Pol Morillas: "Putin and Trump will want to make Europe their backyard"

BarcelonaThe events of the last three days, especially the staging of the rupture between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House on Friday, have thrown global geopolitics into disarray. We spoke to the director of Cidob, Pol Morillas.

How do you assess Friday's meeting at the White House? Do you think it was an ambush and that it was prepared to alienate Zelensky?

— The The meeting was grotesque in every sense. Both in the position of US funds towards Russia, which takes the Kremlin's requests as a basis for negotiations, and in relation to the same objectives of the United States, which had negotiated an agreement to access Ukraine's rare earths and strategic minerals. This makes the positions of Trump and JD Vance grotesque because, on the one hand, they move away from any traditional US position regarding the conflict, while at the same time moving away from their own purpose of making a transaction with Ukraine for rare earths. The result is very shocking. Whether or not it was an ambush refers to the idea that Zelensky has never been a very valid interlocutor for the Trump administration, both for Background on the Biden son affair and his relations with Ukraine, and because Zelensky, in Trump's eyes, remains a weak link in his conception of international relations between strongmen. And the strongman here, for him, is Putin.

But would a change of president in Ukraine change anything in Trump's stance?

— This is another demand from Putin, that Zelensky call elections and give up his post, because he does not consider him a legitimate leader in Ukraine. But it is obvious that the unelected leader is Putin, and it is curious how Trump does not take this obvious point into account. In addition, Zelensky has a much higher approval rating in his country than Trump does in his own, and Ukraine is under martial law and it is not easy to call elections in a war situation, because of the census and the real possibility of going to vote. And finally, Trump saying that Zelensky is a dictator is surprising, but it is in line with the low respect of this administration for the entire democratic process and the guarantees of the rule of law.

British leader Keir Starmer is confident that unity with the United States can be restored in the bloc of Ukraine's allies. Does he think this is possible?

— There is an urgent need for security guarantees, which the Europeans can put in the form of troops on the ground to try to guarantee a peace agreement. And the French and the British are the first to put this on the table, and others will end up joining in. It will not be the whole European Union, but some will. But the operation of this deployment of troops has logistical and intelligence elements that would be much more effective if they were involved with the US army. And, therefore, Starmer, when he talks about rebuilding bridges, is making something out of necessity, a virtue.

Because Europe does not have the military capacity to defend Ukraine alone and seek a resolution to the conflict by force.

— It would require another European approach, along the lines of replacing the US forces. It is true that the effort between the United States and Europe (including the United Kingdom) in military aid in Ukraine has been equal 50-50, but to defend Ukraine without the United States, Europe would have to reach defense spending figures equivalent to those of the United States. And this can only be done if the Europeans were willing to double their bet compared to what they have done so far. But we are not in the scenario where Europe wants to replace the American effort, and we are not in the scenario, right now, of having any guarantee that, if Europe does this, Ukraine can really win the war given the international context with this approach between Trump and Putin. Europe does not see itself capable of doubling its bet.

The only way out is to negotiate. But with Trump and Putin, is there any chance of a negotiation that does not mean surrender for Ukraine?

— It will depend on two things. On the security guarantees, which are robust and do not allow Moscow to make another incursion, and secondly, on how complex and broad the negotiations are. If they are only about a ceasefire or a halt to hostilities with these security guarantees, the European Union has very little to say. If the negotiations are more complex, including things like the reconstruction of the country, accession to the European Union and the entire European security framework, the European Union should take into account. Therefore, it is in Europe's interest that the negotiations are broad.

But how much leverage does Europe have in the negotiations?

— It will be up to the Member States that wish to participate in these security guarantees, in this provision of forces on the ground, which will not involve the European Union as a whole. In other words, the leadership for the European position is no longer in Brussels, but in the capitals of these countries that will lead the effort to offer security guarantees.

After the events of the last few days, do you see a possible war in Europe as closer?

— No, I don't see it any closer now than before. What I believe is that we have entered a situation in which Europe must assert its own position in this game of great powers. Because if not, there are many powers, starting with Putin, but also the United States, that want to see Europe as their backyard, and that is what Europe must want to avoid. And it must demonstrate that it has the capacity and the will to be and to exist and to do, so that others, with this logic of geopolitics of confrontation between great powers, do not prevent it.