationalists have been talking less and less about sovereignty and more about "demography," which in most cases is a euphemism for "immigration." Within the Catalan nationalist community, a diagnosis has become increasingly popular that identifies the strong demographic growth of recent years as the source of many of the social, cultural, and national problems facing Catalonia.

At the origin of this shift demographic From Catalanism, I would dare say that there is a hard-to-digest defeat. The frustration at not having achieved independence in 2017 has had several ramifications, this being the latest reverberation. In just a few years, mainstream Catalanism has gone from contesting power in the state to entering a phase of rather defensive withdrawal, in which Catalan identity as a powerful and ambitious future project has given way to lament over excessive population growth.

This demographic shift is present, in one form or another, and with very different declinations, in discourses across the ideological spectrum of sovereignty. The left focuses above all on the economic model, the radical right of Aliança presents it in xenophobic terms, and the center-right of Junts strives to strike a balance, as do almost all parties of its ideological family in Europe. However, it must be clear: while all these discourses address the same issue, they are radically different from each other. Trying to conflate them may be tempting for political gain, but it's intellectually dishonest.

In any case, it is necessary to begin to debate the substance of some of the premises—explicit or implicit—of the demographic shift in Catalanism. This is due, to the outset, to the fact that some of these discourses contain very reasonable elements. It is reasonable to question a model of economic growth based on low-productivity sectors, which relies entirely on total GDP growth and the stagnation of per capita GDP (as Jordi Galí explained in that same newspaper a few months ago). It's also reasonable to call for limits on the tourism industry, because it generates enormous negative externalities. It's also more than reasonable to consider the limits of public services that are under enormous pressure to serve an ever-increasing and complex population, within a framework of chronic austerity and underfunding that, so far, no one has managed to reverse. And finally, it's reasonable to consider the political consequences, in the form of the rise of the far right, that the interaction of migratory flows with inequalities, the loss of purchasing power of wages, the sclerosis of public services, and the abandonment of parts of the country have throughout Europe. For all these reasons, appeals celebrating or claiming 10 million inhabitants as a national goal are, at best, frivolous.

That said, there are many elements in the demographic shift of Catalanism that need to be critically questioned. First, any discourse that focuses on people, suggesting that there are too many people here, ends up feeding, directly or indirectly, the radical right. Sahra Wagenknecht's failed experiment, which proposed a shift in discourse similar to the German left and ended up out of the game and swelled the AfD, is a precedent for anticipating what will happen here if this path continues, as the polls suggest.

Second, the discourse articulated around the demographic shift is based on a vast simplification of the question of Catalonia's productive model, presenting it as if it were a kind of five-year plan that the Generalitat can make and undo at will. The reality, in a capitalist economy like ours, is that (unfortunately) public authorities have a real but limited influence in defining the productive model in the face of market forces. And, in any case, Catalan institutions have very limited scope for action compared to state and European institutions. This is, at least for the sovereignist left, a reality that needs to be transformed, but never ignored.

Third, the demographic shift also stems from a very simplified analysis of the causes of migratory flows. To understand why so many people have come to live in Catalonia, we must consider both the country's multiple pull factors (jobs, security, stable institutions, public services, climate, networks, etc.) and the factors that push migrants to leave their countries (poverty, violence, repression, etc.). A timid modulation of one of the pull factors (by reducing labor demand) would have a temporary and limited effect at best.

Furthermore, evidence shows that border closure policies are more symbolic—to please voters—than effective: they may temporarily reduce arrivals, but in the long term, the other factors end up prevailing. What these policies do do is greatly worsen the living conditions of migrants, increase deaths on migration routes, reduce seasonal migration and return flows, and cause peaks in arrivals just before border closures.

Fourthly, the discourse of the demographic shift forgets that a productive model that generates quality jobs and a high value-added economy, such as the one that exists, for example, in a good part of Barcelona (or in Sant Cugat), also attracts qualified immigration from rich countries: these are the so-called expats. And from what we observe, the linguistic and cultural effects of this immigration are equal to or worse than those of working-class immigration, because they have fewer incentives to settle, and their children are often segregated in international schools.

Fifth, it also simplifies the effects of immigration on the language. The arrival of non-Catalan-speaking populations reduces the presence of Catalan in relative terms, but at the same time increases its absolute number of speakers. Although only a minority of newcomers adopt the language, with immigration and their offspring, Catalan incorporates thousands of new speakers. And although the percentage of speakers is a crucial factor, the absolute number is also critical for the medium- and long-term viability of a language and culture, determining, for example, its presence in the cultural and technological industries.

In fact, we must consider the second- and third-order effects. In the hypothesis of a Catalonia without immigration, the most likely scenario would be an accelerated aging society, which would enter a spiral of loss of dynamism, economic and cultural decline, and emigration of young natives. Such a country would quickly lose its creative and cultural vitality. This would condemn Catalan culture to sclerosis and folklorization.

Furthering this demographic shift represents a profound break with the majority historical tradition of Catalanism, which, in the face of a centuries-old reality like immigration, has always emphasized incorporation into Catalan identity and equal rights and opportunities for all people living in Catalonia. It is worth remembering that this is a tradition that has made the Catalan language, with all its problems and in a totally hostile political context, one of the most vital stateless languages in the world today.

The big problem with this demographic shift is that it goes against the great challenge we face as a country, which is the effective incorporation of the second generation of the latest wave of migration into Catalan identity—into a living, renewed, and grafted Catalan identity. We already know the recipes: school, language policy, and a powerful and attractive culture, but also social mobility and mixing. It is by no means an easy challenge. Especially without the tools of a state, with a powerful state against it, and in a complex global, cultural, and technological context. But, like it or not, there are no shortcuts.