The housing problem—social, affordable, or market—is at the top of the list of critical problems to be solved. It is a difficult problem because building (in this term I always include rehabilitation) takes time and, above all, because we have not gotten our stimulus policies right, and the supply of new housing is not responding to a demand that has increased significantly, primarily due to population growth, but also due to visitor growth. However, the problem is, in essence, simple to solve. There is only one viable approach to effectively attack the problem: urban planning regulations that expand the available land and floor space, and that the resulting value creation makes both the private development of new housing and the public contribution to the availability of social and affordable housing economically sustainable. Two good recent books on the subject are those by Javier Burón (The housing problem) and Joan Clos (Social and affordable housing).
This is not the first time in our history that rapid population increases have generated housing tensions of enormous magnitude. They are well present in the literature. Among my recent readings I find Irene Polo telling us in 1933: "In Sallent... two thousand people piled up, boarded up in the corners, harassed by hunger, the elements, promiscuity [...]" (The fascination of journalism, p. 128). Or Francesc Candel telling us in 1964: "The shacks have sprung up everywhere [...] in the hollows, on the heights, in the wastelands, in the dry gullies, under the bridges, in the hidden lots [...]" (The other Catalans, p. 229).
In all these episodes, urban planning regulations existed that allowed for the mobilization of real estate development and construction by the private sector. And this will also be the case now. Our public authorities understand this well. But what we fail to gauge properly (the details matter!) is how we should distribute the new real estate value between, on the one hand, the authority that made it possible, and which will use it for social objectives probably linked to the housing itself, and on the other, the private investor, who contributes to the construction of the new housing. There is so much uncertainty in all of this that it is not surprising that an honest and naturally prudent public authority could from the outset impose a criterion that the private development sector does not find viable. And that the result is a migratory supply of new housing. If this is the case, a negotiation process that leads to a better result is in order.
In Barcelona, we have a good example of the impasse I just described: the famous requirement to reserve 30% of newly built housing for social rentals. The specific way it was formulated hasn't worked. I'd add that there are too many players in the private sector to think the difficulty is due to an oligopolistic conspiracy by the private sector. To overcome the impasse we find ourselves in, the current municipal government, the PSC (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party), has proposed a modification that goes in the right direction and is relatively simple. How does it look from the private sector perspective? I'd say it seems sufficient to activate the sector, but just a bit tight. In the City Council, there's only one truly possible majority for the proposal to be approved: PSC-Junts (the Comuns don't want the modification, and the PSC and ERC don't have enough). At the moment, negotiations between the two parties on the proposal are stalled. Juntos, echoing the sentiments of the private sector, is insisting on a better deal for it. Will this disagreement escalate to the point of aborting it? I doubt it. It would help the PSC make some additional concessions. But the fact is that the PSC's primary commitment is to generate housing supply, and Junts' is twofold: first, to be an expression of the interests of the business community. And this puts it in a weak negotiating position, since the private sector will not be in favor of aborting the 30% flexibility. It is eager to build. The PSC knows this, and, furthermore, the perception—fair or unfair—that has been created is that if the negotiation fails, it will be Junts' responsibility, which cannot be in the best interest of this party in any way.
I hope the negotiation ends well. If so, everyone will win: society, which will have more housing; the private sector, which will invest; the PSC, which will approve its proposal; and Junts, which will strengthen its relevance to the private sector. If, on the other hand, we fail to achieve this on such a central issue, there will still be a winner: populism.
