Saudi Arabia seeks to be the other great ally of the United States in the Middle East
The war in Iran and Israel's prestige crisis drive Riyadh's role as a vital piece for Washington in the region
BeirutFor decades, the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia was built on a known balance: Washington guaranteed the kingdom's security, and Riyadh ensured the stability of the global energy market. A pact born in the second half of the 20th century that turned Saudi Arabia into a strategic partner for American policy in the Middle East.
This model, however, is evolving. The war with Iran has not created Saudi Arabia's new role, but it has accelerated a transformation that Washington and Riyadh had already begun to build in recent years. In a Middle East marked by rivalry with Tehran, competition for energy and trade routes, and the search for a new regional balance, the United States needs more than an oil ally; it needs a partner with political, economic, and diplomatic capacity.
Traditionally, Israel was the main pillar of American strategy in the region regarding security. Its military cooperation, intelligence capabilities, and technological superiority made it Washington's central ally. Saudi Arabia played another role, that of a major energy power, with oil production that had a direct impact on the global economy. Now, the new regional scenario also requires an Arab actor with influence, financial resources, and political legitimacy to accompany American strategy. And this is the position that Saudi Arabia aspires to occupy.
Mohammed bin Salman has been driving a profound transformation of the kingdom for years. His Vision 2030 project seeks not only to reduce economic dependence on oil but also to change Saudi Arabia's role in the world. The venture includes technological investments, artificial intelligence, industrial development, civil nuclear energy, and a greater capacity for diplomatic influence.
Therefore, the relationship with Washington no longer responds solely to the old exchange of security for energy. Saudi Arabia no longer wants to be seen solely as a country protected by the United States, but as a partner capable of negotiating from its own position. The negotiation of the Saudi civil nuclear program precisely reflects this new era.
For Washington, participating in the kingdom's nuclear development represents an opportunity to maintain long-term strategic influence and prevent China from occupying this space. For Riyadh, it means moving towards greater technological and energy autonomy. Because, although oil remains fundamental, it is no longer enough to explain Saudi Arabia's current weight. The kingdom is also a financial power thanks to its sovereign wealth fund, a key player in international investments, a strategic point for trade routes, and a country with growing diplomatic capacity.
The change in tone with Tehran
The war with Iran has reinforced this trend. In recent years, Riyadh had tried to reduce tensions with Tehran and open a period of dialogue, culminating in the restoration of diplomatic relations in 2023 with Chinese mediation. But the spread of the regional conflict and attacks by Iran-allied groups have once again made security a priority.
The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and actions by Iraqi militias linked to Tehran have shown that the kingdom's stability is directly connected to the rivalry between the United States and Iran. The Saudi response has also evolved: from a policy based mainly on containment and discreet diplomacy to a greater willingness to respond alongside Washington against Tehran-backed actors. The message is clear: Saudi Arabia does not want to be limited to relying on American protection; it wants to show that it also has the capacity to act as a regional power.
But this new relationship is also marked by a paradox. Saudi Arabia needs American military support, its defense systems, and its technology, but it no longer accepts the old relationship of dependence. Riyadh enters this new phase with a greater negotiating capacity and the will to define its own interests. For Washington, the challenge is precisely this: to maintain a strategic alliance with a partner that continues to need American protection, but which aspires to play a much more autonomous role in the region.
The change, therefore, does not mean that the United States is replacing Israel with Saudi Arabia. Israel will continue to be its main military ally in the Middle East. But Washington now seeks to complement this alliance with a second pillar capable of providing political influence, economic capacity, and diplomatic weight in an increasingly complex region. The new reality is that Saudi Arabia needs the United States to guarantee its security, but the United States also needs Saudi Arabia to maintain its influence in the new Middle East.