The Houthis double the bet and strain Iran's war

There is a strait south of the Red Sea that helps explain why the Houthis have ceased to be just an actor in the Yemen war: Bab el-Mandeb, the maritime passage that connects the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea and through which 12% of global trade passes. In recent weeks, the group, aligned with Iran, has advanced along the western coast of Yemen and has consolidated positions at strategic points in the strait. At the same time, has resumed attacks against Saudi Arabia and has announced a blockade against ships linked to the kingdom.Now, the Houthis have a position that allows them to threaten one of the main maritime routes between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. And they do so while the war between Iran and the United States has turned the Strait of Hormuz into the other major focus of maritime tension in the region.“The Houthis have a real capacity for pressure. They cannot indefinitely close traffic through the Red Sea, but they can certainly increase costs, generate uncertainty, and periodically interrupt commercial and energy flows,” explains Neil Quilliam to ARA, a researcher at the Middle East and North Africa program at the international analysis center Chatham House. According to the expert, they do not need to close the strait: it is enough for them to increase the risk.If sailing through the Red Sea is too expensive or unsafe, companies can divert ships around the Cape of Good Hope, on the Atlantic coast of South Africa, with more days of navigation and higher costs. Thus, Tehran and its allies can exert pressure from two different points on two key routes for global trade and energy.The Houthis, who officially call themselves Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), are part of the so-called "axis of resistance," the network of armed and political actors linked to Iran, and they receive military and technological support from Tehran. A 2024 UN report documents transfers of military material, assistance, and training linked to Iran and other actors in the axis to the Zaydi Shia group. Although Iran denies supplying weapons to the group and claims its support is only political, the Houthis have gone from being a local militia in northern Yemen to possessing about 350,000 fighters and a significant arsenal of missiles, drones, and anti-ship weapons.The role of the Houthis in the US-Iran confrontation

Various reports from the analysis centers Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Chatham House point out that the Houthis can now act as a negotiation instrument for Iran before Washington, in a war that has already been going on for seven months. But this does not mean that Tehran controls the group's decisions. The movement has a command structure, territorial interests, and its own political agenda. Control of the coast, in fact, responds to its own interests: it gives them more capacity to pressure Saudi Arabia, strengthens their position ahead of future negotiations regarding Yemen, and expands their control over the oil and gas in the areas they dominate.

But it is precisely this autonomy that makes the group useful to Iran: they can act according to their own interests and, at the same time, generate costs and pressure on Tehran's adversaries without each movement necessarily implying a direct confrontation between Washington and Iran. In this context, there is a significant paradox: Washington has avoided, for the moment, reopening a military campaign against the Houthis, a group it considers terrorist, while they expand their territorial control and pressure one of the United States' main allies in the region, Saudi Arabia.For Riyadh, which has supported the internationally recognized Yemeni government since the beginning of the civil war and has intervened directly in the conflict against the Houthis, the group's advance comes at an especially delicate moment: with Hormuz closed de facto and the group's attacks resuming, its export routes are once again under pressure.“The Houthi threat to Saudi Arabia is very serious,” adds Quilliam. “Recent attacks have demonstrated that they maintain the capacity to strike critical energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and to disrupt export routes.” Riyadh can absorb isolated attacks, says the expert, but a sustained campaign that affected exports or investor confidence could harm both the Saudi economy and global energy markets.Support movements for Riyadh

Saudi Arabia has already sought to strengthen the support of its allies. The United Kingdom has agreed to provide aerial refueling to Saudi aircraft for defensive missions and Riyadh has communicated that it will organize an urgent meeting with Turkey and Pakistan, partners of the new Mecca Agreement, signed in August, to address formulas for supporting the kingdom. And here Israel appears.

The Israeli press has begun to talk about a possible rapprochement between the two countries following the new escalation. Both share concerns about Iran and common interests in the protection of maritime routes and energy infrastructure. This could favor more cooperation in intelligence, missile defense, and maritime surveillance, but, for the moment, an open alliance cannot be taken for granted.The Houthis began as a local movement in northern Yemen, but today they are an armed actor, a territorial authority, and a regional ally of Iran with influence over maritime security. Their strategy is twofold: to consolidate their gains in Yemen and to use the Bab el-Mandeb to pressure Saudi Arabia. For Iran, this opens another front of pressure on Washington without having to control every move the group makes or exposing itself directly to an American response.