The invisible war against GPS

Last Sunday the plane carrying the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to Plovdiv (Bulgaria) suffered what was initially described as Russian interference with its GPS positioning system that forced the pilots to land "using paper maps"". Later, some objective data has qualified this version. On the one hand, several pilots have clarified that landings are almost never made depending on GPS. On the other hand, the popular flight tracking platform FlightRadar24 has categorically denied the claims of GPS interference. According to data from the signal transmitters, even the quality of the aircraft "upon landing." The only accredited incident was a nine-minute delay.

However, the diplomatic incident has put the spotlight on the supposed fragility of European navigation systems. The case exemplifies how interference with satellite navigation systems (GNSS, due to silence). With a 220% increase in GPS signal loss incidents between 2021 and 2024, what was once a theoretical vulnerability has become a real threat to civil aviation, maritime transport, and critical infrastructure.

Two attack techniques

Attacks on satellite navigation systems fall into two categories: jamming (jamming) and counterfeiting (spoofing) of signals. The first involves drowning out weak satellite signals with more powerful radio interference; the second involves generating fake GPS signals to fool receivers. These are the same two techniques used in jammers and fake cell phone antennas, respectively.

Jamming is the most common and affordable. Basic jammers, with power outputs of around 5 watts, can affect a radius of up to 100 meters. In contrast, military systems with more than 50 watts can interfere with areas of several kilometers.

Spoofing is more sophisticated but increasingly accessible. The simplest asynchronous attacks can be carried out with equipment costing less than €500. Advanced synchronous attacks require specialized equipment costing thousands of euros.

The global satellite navigation ecosystem

The current GNSS systems landscape is dominated by four major global constellations. The American GPS has 32 operational satellites in six orbital planes at an altitude of 20,200 km, providing global coverage with an accuracy of less than three meters. The European Galileo, with 27 operational satellites, is the most precise system with an accuracy of less than one meter and the most advanced authentication service in the world. The Russian GLONASS has 24 satellites optimized for high latitudes, while the Chinese Beidou has completed its constellation of 45 satellites providing global coverage, but especially strengthened in the Asia-Pacific region.

In addition to the Big Four, there is also the Japanese QZSS (4 satellites) and the Indian NavIC (5 satellites). All are designed with interoperability in mind: modern receivers—like the ones in your smartphone—are capable of supporting the entire system.– You can view multiple constellations simultaneously.

A world map of interferences

The FlightRadar24 portal maintains a updated map which uses data from aircraft receivers to detect degradations in GPS signal quality and thus identify problem areas. There are currently 51 flight information regions with interference. Among the most affected are Poland, Turkey, Sweden, and the Baltic states. In fact, the Baltic Sea has become the global epicenter of interference, originating primarily from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.

The tragic crash of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 on Christmas Day 2024 marked a turning point. The Embraer 190AR aircraft suffered powerful GPS interference, with a complete loss of signal for thirty minutes. The disorientation caused by this lack of navigation led the aircraft to inadvertently enter the airspace of the war between Russia and Ukraine, where a Russian missile shot it down, mistaking it for a Ukrainian drone. The crash in Kazakhstan left 38 dead, becoming the first civilian fatalities directly linked to GPS electronic warfare.

Impact on critical sectors

Civil aviation is the sector most visibly impacted, with more than 1,100 flights affected each day during the 2024 peak. Estonia is experiencing interference on 85% of its flights, while Lithuania has seen a 20-fold increase in spoofing incidents.

But it's not the only vulnerable industry. Some studies estimate the US economy's dependence on GNSS at more than €250 billion annually: a complete disruption could cost $1 billion per day. The trucking industry, for example, has reduced its operating costs by $74.5 billion thanks to GPS route optimization.

According to the Rand Corporation, shipping could lose $85 million per day in the event of a widespread GNSS disruption. Civilian infrastructure is also vulnerable: many cell phone sites use GPS to synchronize with the grid, accurate to within 10 microseconds. Many ATMs and other financial systems also rely on GPS time synchronization, while electrical distribution grids use GNSS to optimize routes.

Precision agriculture is also suffering. According to Bloomberg, 70% of Israeli farmers used GPS-dependent technologies (only 27% in the US), such as semi-autonomous tractors, crop mapping systems, and crop-spraying drones. Fields planted without GPS display visibly crooked rows, and expensive crop-spraying drones have crashed in the absence of a signal.

Countermeasures and International Response

The technological response is advancing rapidly, driven by military anti-jamming systems. The global market for military GNSS anti-jamming systems is projected to exceed €15 billion by 2035. Finland has installed radar-based landing systems at fourteen airports in direct response to Russian jamming.

GPS jamming has become a weapon of hybrid warfare, with Russia leading the most extensive operations since February 2022. The most serious incident occurred between March 23 and 24, 2024, when more than 1,600 aircraft were affected. The Baltic states have filed formal complaints under Article 45 of the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), while the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is considering withdrawing Russia's civil aviation radio frequency rights.

An uncertain future

Humanity has become so dependent on weak signals from space that their disruption can paralyze entire societies. Building resilient positioning systems is no longer a technical option, but an existential necessity for global security and the economy.