The Trump effect generates another concern in Europe: is there a substitute for the nuclear deterrence power of the USA?

BrusselsEuropean allies have set out to achieve military independence from the United States after the Donald Trump administration decided to abandon the security it has provided them since the end of World War II. They are multiplying defense spending and military capabilities and approving ambitious initiatives to strengthen and unify the European war industry. Although progress is slow, the European Union assures that in the medium term, by 2030, it will have achieved military autonomy in conventional capabilities.

Analysis of Europe's nuclear optionsNevertheless, among European allies, there are beginning to be movements to stop being at the mercy of the White House. French President Emmanuel Macron offered a nuclear umbrella to European allies, and a total of six member states (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, and Greece) of the European Union and the United Kingdom have joined. However, this offer has a catch and technical limitations.

Firstly, political difficulties. Researcher Heloise Fayet recalls in the report "Analysis of Europe's Nuclear Options", prepared for the Munich Security Conference, that "very likely" France and the United Kingdom will continue to "present reservations" about ceding autonomy in the use and development of their atomic weapons. In fact, diplomatic sources from European NATO allies admit that it is a growing debate within the organization and that a kind of co-financing of France's nuclear power by willing European partners has been considered, but Paris has refused because this would imply co-direction of these weapons and, therefore, a loss of sovereignty.

It should be remembered that France is the only ally that does not participate in NATO's nuclear programs and is historically the European partner most opposed to transatlantic military dependence. In contrast, the United States maintains close coordination with the rest of its allies in this area and, of course, leads the nuclear deterrence strategy within the Atlantic Alliance.

Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest at this time that the Pentagon wishes to lose this power over its European allies and allow a parallel military organization to NATO that would, among other things, unite European nuclear capabilities. NATO diplomatic sources also emphasize that the United States' nuclear capabilities are already spread across the European continent and very well integrated with European armies, while France remains completely on the sidelines. This is seen by some countries, according to the same sources, as another major complication when seeking shelter under the French nuclear umbrella – especially in the short and medium term – in a context of Russian threat.

Too little nuclear power

NATO diplomatic sources also have doubts about the extent to which France's nuclear capabilities are sufficient to protect an entire continent. The French country currently has fewer than 300 nuclear warheads, while China has 600 and both Russia and the United States exceed 5,000. For this reason, they recall that Paris – and its allies, if they were to collaborate – would have to make a large investment in atomic armament and substantially increase its capabilities. Nevertheless, Paul Taylor, a European defense and security expert at the EPC (European Policy Centre) think tank, points out in a conversation with ARA that, in terms of deterrence, in addition to the actual armament available, the 'credibility' that France and the United Kingdom may have in terms of nuclear power is key.

The same diplomatic sources from the Atlantic Alliance also note that there are European allies who fear that an increase in the nuclear capabilities of France and the United Kingdom could violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, anger foreign powers and provoke a warlike escalation. However, there are voices that deny this outright and claim the right of European allies to achieve real deterrence power independent of the United States.

In this regard, Taylor points out that this limitation, to which some European allies allude, "makes no sense" and assures that the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not include a ceiling for the French or British army. Furthermore, Taylor recalls that the United States already has atomic weapons spread across Europe, such as in the Netherlands, Belgium, or even Turkey, and that, therefore, a substitution of US nuclear capabilities by France or the United Kingdom would not practically represent an increase in operational atomic armament.

Be that as it may, Fayet points out that, although in the short term Europe cannot do without the nuclear deterrence power of the United States, it must begin to prepare to also be militarily autonomous in this field and the most feasible option is to rely on a French and British umbrella in the long term. And, moreover, the expert warns that European leaders must get a move on because transatlantic distancing poses an "imminent risk" and could lead to what she calls a "deterrence vacuum," which could embolden adversaries like Vladimir Putin's regime to consider aggression against European allies.