Sánchez goes on the attack
1. Trust. It's clear that Sánchez's strength largely stems from the weakness of others. It's truly unusual that in a corruption case of this magnitude, the opposition is incapable of taking the initiative: of setting the pace and the steps. This is typical of the Spanish right. With a divided and cornered PP (People's Party), led by a figure incapable of drawing up a strategy and launching an offensive. With two obstacles (Vox and Ayuso), who, to dominate and subdue, require someone with charisma and a vision. It's not enough to repeat the litany of "corrupt Sánchez."
The Santos Cerdán case is not a carrot in the pot of corruption. He is a key figure, who becomes the president's confidant, who assembles a team that accompanies him to the Moncloa, and whose role is to keep the party under surveillance and control. He was supposed to be the guarantor of an efficient and responsible PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party), and it turns out he was the group leader of a corruption cell that had been exploiting its position for years to make a fortune. And the president is none the wiser. Trust makes us blind, a psychological defensive mechanism to avoid problems, which then erupt when least expected. Surrendering to that group had created problems for Sánchez within the party, which felt slighted and merely obeying orders. Now the president wants to make it a party issue to safeguard the Moncloa Palace.
It's clear that Sánchez bears great responsibility, having entrusted key missions to Santos Cerdán all this time and having overlooked the character's traits. Something is wrong in the Moncloa Palace; it's hard to understand how the presidency could be so helpless. And it would be interesting to understand how it has been possible to hide the misdeeds of such an impenetrable figure.
2. Offensive. The question is: Does Sánchez really correctly analyze reality when he goes on the offensive? With the offensive, Sánchez tries to make us believe he has no burdens to hold and that he has room to dictate his own course. Corruption alienates citizens from politics and breeds distrust in relationships with politicians. It's good to doubt; it's good to view politics with a critical eye.
In this scenario, where the right will struggle to secure a majority, Pedro Sánchez must play hardball if he wants to continue. And this means relaunching the project and significantly revamping the staff, with the risks that this entails as more and more people are offended and eager for revenge. Sánchez needs to act quickly and decisively to demonstrate that he's still here and to make people believe he has nothing to hide and that he has the ability to combine to build majorities. An uncertain path that requires broad confidence in the socialist space, which it's not clear he has. Fortunately for Sánchez, Felipe González's administration, which practically no longer has any greater institutional significance than the president of Castilla-La Mancha, Emiliano García Page, has shifted so far to the right that it has become unrecognizable to the left.
This crisis within the PSOE highlights the difficulties of alternation when the right veers toward the far right without having managed to gather strength and fill the gap. Spanish society is more resistant than most European countries to taking that step. And the divided right is in flight and mourning, far from the days when alternation was marked by CiU and the PNV.