Eitvydo Bajaruno: "Putin tries to involve us and tell us: your support for Ukraine will not be free, you will have war"

BarcelonaEitvydas Bajarūnas is a renowned Lithuanian diplomat and expert in foreign policy and international security. He has been ambassador to Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Russia, where he held the highest position in Lithuania's diplomatic mission in Moscow until three months after Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We speak with him in a context of growing threat due to Russia's hybrid war against Europe.

In recent weeks, there have been constant alerts from European leaders and intelligence reports warning that the risk has increased and that there could be attacks on NATO territory. Do you believe there is really a higher risk now?

— First of all, it is necessary to understand the situation in which Russia finds itself. The front line in Ukraine is not moving; the Russian economy is not only stagnant, but is doing very poorly, with a large deficit and an increase in the cost of living. Russia's capacity to sell oil and gas is increasingly limited. And, on top of that, the Ukrainians are constantly bombing Russian territory, companies and oil factories, and this also increases the psychological pressure. Vladimir Putin must find another target. So now the target is the West. When Putin talks about the war, he does not talk about Ukraine; he says that Russia is at war against the West. It works better for him to sell it to his population. "Why aren't you moving? Our country is five times larger economically than Ukraine. Why can't you win?", people might reproach him. The propaganda machine's answer is: "Because we are against the entire West. The entire West is against us". But it is not just a question of internal rhetoric, but Putin is also trying to involve us and tell us: your support for Ukraine will not be free, you will have war. I will make your life impossible. Every day you will hear sirens, loudspeakers with emergency messages, and your leaders will speak every day, and this is also to create an atmosphere of nervousness.

What does he hope to achieve, with this, among the European population?

— In some countries, the population might start asking their politicians why we support Ukraine, with the cost that it entails. Furthermore, Russia is eager to test the reaction capacity of NATO and the EU. Russia wants to demonstrate that they are obsolete organizations. That is why it is, without a doubt, in the curve of planning more and more operations. But one thing must be said very clearly: we are not in a situation where a conventional war has to start tomorrow. Perhaps it will come, but, in the first place, Russia does not have the resources. In 2022, when all the signs were arriving that Russia could attack Ukraine, there were 200,000 soldiers near the Ukrainian territory and they were conducting exercises. All this nervousness in Europe was a fact. But now Russia does not have the resources to start a conventional war.

But yes, another type of war?

— Russia can do unpleasant things, a drone in Vilnius, an explosion in Germany, some attack against other countries, infrastructure, cyberattacks... and this is what we can expect in the future. In fact, it is already happening and it is increasing. That is why we also see that Western leaders are sending messages, Western intelligence is sharing this information, warning the population. But we must understand that making us nervous, making us talk about this every day, is also in Russia's interest. They are already achieving their goals. Society has begun to ask itself: "Are we prepared? What will happen if Russia attacks us?" So, without starting the war, they are already attacking the West. That is why we must react. We must take it seriously, because it is already happening. But we must not overreact. And the best response is not nervousness, but making plans and being prepared to react.

And how should one react?

— The civil defense exercises that have taken place this week in Lithuania are the best response. Europe and NATO must do more, not just by reacting rhetorically, but by making specific plans: how to prevent the Russians from doing this, how to inform the population about what they should do in the first 24 hours of a crisis. What should the population of Germany or Spain do if a drone were to strike a power plant and, in winter, they were left without heating? This is what would create an atmosphere among the population not of hatred, but of a sense that our governments are prepared. Governments need to understand the complexity of the situation and not overreact to every signal from Russia. Let them react, but let them not overreact.

In the south of Europe, the risk is felt differently.

— It is important that the citizens of Spain or Italy understand that being far from Russia and Belarus does not make them less vulnerable. They can also be the target of an attack. And this is the essence of the approach we have in Eastern Europe, such as in Lithuania and Finland, where we talk about a whole-of-society approach. That is to say, everyone must know what to do in case of a crisis or war; what to do to survive for three days without electricity, for example. It is not about generating nerves, but about preparing ourselves. That is why we advocate this approach in other countries.

How do you interpret the Kremlin's recent threat to use nuclear weapons in the face of a blockade of Kaliningrad?

— I would not interpret the sudden focus on Kaliningrad as proof that Russia has already decided to take military action there. NATO itself says it sees no imminent Russian threat to allied territory and has explicitly rejected the claim that its activities threaten Kaliningrad. My interpretation is that these are primarily messages of deterrence and information warfare. Russia is trying to establish a narrative that NATO is threatening Kaliningrad, which allows Moscow to argue that it is responding and not escalating. At the same time, we must pay attention because these narratives can prepare the information ecosystem for provocations or hybrid actions in the Baltic region. What concerns me most is not necessarily an imminent conventional attack, but the risk of escalation and miscalculation, especially when nuclear rhetoric, military exercises, drone incidents, and hybrid operations increasingly overlap in the same relatively small geographical space.

What is the risk that a hybrid incident accidentally turns into a military conflict?

— If NATO and the governments of EU states do not react to threats, it is bad. But the other extreme, overreacting, is also dangerous. There are people who say that if Russian drones fly over Lithuania, we should attack. But we must exercise restraint. We must be firm and clear with Russia; it must be clear to them that if they cross a red line, NATO will respond, but we cannot overreact to each of the incidents, because this spiral of escalation can reach an enormous level.

There are analysts who already consider that we can speak of a war of Russia against Europe.

— Three phases of conflict must be distinguished: hybrid attacks, military escalation, and total war. We are currently, without a doubt, in the first phase. There is a hybrid war. But we are very far from a military attack or total war, and I do not believe we will reach that point, because Putin does not have the resources for another conventional war. But I agree that we cannot think that we are in a period of peace. And that is why we must change our mentality: we are no longer in that paradise of peace following the Cold War, but we are still far from a military escalation.