Andrius Kubilius: "I don't know why Spain should be allowed to spend only 2.1% of its GDP on defense."

BrusselsThe office of the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius, is on the tenth floor of the European Commission's Berlaymont building in Brussels. Several members of his team are already waiting for us, but the one most eager to talk is a young intern. He's also Lithuanian and says he knows some Catalan. "A coffee with milk, please," he demonstrates. But soon, the conversation turns to a crucial issue in Europe: the war in Ukraine is experienced very differently in Eastern Europe—closer to the Russian threat—than in the southern countries. The young man proudly states that, when his internship is over, he will do his mandatory military service in Lithuania.

This conversation is a preview of Kubilius's words and speech. "Do you think this interview will resonate?" he asks. "It depends on what I say," this journalist replies. However, the Commissioner is clear about the message he wants to convey. He is one of the members of the European Commission who adopts a more political tone and, as the representative of the Baltics, is prepared to pressure the European Union as a whole in favor of rearmament to prepare for the threat posed by Vladimir Putin's expansionism.

Thus, in a very clear warning to Pedro Sánchez and in the same vein as NATOThe European Commission warns that Spain will have to spend more than 2.1% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, which is the figure that the Moncloa Palace intends to allocate to it and with which it promises that it will already achieve the military objectives agreed by the Atlantic Alliance. at the Hague summit last JuneAlthough all the other allies admit they will have to reach 3.5%.

Why do you think the European Union should rearm to the levels Donald Trump is talking about?

— It is necessary to compensate for all the years we have gone without investing in our defense. We relied on American protection, and now we have seen that, without a doubt, we must build our military capabilities for two main reasons. On the one hand, because of the war that Russia has started against Ukraine. On the other, because all the intelligence services of the member states predict that Russia may be prepared to test Article 5 of NATO [which stipulates that an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all allies and, consequently, the entire Atlantic Alliance may respond as such]. And, to build our military capabilities, we need to invest large amounts of resources. The goal is to reach 3.5% before 2035 [the same thing that Trump imposed on NATO].

But there are southern European countries, such as Spain, that are reluctant.

— I certainly can't get involved in Spain's internal political debates, but we should remember that European and NATO defense policy is based on the principle of collective defense. Therefore, the defense of all depends heavily on what each country does individually. Ultimately, if any country doesn't invest enough in its military capabilities, it weakens not only itself but the entire EU and NATO. That's why solidarity in building military capabilities is an obligation for all member states.

Is 2.1% of GDP on defense [the rate that Spain plans to spend] enough?

— The commitments made by NATO member states are sufficient. Member states, currently spending an average of around 2.1% of their GDP on defense, have pledged to gradually increase this figure to 3.5% by 2035. This was agreed upon at the NATO summit, where all allies agreed on the capabilities they need to strengthen. To meet these objectives, significantly more investment than has been made to date is required—more than the current 2.1%.

Is it possible to achieve NATO's military capability objectives with defense spending of only 2.1% of GDP?

— I don't know what kind of capabilities NATO and Spain have agreed upon. They know that. But when all the other countries are investing, or have committed to investing, 3.5%, I don't know what the reasons could be for Spain somehow being allowed to invest only 2.1%.

Do you think the EU should become militarily independent from the United States?

— Europe must be independent in its defense, not in relation to the United States or any other country. We must be able to defend ourselves independently. This will take time, and it is now, as we face Russian threats, that we must build our military capabilities and be prepared for the American shift towards the Indo-Pacific.

What should the relationship between the EU and NATO be on the path to that independence?

— The EU does not compete with NATO. NATO works with its member states to develop military capability objectives, such as acquiring more tanks, artillery platforms, drones, and other new weapons systems. The EU, on the other hand, provides the added value of additional European funding, which NATO cannot, and helps member states achieve NATO's objectives.

Do you think that a more military-capable EU would have more international weight and negotiating power to achieve, for example, better trade agreements with the United States?

— I wouldn't mix them. Trade is trade. It's clear we'd like to have a better understanding on trade matters with the United States. However, We have really reached a good agreement.especially considering the conditions we have faced with the new American administration, which headed towards a tariff war.

He believes that the EU should move towards greater military union and that joint initiatives such as the drone wall Could this be a first step?

— The EU is not a military organization like NATO. Now, bearing this in mind, Europe must be able to defend itself in order to maintain peace, as the ancient Romans said: If you want peace, prepare for war.Or prepare for defense. This is our goal, to maintain peace, and that is why we support Ukraine, which is defending not only itself, but the entire EU.

Could greater coordination and unity among European militaries be positive for rearmament and allow for spending less money?

— This would definitely be a great help for rearmament. For example, allowing member states to jointly purchase weapons makes it cheaper for them. Our experience tells us that you can save up to 30%. It's also positive for Europe's defense industry, such as Spain's, which is very strong, because it provides predictability and large, long-term contracts. However, at the moment, the European defense industry is very fragmented, and defense policies are a sovereign prerogative of each state.

Are you afraid that the EU's rearmament could lead to cuts in the welfare state, such as health or education?

— It is up to the Member States to invest in what they consider a priority. However, we must remember that if we cannot guarantee peace, people will suffer greatly in every way—socially, economically, and environmentally. Therefore, investing in defense is crucial to ensuring peace as the foundation of our social development.

— Furthermore, it's worth remembering that investment in defense, and especially in the defense industry, is one of the most important tools for developing a country's economy, creating good jobs and salaries. This is particularly true in countries like Spain, which have a highly developed industry with large companies like Indra, and which can benefit from significant investments.

Can European industry handle all this massive rearmament or buy weapons, for example, from the United States?

— We want to significantly strengthen our defense industry. From a military perspective, having a developed industry on the European continent, not far from a potential conflict zone, is also important. We also want it for reasons of economic development, as I mentioned earlier. However, our current industry is weak in terms of its production capacity and our needs, which is why much of the EU's money is spent outside the EU. It's a vicious cycle, and we need to break it with initiatives such as joint arms procurement. In any case, our industry doesn't currently produce everything we need, and that's why we're spending considerable sums of money buying weapons from the United States or, for example, South Korea.

Could Ukraine's accession to the EU help in this regard, and in terms of military strategy in general?

— Of course. Ukraine has a unique experience, one that no other EU member state has. They have a battle-tested military force of about 800,000 peopleAnd it has been fighting against a Russian army that is also very experienced in battle. If Putin decides to launch a new aggression against the EU or NATO, we need to know what we are up against: a Russian army that is much more robust than it was even in 2022. That is why integrating Ukrainian military capabilities will be one of the EU's most important steps to strengthen our defense, including in the defense industry.

Do you think the EU should learn more and, for example, get up to speed with the technology of new warfare, such as shooting down drones?

— We are very slow to learn the lessons of Ukraine, which has learned by enduring all kinds of provocations from Russia. The incursions of some 20 Russian drones into Poland have demonstrated that not only Poland, but most EU member states lack the capabilities to detect and intercept drones effectively and without incurring exorbitant costs.

Finally, how do you assess your first year as Commissioner for Defence, the first in the history of the EU?

— These are not easy times, but I believe we have accomplished a great deal this year. The EU, in terms of defense, has changed substantially, and we have been able to agree on one of the main defense measures, namely the European rearmament plan. This is a very important milestone, and we have achieved it with remarkable speed. This means that the European Commission is doing its job exceptionally well, and I am proud of that.