Elections in the land of disenchantment

Beirut (Lebanon)After two decades of failed transitions, the Iraqi political landscape reveals a fragile balance between forces no longer vying for power, but rather for their share within the system. The wave of protests that challenged the sectarian regime in 2019... after the American invasion It revealed its lack of legitimacy, but the subsequent repression consolidated an authoritarian model. The system has closed in on itself, with the same coalitions, the same leaders, and an increasingly disengaged electorate. Next Tuesday, between 21 and 28 million people—according to official sources from mid-June and published figures—are called to elect the 329 members of parliament.

But more than a democratic exercise, the process seems like an operation of internal consolidation within a fragmented structure, dominated by patronage networks and external oversight. Twenty-two years after the American invasion and sixteen since the end of the civil war, Iraq remains trapped between institutional erosion and an exhausted society, disconnected from its ruling classPrime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is the clear favorite for a second term, according to Reuters, thanks to the support of the Shiite Coordination Framework bloc and a pragmatic strategy that balances his relationship with Washington and Tehran. His government has stabilized the currency—100 meals are equivalent to 7 euro cents—and contained internal tensions, but has not addressed the reforms demanded by the youth mobilized six years ago. His priority is preserving control of the state apparatus rather than transforming it. The country goes to the polls in a deceptive calm. Violence has fallen to historic lows, although selective repression, the exclusion of independent candidates, and the redrawing of electoral districts ensure that the vote remains within margins acceptable to the elites. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) observatory, a non-profit organization that collects, analyzes, and maps real-time data on political violence and protest events worldwide, points out that political competition has been reduced to a struggle between factions, rather than a dispute over a national project.

The sectarian system of power-sharing, the muhasasaHe continues to block all reforms. Each ministry is a fiefdom of a single party, and each party manages its own parallel economy. According to Sajad Jiyad, an analyst at The Century Foundation, the elites benefit from this.status quo And the ballot boxes only serve to legitimize that distribution. Turnout could fall below 40% despite incentives and vote buying. think tank The US Atlantic Council warns that citizen apathy reflects the belief that real power is decided outside of elections.

Pressure in Kurdistan

To the north, the fracture between the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan It has paralyzed the regional parliament and weakened its position vis-à-vis Baghdad, which uses federal budget payments and control of oil as leverage. The issue at stake is not identity politics, but access to resources. The economy is sustained by oil, which accounts for 90% of state revenue. But corruption, lack of investment, and prolonged drought exacerbate structural instability.

Iran retains considerable influence, although its control is no longer uniform. Shiite militias maintain ties with Tehran, but the government in Al-Sudan is pursuing a sovereignty agenda that seeks to balance relations with regional power centers. Renad Mansour, of Chatham House in London, points out that Iraq is trying to establish itself as a functioning state within an unstable environment.

The United States, under the presidency of Donald Trump, maintains a policy of discreet containment, with less military presence and more technical support. Washington is trying to prevent Iraq from falling into Iran's exclusive sphere of influence without bearing the cost of a new reconstruction effort. Turkey, after reducing its military presence in the north and advancing in the disarmament of the PKKIt has recalibrated its influence toward the economic sphere, promoting logistics corridors and energy projects.

The Iraqi chessboard has transformed into a space of contained competition among regional powers, where each actor seeks to secure its influence without triggering a direct confrontation. What happens in Baghdad has repercussions in Damascus and Beirut, because the same balances between militias, weak states, and external patronage run along the arc connecting Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

The Iraqi paradox is that current stability rests on a system incapable of reforming itself. Tuesday's elections do not measure Iraq's capacity for political renewal, but rather the regime's ability to maintain the appearance of normality. No blog has an interest in altering thestatus quoAnd the citizenry, deprived of alternatives, takes refuge in disillusionment. The legitimacy conferred by the results will be more formal than real. After the polls, the country remains divided along sectarian lines, with institutions functioning as extensions of the parties, power wielded without accountability, and a society dissolving into indifference.