Catalonia's trains: segregating the networks
This article aims to define how train services in Catalonia can be separated with two objectives: to clearly identify the responsibilities of the Catalan government (Generalitat) and the central government, and to facilitate their management. The proposal negotiated between the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and the central government does not achieve this goal. Responsibilities are shared, and management is entrusted to Renfe, an operator that has demonstrated its shortcomings in the current model. This is the solution that will most likely be implemented because it is the quickest and most practical: first, we recover the commuter and regional train services. When the system's limitations become apparent again in the short term, it will be necessary to remember that better alternative solutions exist. The one proposed here is one of them.
Trade unions originated in the 19th century around the railways. Their strength stemmed from the consequences of strikes, which, if carried out, paralyzed the country. A strike in a factory, where only the factory shuts down, does not have the same economic and social consequences. This is the power of corporate unions: if it's dockworkers, the strike halts maritime traffic; if it's air traffic controllers, the strike halts air traffic. The train drivers' union dominates Renfe, which is why it has forced the current operator, Renfe, to remain the same. The threat of a strike has forced a modification of the train segregation model agreed upon between the central government and the Catalan government. Calling a three-day strike across Spain, after the disaster caused in Catalonia by commuter rail failures and the accidents in Andalusia and Gelida—due to safety issues that no one disputes need improvement—demonstrates that the union's priority is defending its corporate interests.
Segregation presents two opportunities that should be seized:
a) There are two railway networks in Catalonia: European gauge and Iberian gauge. The former connects Catalonia's passenger transport with the rest of Spain; AVE high-speed trains, long-distance trains, run on this network. The latter carries medium-distance and commuter trains, transporting passengers within Catalonia, as well as freight, with most of the traffic destined for the rest of Spain and France. Combining freight and passenger traffic on the same network is easy because freight traffic is subordinate to passenger traffic. Combining commuter and medium-distance trains is difficult; they have the same priority, requiring a single operator.
b) The Generalitat has railway workers; it is possible to increase their number and have them operate the commuter and medium-distance trains.
Therefore, the segregation of the rail networks is straightforward. On one hand, there is the European gauge, owned and operated by the central government, and served by public companies, Renfe, and private companies. On the other hand, there is the Iberian gauge, owned and operated by the Generalitat (the regional government of Catalonia), which operates commuter and medium-distance services. Renfe pays a fee to the Generalitat for the use of the Iberian gauge tracks for freight. All the stations are under the jurisdiction of the Generalitat, and the central government pays a fee that is shared by AVE (high-speed rail) and commuter and medium-distance services. The service, now provided by the Generalitat and previously by the central government, requires an annual transfer of costs.
Separating the management of the long-distance network—the infrastructure (tracks and overhead lines) and the trains—makes sense to allow private companies to operate trains, but it doesn't for medium-distance and commuter trains, where the priority is optimizing service. There is no second operator. The infrastructure and the trains are more interconnected, and a single authority facilitates incident resolution, which is more frequent on this network due to its nature.
The Iberian-gauge rail network has suffered from underinvestment over the last 40 years. From 2010 to 2023, the budget was €11 billion, while the actual investment was €5.5 billion; therefore, the investment deficit over 40 years is €15 billion. If we add to this the cost of rebuilding the coastal line and the hangars needed to park and maintain trains, the total reaches approximately €20 billion, which is roughly what should be invested now to restore this network to standard operating standards. To ensure that a 10-year investment is made, a fixed budget, not subject to annual approval, is necessary. Since the network is owned by the Generalitat (the regional government of Catalonia), it should be the entity responsible for carrying out this investment. The central government has an investment fund for extraordinary actions and, although this capital must be remunerated at market interest, it would be possible to use it if the financial cost, €600 million/year, were borne by the general state budget.
The transfer of infrastructure and trains from the central government to the Generalitat should be done at no cost, as a free transfer. Now that an increase in regional funding of another €21 billion is being proposed, it makes no sense to burden the Generalitat with debt that would be a significant financial burden in the coming years.
A transfer of this magnitude requires no less than two years to be carried out properly; it should be done line by line, including staff changes, with new personnel receiving training in the interim. One advantage of this solution is that it is not disruptive, except for potential labor disputes, which are not the end of the world because the power of company unions in Spain remains unchanged. This approach can be replicated in other autonomous communities experiencing problems with commuter or local train services.