I would like to offer an analytical assessment, free from preconceived notions, without going into detail, but considering the most basic structural features of the new funding proposal. I don't believe its effects on final results can be fully anticipated, despite the important work on figures and ordinality rankings carried out, for example, by FEDEA and by this same newspaper based on government sources. We're missing some details about what's in the denominators of the ratios and how the calculations for the agreement were made. The final figures are difficult to guarantee, beyond the money one might assume will be involved in one way or another. (And if the current Spanish government wants it)It will reach every community. But I don't think the new formula, in the hands of some other government, will guarantee ordinality. And it's clear that it's not the same to be third in the order of per capita resources with one euro less than the second as it is with one euro more per capita than the fourth. I think that's why, regarding ordinality, the minister It hasn't gotten wet beyond voluntarily securing it for Catalonia in 2027.
In any case, despite the criticisms from both sides, it must be said that the proposal presented does not constitute a new financing system. It is not unique to Catalonia, although it benefits relatively from it (but not only Catalonia: Andalusia, Murcia, and the Valencian Community also benefit). It does not remove Catalonia from the common regime. It is not a faithful reflection of President Isla's investiture agreement. It is not a pact with a solidarity agreement. It does not commit to the desired ordinality. Nor is it the proposal on which the Catalan commission for financing reform, promoted by the Generalitat of Catalonia, worked for almost a year (by the way, what has been done about it?). It is not a model based on the fiscal capacities of each community: it remains a model that guarantees needs with little effective fiscal responsibility.
The proposal is It's simpler than the current system. It streamlines the treasury of the autonomous communities. Although the results ultimately translate into relative rather than absolute gains, it's a model that, by providing more funding, allows for the declaration that all communities "win." It is perhaps the only possible agreement, although unlikely to be implemented given the current balance of power at the state level. It's a "now or never" proposal, because it's unlikely that the state coffers will be able to withstand it in the future, once European funds and current extraordinary tax revenues have run out. It's a system that can be defended by business sectors that want to close the window of opportunity (given the polar chill opened by the Catalan independence movement) so they can return to the... Business as usual.
For Catalonia, the benefit is positive although relatively very small, since, again, with respect to its fiscal deficit the gain is relatively modest (less than 10%). In any case, for the first time, the new funding (the 4.7 billion out of the 21 billion mentioned, 23.4%) marginally exceeds the overall ratio of its contributions (19.3%) and certainly surpasses the demographic weight it had traditionally received from regional funding (1) compared to the State's role in the territory (9.3%). Incidentally, none of this is replicated in the case of the Balearic Islands, and without any guarantee of ordinality.
On the positive side, then, any new increase under this system will now favor Catalonia according to the new parameters. However, it should be noted that, from the perspective of overall fiscal balances, the improvement in the regional funding component can be offset by the State through spending carried out within its own powers. Nothing is resolved, therefore, nor is anything definitively settled. It should also be emphasized that the final data, as As we said, they cannot be anticipated, since they depend on how the regulatory collection is reviewed, which the ministry says it will carry out, and on some invention further into the so-called "adjusted population".
In any case, participation in Personal Income Tax (IRPF) and VAT is increased, while preserving the index based on the total relative consumption of the Community (therefore, without VAT for schools or consumption solely by residents), thus also benefiting from the floating consumer population. An addendum for VAT for SMEs is incorporated, if greater tax compliance by the community compared to the rest is confirmed at this retail stage, and participation in the new fund for climate change is included (two-thirds allocated to the Mediterranean basin). It is in the interest of both the Balearic Islands and Catalonia that the equalization be maintained at 75%; this consolidates the current fiscal capacity against proposals that aspired to 100% and eliminates any hint of tax liability for the communities.
The "dangers" can always come from the "specter" of the adjusted population. This substitute for needs assessment, which defines variables and weights them somewhat arbitrarily, maintains a high degree of discretion in favor of the central administration. Certainly, it is not in the best interest of any community to position itself in favor of a model based on fiscal capacity, with greater fiscal responsibility and, consequently, the assumption of financial risk.
The recently presented funding proposal has an uncertain future. Its legal path is unclear, as is the willingness of the parties to accept changes, or how this might alter the initial acceptance of the proposal. It is up to the respective governments, and above all to civil society, to prevent this from ending in a new form of political trickery that further discredits our already weakened democracy and leaves things exactly as they were.
