Caution in the Middle East ahead of a possible fall of the Tehran regime

BeirutThe Protests rocking Iran And international pressure on the ayatollahs' regime has opened up a hypothesis that until recently seemed remote: the end of the Islamic Republic that emerged in 1979. This possibility not only redefines Iran's internal balance but also forces regional actors to anticipate a scenario without one of the pillars that has structured the Gold Policy. More than an expectation of immediate change, the region faces the prospect of an uncertain transition, whose consequences extend far beyond the country's borders.

In the Gulf countries, the prevailing attitude is one of prudence. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman have intensified diplomatic contacts to avoid both a direct military escalation and a sudden collapse of the state. The central argument is twofold: on the one hand, a war would affect global energy markets; on the other, a disorderly fall of the regime would create a vacuum that would be difficult to manage. Riyadh, which recently had resumed relations with Tehran After years of open rivalry, he warned Washington of the risks of replicating scenarios like those of Libya or Syria, where foreign intervention precipitated state fragmentation and protracted conflicts.

The fear of a power vacuum extends beyond the Gulf. The experience of the civil wars of the last decade has instilled a shared concern among Arab capitals: the fall of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily imply the emergence of a stable order. In this calculation, Iran represents not only an ideological power, but also a state structure whose implosion would have cascading effects on the political, military, and economic networks that currently span several countries in the region.

Lebanon is the most immediate case. HezbollahBuilt as a direct projection of the Iranian revolution, it depends heavily on political, financial, and doctrinal support from Tehran. A fall of the Islamic Republic would mean the loss of its strategic backer and would accelerate a debate already underway in Beirut about the future of their arsenal and its role within the political system.

Deprived of transfers that for years have reached figures close to one billion dollars annually, the movement must choose between transforming itself into a party fully integrated into Lebanese institutions, reducing itself to a local armed force with limited capabilities, or fragmenting internally. Competition with the Amal group for leadership of the Shia community, thus far contained by influence-sharing agreements, could be reignited. For the Lebanese balance, the question is not only whether Hezbollah would survive, but in what form and under what correlation of forces.

Ankara's pragmatism

Turkey views the Iranian crisis from a pragmatic perspective. Ankara has avoided openly siding with either the protesters or the repression, and opposes foreign military intervention. Its interests are concrete: Iran is a gas supplier, a trading partner, and a border neighbor in a region already saturated with conflict. An Iranian collapse could generate new refugee flows into Turkish territory and disrupt the delicate Kurdish balance on both sides of the border. Therefore, Turkish diplomacy presents itself as an intermediary and promoter of de-escalation, aiming to maintain influence regardless of the outcome in Tehran. In Iraq, the potential collapse of the Iranian regime would have a direct impact on the network of militias and parties that have consolidated under its patronage since 2003. The Popular Mobilization Forces, many of them linked to the Revolutionary Guard, could lose coordination, funding, and strategic direction. This would open a phase of internal readjustment among Shia, Kurdish, and Sunni actors in a state still struggling to consolidate its institutions, where the risk of fragmentation or clashes between armed factions cannot be ruled out.

For Israel, the hypothesis of the ayatollahs' fall poses a strategic dilemma. The Islamic Republic has been its main regional adversary for decades, both because of its nuclear program and its support for Hezbollah and other armed militias. Their disappearance would eliminate this hostile axis but raise questions about the control of the military capabilities accumulated by Iran and its allies.

Faced with these uncertainties, the Iranian opposition in exile projects an alternative scenario. Prince Reza Pahlavi has presented a roadmap which includes the end of the military nuclear program, the renunciation of support for regional armed groups, and diplomatic normalization with the West. His proposal envisions an Iran reintegrated into global energy markets and with institutions open to international capital. For now, it remains a theoretical vision, lacking clarity on the transition mechanisms or the internal balance of power that could sustain it.

Thus, the potential end of the Islamic Republic is shaping up less as an end point than as the beginning of a profound reconfiguration. Between expectations of change and fear of chaos, regional actors are preparing for a scenario without recent precedent. The central question is not only whether the Iranian regime will fall, but how the aftermath will be managed. A substantial part of the future balance of power in the Middle East will hinge on this response.