Bombing is not governing

Just a few weeks ago, many analyses took it for granted that Iran was on the verge of collapse. Israel and the United States seemed convinced that a combination of bombings, economic pressure, and regional isolation would be enough to bring down the Islamic Republic and definitively consolidate a new balance of power in the Middle East.

This week, however, Washington has been negotiating against the clock on a memorandum of understanding mediated by Qatar and Pakistan, while Donald Trump alternated military threats with calls to avoid an even greater escalation. This already says a lot about how the situation has changed.

Iran has suffered significant damage. Part of its conventional military capabilities have been weakened, and the country continues to be subjected to enormous economic and military pressure. But, from a regional point of view, the war has also reinforced something fundamental: its deterrent capacity and (geo)political centrality.

The Strait of Hormuz has become the most evident proof of this. Even after months of attacks and threats, the possibility of fully reopening the maritime route continues to depend on negotiations with Tehran. Washington insists that the passage must be opened "one way or another," while Israel watches uncomfortably as Iranian control over the strait continues to be one of the region's main bargaining chips.

Here lies the main problem for the United States and Israel. Military superiority remains immense. But strength no longer automatically guarantees the ability to impose clear political outcomes.

Iran retains no minor deterrent tools. Drones, missiles, naval mines, small vessels capable of disrupting trade routes, or the very geography of Hormuz continue to grant it the capacity to condition the conflict even after the attacks it has suffered. And, above all, the regime has demonstrated the ability to absorb extreme levels of violence without politically collapsing.

The regional reaction is also significant. Qatar and Pakistan have assumed central roles in the negotiations. Saudi Arabia is trying to avoid a total confrontation. Even traditional allies of Washington seem more interested in containing the conflict than in accompanying an indefinite escalation.

After Afghanistan, Iraq, Gaza, and now Iran, an uncomfortable reality is beginning to consolidate for countries accustomed to dominating: destroying continues to be relatively simple. It is much more difficult to transform this destruction into lasting political authority.

Perhaps this is the main lesson of these weeks. Israel and the United States continue to have overwhelming military capability. But the Middle East no longer responds automatically to this superiority. And this profoundly modifies how power is perceived in the region and, ultimately, on a global scale.