Trump's calculations on a military intervention in Iran

WashingtonDonald Trump's war of nerves with Iran has become a constant exchange of threats in which a miscalculated escalation of tension could end up turning into an actual military intervention by the United States. The president, who had begun his term five months ago with the expectation of restoring peace to the Middle East and turn Gaza into a tourist resort, is now playing with a much more inflamed region and the possibility of getting involved in the conflict. within a period of two weeks for the ayatollahs to weigh the options while they back channels Diplomats are also working to resume negotiations. Without explicitly saying so, the US president has left his offer to the Islamic Republic on the table.

"Right now [Trump] is imposing all these demands on Iran because he understands that the Iranians are in a bad strategic position, and I still think he wants a negotiation on Iran's nuclear program," Ilan Berman, vice president of the American-Foreign Affairs, told ARA. Berman emphasizes that both Washington and Tel Aviv have only spoken about the nuclear issue, without making any other reference to the Islamist regime of the ayatollahs. "That's why I think right now the administration is still trying to make Iran understand that it can have a nuclear program or maintain its regime. It can't have both. And, therefore, it's trying to get them to make the right decision."

Trump's plan, apparently, would be this: to bare his teeth so that Iran reconsiders and understands that the United States does not want to jeopardize the survival of the regime. per se, but only the nuclear plan. While one can never know what the Islamic Republic's reaction will be and Tehran's disadvantage is evident, there are "options to improve its position." "For example, Iran is located on the Strait of Hormuz. Oil," Berman explains.

The fine line between conflict and dialogue

In this pressure game, Berman believes the administration must be careful not to cross the line that makes Iran feel its regime is in danger. "If the regime feels threatened, it will likely act aggressively," he notes, and that could break the fragile thread that separates entry into the conflict and a return to the negotiating table. The risk of playbook Trump's theory is that if you're betting high, "you have to show that you're serious" if your expectations aren't met. "If the Iranians don't cooperate, then another scenario opens up, because he's compromised a lot of his political credibility, including his electoral base, by making very demanding demands of the Iranian regime. What happens if they say no? Will he just back down and say, 'Well, I guess they don't want it.'"

The two-week window to decide whether to intervene and a certain willingness to reactivate the diplomatic path allow Trump to establish a narrative framework to politically justify an attack on Iran, should it occur. The same MAGA bases They have revolted against the idea of the United States being immersed in a new war, especially after the Republican campaigned in 2024 with the promise of getting the country out of international conflicts under the slogan America first.

"I think the political argument will be that the Iranians are not cooperative and therefore we need to show them more muscle and bring them back to the negotiating table," Berman says, noting that the narrative will be that "the US is getting involved to end the war." "And that means the US should strike very hard against the nuclear program, but it should do so very quickly, as a way to force the Iranians back to the negotiating table. Otherwise, there's a risk of a protracted military involvement, and that's not something the country is eager for. And it's going to be very difficult for the administration to maintain support if that's the case."

The jewel of Iran's nuclear program

In that "quick" attack to force Tehran to negotiate there would have been the Fordow uranium enrichment plantIsraeli and US intelligence services consider this to be one of the major infrastructure sites of Iran's nuclear program, where uranium has been enriched to 60%, far above what is needed for civilian purposes, despite the authorities' denials. Located more than 30 meters underground, Israel lacks the capacity to destroy it: it needs American B-2 bombers, which are the only ones capable of transporting "bunker-busting" missiles. "The key to all this seems to be the Fordow facility, because it is fortified; it is a significant challenge for Israel (because they cannot destroy it alone) and a symbolic element of the nuclear program," the analyst notes.

The question is what Iran's reaction would be if Trump bombs Fordow. "The scenarios are multiple and possible. On the one hand, there's the possibility that we go to war. The other option, and I think it's the Trump administration's line, is to show that escalating tensions with the US over the nuclear program could be a destabilizing element for the regime. The goal is to get the Iranians, voluntarily, to say: 'D nuclear.'" But, as in any game, no one other than the ayatollahs' regime can know what cards they're willing to play and how they'll respond once this scenario is reached.

The US's arrival at this point of near-no return has also been driven by pressure from Israel and its unilateral actions. "I don't know if Israel necessarily wants the United States to get involved. Israel wants to significantly dismantle Iran's nuclear program and its ballistic capabilities. To get there, obviously, it's faster if it can use the munitions provided by the United States or if the US does it directly. But, as for the ultimate goal, I think it's Washington and Jerusalem."

US military intervention in Iran would not only further destabilize the region but also threatens to trigger a domino effect internationally. Russia and China have emerged as the main backers of the ayatollahs' regime, especially Vladimir Putin's government. Washington's intervention could make Moscow and Beijing feel the need to respond, although Berman doesn't see it that way. "At the moment, the Russians and Chinese are making it very clear that there are limits to their partnership with Iran. They don't want to get involved. This could change if the Iranian regime were truly in danger of falling. But right now, I don't think either Beijing or Moscow have any interest in getting involved."