More nuclear proliferation, less security
The world is entering a new era of nuclear proliferation. The agreement signed between the United States and Saudi Arabia whereby Washington will help the Gulf kingdom develop a civilian nuclear program is just the latest example. The list of countries considering joining the current nine atomic powers is much longer: from Iran to Turkey, Poland, South Korea, and possibly also Japan or Germany, which have already shown interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. This adds to a process of normalizing the use of the nuclear threat in conflicts, as Vladimir Putin is doing in Ukraine, and to a progressive dismantling of the containment agreements that marked the balance of power in the post-Cold War era. The last nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia expired in February. Since then, China has not stopped expanding its arsenal, and several Asian and European countries that for decades had lived relying on the nuclear umbrella of the United States are now debating whether to acquire or strengthen their own capabilities.
The agreement between Washington and Riyadh is emblematic of this new era of proliferation. On the one hand, because it applies a double standard that exacerbates the erosion of control mechanisms, and on the other, because it plunges the region into its own nuclear race. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the intergovernmental body responsible for controlling nuclear proliferation, has not participated in the negotiation of this bilateral agreement; therefore, it is not clear how the safeguards that must guarantee the exhaustive supervision of the use of this energy will be ensured.
While the Trump administration insists that Iran must accept a total renunciation of uranium enrichment —justifying the use of military force to prevent it—, the United States is the first to contribute to the export of this same technology to many other countries around the world. The impact of this policy is already changing regional power dynamics in the Middle East. If Iran becomes a nuclear power, the United Arab Emirates might want to follow Riyadh's example. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has also obtained security guarantees from a nuclear-capable Pakistan and is considering possible security cooperation with Turkey. All of this directly alters Israel's supremacy as the sole nuclear power in the region.
Thus, the crisis of nuclear containment has been added to the disruption of global trade that is played out between the two ends of the Red Sea. On the one hand, Iran's return to military escalation in the Strait of Hormuz must be interpreted, to a large extent, as a calculated move, prior to negotiation. Tehran's objective is to increase the cost of confrontation to the point of forcing Washington to resume talks, but on more generous terms. Tehran's plan is to escalate to de-escalate.
On the other hand, the return of Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia also seeks to capitalize on a confrontation that has ended up destabilizing the Gulf countries: these states had based their security on an order guaranteed by the United States, which today acts as another factor of risk and instability in the region. During the past week, the Houthis have launched missiles and drones against Saudi Arabia and against ships in the Red Sea —altering already very volatile global energy markets—, while a military coalition led by Riyadh has carried out airstrikes in territory controlled by the Houthis for the first time in years. In practice, insecurity is again exacerbated, both in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and in the Suez Canal, as is its impact on global interdependencies. We are immersed in a race to exploit the weaknesses of the opponent and the frailties of an international system increasingly exposed to supply disruptions and commercial, financial, energy or critical resource chokepoints.
The deterioration of the internal architecture in the Middle East increases proliferation dangers. The actors involved are acting more unpredictably each time, whether in global cooperation frameworks —as demonstrated by the United Arab Emirates' withdrawal from OPEC— or in the damaged balances of international containment. We are collectively moving towards a more armed and less secure world.
