What was Feijóo really worried about on the day of the DANA storm?
Finally, the president of the People's Party (PP), Alberto Núñez Feijóo, has handed over to the judge investigating the DANA storm his messages from Mazón during the critical hours of the catastrophe. It's worth remembering that Feijóo had only previously submitted the messages of the former Valencian president, but not his own, and that he did so just hours before Christmas Eve. In this new batch of messages, it's clear that the PP leader was, from the very beginning of the crisis, uneasy and worried about the political consequences. This is the only way to explain why, at 8:26 p.m., after a perfunctory message of support half an hour earlier, he wrote from Mazón: "Keep your spirits up. Lead like you led with the fire." And later he repeatedly sent instructions and advice on how to manage the crisis to achieve communication success: "Take the lead in communication. It's key. The mayors, provincial councils, coordinate with the people, and you keep them informed," he told him.
As night fell, and the magnitude of the tragedy became clear, Feijóo's concern shifted to the Spanish government's response. "The government says they called you... I hope that's true and that they're providing you with sufficient assistance," he told Mazón. He continued, "What time did they call you? Which minister are you referring to?" It was evident that by then Feijóo was already plotting how to shift the blame for the catastrophe onto the Spanish government, and there was not a hint of empathy for the victims.
The scenario, then, painted by the series of messages confirms what was already known. Feijóo acted late, at 7:59 p.m. that same day, and not the day before as he had initially stated. His first reaction was to advise Mazón on how to manage the crisis from a communications standpoint, rather than an operational one, which demonstrates his lack of confidence in the Valencian authorities and his fear of the political fallout from the disaster. Then, during those critical hours, the PP president maintained his schedule and went more than an hour without communicating with Mazón ("Sorry. I was at an event. Can I call you at 10:30 p.m.?" he wrote at 9:29 p.m.). Finally, before midnight, his main concern was finding arguments to shift the blame onto the Spanish government.
Curiously, Carlos Mazón initially ignored this and publicly thanked both the Spanish president for his presence in Valencia two days after the DANA storm and for the aid the Spanish government was providing. It wasn't until later that Mazón adopted the PP's communication strategy, which Feijóo had already outlined that same night. This strategy essentially consisted of shifting the focus to Madrid and Spanish government agencies, such as AEMET (the Spanish State Meteorological Agency) and the Júcar River Basin Authority. The PP president, therefore, cannot boast about these messages, because while they demonstrate that he had no direct influence on the Valencian government's disastrous handling of the crisis, they also clearly reveal his priorities in the face of the worst natural disaster of the century in Spain.
