Russia tests the limits of Europe

Last August, a drone loaded with explosives was located at Leipzig airport, near a Ukrainian cargo plane. The German government attributed the attempted attack to Russia, which denies authorship. Leipzig is an important European logistics hub. The episode shows that Kyiv's ability to sustain the war also depends on factories, warehouses, and transport networks located in Europe that allow weapons and equipment to reach Ukraine.

It is not an isolated case. A few weeks ago, the Danish intelligence services warned of sabotage attempts against companies that supply military equipment to Ukraine. In September, a Russian operation near the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard became known in which, according to Western sources, an attack against submarine cables had been simulated. This does not mean that every incident in Europe is the work of Moscow, but the documented cases point to growing pressure on the networks that support Ukraine and other critical European infrastructure.

Sabotage, cyberattacks, electronic interference, or disinformation are not new instruments. What characterizes hybrid strategies is how they are combined and for what purpose. In the Russian strategic debate, the vision of Europe as an adversary with its own entity, not just as an appendix to Washington, is gaining weight. Moscow seeks to hinder support for Ukraine, force European governments to dedicate more resources to protecting themselves, and test the cohesion of the allies.

The grey zone is a way of managing escalation. It allows increasing pressure without openly crossing a red line and gradually shifting the limits of what is considered tolerable. Sabotage, a cyberattack, or a drone incursion may not, separately, justify a forceful response. But the repetition of these actions and their extension to new sectors can end up imposing significant costs without provoking an open confrontation.

The attacker also has a temporal advantage: executing an operation may take hours; investigating it, attributing authorship, and agreeing on a response among various governments can take weeks. In the meantime, Moscow can act again.

It is necessary to protect infrastructure and strengthen cybersecurity, but that is not enough. If a facility is well defended, Moscow can seek other targets. Europe must identify patterns, attribute responsibilities, and have graduated responses that impose costs on those responsible. It must also prepare for riskier actions, capable of causing significant physical and personal damage.

Moscow does not need to completely interrupt support for Ukraine. It can erode it by slowing it down, making it more expensive, or making it politically more difficult to maintain. The European challenge is to avoid an open confrontation without prudence ending up normalizing increasingly serious hostile actions. The gray zone is not the absence of escalation: it is one of the spaces where it is already taking place.