USA-Iran: and now what?

Amidst a fragile ceasefire, with Israel violating the cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, the face-to-face negotiations in Islamabad, mediated by Pakistan, between the delegations of the United States and Iran have not yielded any concrete results. It was really very difficult.

The military disproportion between the US-Israel bloc and Iran has not been sufficient so far to bring down the ayatollahs' regime nor for them to consider themselves weak enough to accept an express agreement that would practically mean surrender. This is what the American president, always prone to maximum stakes, intended. For their part, if Washington has sat down at the table – since the Islamic revolution of 1979 there had not been a meeting of this high level between the two countries – it has been because they also felt the global economic pressure and the discomfort of American public opinion. But haste, in this case, played in favor of Tehran, which, as it seems, has maintained its negotiating red lines.

Now we will have to see what happens with the ceasefire. For the negotiation to prosper, it is essential that the military de-escalation be maintained. That will not be easy either. At this point, the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is the main danger: he is determined to take advantage of the opportunity of the war to advance the idea of Greater Israel. Lebanon has it within reach as an objective. He will hardly stop.

Trump's impatience, avid for concrete results and insensitive to diplomatic subtleties, is the other great stumbling block in the negotiation. In fact, he has already proclaimed an illusory military victory several times in the war against Iran... But can one really claim to win a war and then be forced to negotiate peace? This is what Trump has done, and furthermore, in this bellicose gamble, he has been left orphaned of other real support – for example, from Europe – apart from that of a Tel Aviv difficult to control.

Of course, Tehran will not make it easy either. The radical religious regime is gambling with its survival and, despite its evident weakness – with its leadership decapitated –, it has shown that it has enough weaponry and logistical and organizational capacity to maintain the struggle and destabilize the region, with the bellicose focus placed particularly on the Strait of Hormuz, where the petromonarchies of the Gulf, if they desire anything, it is to return to the normality of peace for business and tourism. Hormuz, right now, as seen in Trump's initial reaction to the negotiating fiasco, is where the crux of the matter lies.

In any case, apart from the Israel of the unleashed Netanyahu, the ceasefire for the moment benefits everyone: Trump makes it seem like he has won, Iran gains breathing room to recover, the Gulf monarchies return to an apparent normality, the Asian countries cross their fingers hoping that ships loaded with oil will start circulating through Hormuz, and so does Europe, even though it depends on it less. Hormuz, right now, as seen in Trump's initial reaction to the negotiating fiasco, is where the crux of the matter lies.

But the situation remains uncertain and extremely volatile, with the world economy faltering. The negotiating game is complicated: the US and Iran do not want more war, but neither do they want a losing and unstable peace. For the moment, everything points to an entrenchment of the clash, even if it is with a low-profile confrontation but with Israel waging war on its own.