Neither with Iran nor with the EU: China will never be an ally
In 1950, Mao Zedong sent Chinese troops to fight alongside their North Korean "brothers" against the United States for control of the Korean Peninsula. Mao had just established the People's Republic, and the ideological alliance between Asian socialist movements was strong. The Chinese communist troops, worn down by the war against the Japanese and the civil war, were willing to come to the aid of their North Korean ally, despite the People's Republic's precarious and weak situation.
The situation was completely the opposite a few days ago, when the United States and Israel decided to attack Iran. China has condemned the attackBut he hasn't done—nor will he do—much more. The most transatlantic intellectuals have spoken in recent years of a "axis of autocracies" —China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela— that supposedly threatened the world democratic order. But China didn't jump to Maduro's aid, nor will it do so now with Iran. Just as it has done with the new Venezuelan government, if Iran's were to fall, Beijing would pragmatically adapt to the new authorities and resume doing business with them. Putin is a different story: China's longest border is with Russia, a critical northern flank for Beijing's security. If there were an anti-China regime change in Moscow, we would see a remilitarization of Siberia.
Today's China is not the Soviet Union. The Russians had universalist ideological goals, seeking to extend their model internationally by promoting guerrilla and subversive movements. Mao followed a similar pattern, supporting insurgencies in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. But China in recent decades is a very different entity: its interests are purely national. China's major territorial conflicts are in its immediate periphery—Taiwan, the Himalayas, the South China Sea—linked to its patriotic narrative and sense of territorial insecurity. China will not engage in war. proxy Beijing will not engage with Iran, nor will it deploy troops on the ground to the Middle East, as the Soviets or Americans did. When it comes to involvement in foreign conflicts, Beijing is an extremely conservative power.
China is very wary of signing formal alliances with anyone. Even the much-vaunted "unlimited friendship" with Moscow has no real validity. China adapts to the realities of the world—pragmatically or cynically, depending on who you ask—primarily looking out for its own interests. China's perspective is fundamentally nationalist. Despite still being governed by a Communist Party, Beijing is skeptical of anything that smacks of universal values or internationalist missions. It lacks Napoleonic ambitions or the creation of a global empire.
At the same time, the lack of that universalism, that malleable pragmatism, makes any hope Europeans have of having a committed and stable partner in China more of an illusion. If the Iranians cannot count on China in the event of an attack, neither can we if our objectives do not align with its interests. In any case, however many plot twists China may employ, right now Beijing seems like a haven of stability and predictability compared to the United States.