Hezbollah is quietly rebuilding its military power
The Lebanese Shiite militia maintains its social influence while rebuilding its military arm, which was weakened by Israel's attack.
BeirutOne year laterIsraeli attack that killed Hassan Nasrallah And after devastating much of southern and eastern Lebanon, Hezbollah is attempting to recover. The Lebanese Shiite militia is doing so quietly, prioritizing internal reorganization over open confrontation. Its political and social apparatus remains intact, but its deeply affected military structure is undergoing a reconfiguration process overseen by Iran.
According to Hussain Abdul-Hussain, an analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, although the Lebanese government promised to work toward the militia's disarmament, the opposite is happening: "We are witnessing an intensification of its rearmament." This fact, he emphasizes, worries Israel and is pushing the Israeli army to reinforce its own capabilities, thus fueling a dynamic of escalation. The analyst maintains that, far from having disappeared, the Shiite movement is adapting to a new equilibrium in which "discretion has become its main survival strategy."
Nasrallah's death in September 2024 plunged the party into near paralysis. Shortly afterward, Iran's Quds Force intervened directly, and in less than two weeks, agents sent from Tehran restructured the chain of command, replaced mid-level officials, and reduced the group's public visibility. This process confirmed a trend that began before the war: a clearer separation between the military wing and the political apparatus, which now operate almost as two complementary but autonomous entities.
Tactical withdrawal
South of Lebanon, where numerous towns were left partially destroyed, Hezbollah has formally accepted a reinforced presence of the Lebanese army and UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping mission. However, diplomats and observers on the ground agree that this apparent withdrawal is primarily tactical. The group maintains local networks, logistical structures, and informal control over a large part of the Shia population. Its network of social services, hospitals, and schools continues to function normally, thus guaranteeing a bond of dependency that no other Lebanese actor has managed to match.
"A full political presence, with minimal military visibility; this is the formula that allows it to maintain influence without provoking a new Israeli offensive," notes political scientist Sami Nader.
Pragmatism with Reconstruction
The reconstruction of the south is the other front. Damages exceed $10 billion, according to official estimates, and the international community is conditioning aid on a disarmament commitment. Hezbollah has reacted pragmatically, promoting local rehabilitation campaigns through its civilian arm, Jihad al-Bina, but avoiding a visible role in reconstruction forums promoted by the United Nations or the Gulf donor countries. This double standard—collaborating without relinquishing control—is, according to Nader, a natural extension of the logic of resistance, in which the state is delegated only the bare minimum necessary for survival. In the political sphere, the movement has also retreated. Its members of parliament remain active, and its alliance with the Amal movement guarantees it institutional influence, although internal cohesion has become the priority. "Young cadres, trained in Tehran and Damascus, have assumed new responsibilities. This generation is less ideological and more technocratic. Their task is not confrontation, but the reconstruction of the movement," warns the Lebanese political scientist.
For its part, Israel maintains the pressure. In recent weeks, the Israeli army has carried out airstrikes and limited incursions into border areas, arguing that Hezbollah is trying to rebuild its operational infrastructure. These operations demonstrate that the ceasefire imposed after the 2024 offensive is fragile.
Washington is trying to take advantage of this impasse to strengthen the role of the Lebanese state. The Homeland Shield Plan, promoted by President Joseph Aoun, envisions the Lebanese army regaining full control of the south in five phases, although its implementation is progressing slowly. Aoun acknowledged in September that "it was better not to provoke a wounded beast," alluding to Hezbollah's remaining power.
Iran, behind the scenes
Meanwhile, Iran continues to act behind the scenes as guarantor and supervisor. According to diplomatic sources cited by Reuters, Quds Force officers remain in Lebanon to advise the movement's new leadership. Their objective is not to prepare an offensive, but to ensure that the group maintains the capacity for influence that Tehran considers essential within its regional network. Today, the Shiite party seems to have accepted that its survival depends less on weapons than on its ability to remain indispensable within the Lebanese system. It adapts, retrenizes, and maintains its presence discreetly. It no longer needs to demonstrate strength, but persistence.