Does Putin have plans to attack NATO? This is how it is seen from Russia

Moscow"It is not only nonsense, but also an example of provocation." Vladimir Putin has grown tired of denying his responsibility for the acts of sabotage that European authorities attribute to Moscow and of dismissing Western intelligence reports that warn that Russia is preparing to attack NATO. On the contrary, in the Russian capital they claim to feel threatened by the growing militarization of Europe and fear that the allies will use Ukraine to try to inflict a strategic defeat on them. In fact, they are convinced that the Atlantic Alliance is already in conflict with Russia and that, therefore, European countries are legitimate targets, if not for a conventional war, then for a hybrid war.

"Russia is neither drawing up plans nor does it have the intention of attacking NATO member states", points out to ARA Vasily Klimov, a senior researcher at the Center for International Security of IMEMO, one of the most prestigious institutions on global policy in that country. Russian academics frame the current spiral of tension in the security dilemma, a concept that describes a situation in which the measures a state takes to feel more secure make another state feel in danger and, consequently, also choose to arm itself.

However, while Russia argues that the invasion of Ukraine is partially justified by the approach of the Alliance to its borders, the community partners maintain that the Russian aggression was deliberate and that, therefore, it is the Kremlin that took the first step in the escalation. It must be remembered that, back then, Putin also denied until the last moment that he had any intentions of attacking Ukraine. Obviously, it was a lie.

Vladimir Putin understands that his country is genuinely threatened by the rearmament of Europe and by the possible deployment of nuclear weapons in the Baltic countries, and that the leaders of these states use "anti-Russian hysteria" and the fear of a confrontation to unite society against an external enemy and relaunch the defense industry. "The main cause of the current crisis, as paradoxical as it may seem, is the fear that Western elites have of Russia," states Klimov. "In the West, the historical fear of an uncontrolled military expansion of Russia across Europe still persists, but that is an invention of the intelligence services and the leaders of the countries of Eastern Europe," he adds.

The Russian president has raised the tone against Europe as Ukrainian long-range attacks have been causing more damage inside the country, as he considers that they would be impossible without the "direct participation" of NATO. Thus, Moscow perceives Kyiv as the executing arm of European capitals. "The goal of the West's current strategy is not to contain Russia, as happened during the Cold War, but to crush it," writes Dmitri Trenin, president of the Russian International Affairs Council, a think tank very influential in Moscow regarding foreign policy.

Towards a period of instability

"Moscow wants to subdue Ukraine, at the very least, and recover its sphere of influence," highlights Russian researcher Igor Gretski to ARA, from the International Centre for Defence and Security, based in Estonia. "To achieve this goal, it acts in a very aggressive manner and uses a wide range of tools, including threats of a direct armed conflict and the use of nuclear weapons," he explains. Trenin himself advocates for sending "an unequivocal signal" that at some point Russia could resort to a tactical nuclear bombing.

But the consensus among the majority of specialists is that Putin is not in a position to open a new front while mired in Ukraine. "Russia does not have the necessary resources to simultaneously carry out a large-scale conventional war against Ukraine and against NATO," stresses Gretski. According to him, all of the Kremlin's threats are intended to make the allies stop arms shipments to Volodymyr Zelensky, and that is why it "sows fear among European populations at the prospect of an armed confrontation with Russia".

And the same logic continues with hybrid warfare. The Kremlin does not acknowledge the sabotage or drone shipments. It often complains that community authorities point the finger at it self-interestedly, without evidence, and that they overreact to incidents that are normal in a context of war. However, despite not claiming them, it implies that they could be justified taking into account NATO's involvement in Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia also feels like a victim of the West's hybrid war. It accuses European countries of exacerbating anti-Russian propaganda, funding sectors that try to overthrow the regime, or applying draconian sanctions against them.

Trenin admits that the destabilization of Europe may have positive consequences for Russia with the rise of far-right and far-left formations more predisposed to negotiate with the Kremlin. In any case, he considers that the only "minimally acceptable basis" for future relations with Brussels and to restore deterrence on the continent involves winning the war in Ukraine. And, even then, he concludes that the clash between Russia and NATO will persist "for a long time" and that we are heading towards a "very different" period compared to the "relative stability" of the second half of the 20th century.