The silent battle for the South Pacific that can decide the future

TokyoIn September, all members of the Pacific Islands Forum were connected for the first time to the global network of submarine telecommunications cables. Among them is Tuvalu, a small state made up of nine islands where the first international cable entered service last year. The Vaka connects the capital, Funafuti, with the Bulikula cable system and is funded by contributions from the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan, with the participation of Japan and Google.

The connection allows Tuvalu to have faster and more reliable internet, but the project also illustrates to what extent basic infrastructure has become a piece of geopolitical competition in the Pacific. Australia has invested more than 500 million Australian dollars since 2018 to extend submarine cables in the region, in collaboration with Japan, the United States, and other partners, while Beijing also maintains growing activity in infrastructure and development projects in the island states.

Fiji is a good example of this competition. In January 2025, the Bulikula and Tabua submarine cables arrived there, with new connections in Suva and Natadola that link the archipelago with the United States, Australia, Japan, and South America. The project reinforces Fiji's position as a Pacific communications hub and reduces dependence on a very limited number of connections.

But while Australia, Japan, and the United States are promoting this digital network, Beijing maintains its own infrastructure agenda. China is financing, with a 300 million Fijian dollar donation, the improvement program for more than 80 kilometers of roads in Vanua Levu, the country's second-largest island. The project, integrated into the New Silk Road initiative, is the one that has received the largest Chinese donation in the Pacific.

The same country can receive Chinese funding to build roads and, at the same time, digital infrastructure funded by Australia, Japan, or the United States. For small island states, having several partners is also a way to maintain room for maneuver amidst the rivalry between the great powers.

In Papua New Guinea, however, the issue already directly enters the realm of security. Australia has pledged 621.4 million Australian dollars to renovate ports in five areas of the country, while the Pukpuk defense treaty with Canberra came into effect in July of this year and turned the relationship between the two countries into a military alliance. In parallel, Australia will fund with 120 million dollars three new submarine cables that will connect the north and south of Papua New Guinea and the autonomous region of Bougainville, a project that Google will execute.

Australia's boost

The perception of Chinese influence is also changing. According to the 2026 Lowy Institute poll, 39% of respondents consider China to be the most influential country in the Pacific Islands, compared to 33% who point to Australia. Cooperation figures tell a different reality: Australia has provided 38% of all aid to Pacific island states over the last fifteen years, compared to China's 9%. The difference shows that money does not explain influence on its own. China is perceived today as the most influential actor even though Australia continues to provide much more in aid.

In the area of security, Australia has also taken significant steps. With Tuvalu, Canberra has gone beyond development cooperation with the Falepili Treaty, which establishes that Tuvalu must agree with Australia on any agreement with another state regarding defense, security, cybersecurity, or critical infrastructure. The pact does not eliminate Tuvalu's sovereignty nor prevent it from maintaining other relationships, but it gives Canberra a privileged role in the archipelago's security matters.

Fiji has taken an even more explicit step this year. In July, it signed the Ocean of Peace Alliance with Australia, its first mutual defense pact with Australia, which obliges both countries to come to each other's aid in case of need. The treaty coincides with an intensification of economic and digital cooperation with other partners, while Fiji simultaneously maintains its relationship with Beijing. The result is a region where small island states are not necessarily choosing a side, but rather trying to expand their options by leveraging the rivalry between the great powers.

The competition for the Pacific also involves the cables that connect the islands to the world, the ports, and the roads that structure the archipelagos. For the region's governments, the rivalry between the great powers offers a possibility that was harder to exploit a few years ago: multiplying partners and avoiding dependence on just one.