What was the Trial?
BarcelonaEight years after the events of October 2017, there is still no clear consensus on what the so-called Process was. This period began with the 2012 Diada, the first organized by the ANC, and can officially be considered over on May 12, 2024, when the majority of the independence movement loses. During this period, with varying intensity, the debate over independence and the self-determination referendum dominated the Catalan and, to some extent, Spanish political agendas. There is no doubt that the culminating moment of the Process was October 1, 2017, when more than two million people participated in a referendum on independence, thus defying the ban imposed by the Spanish courts.
Seen in retrospect, the Process was an attempt by Catalan political representatives, who at the time held the majority in the Parliament, to force Spain to agree to a self-determination referendum through a massive operation of civil disobedience. The great debate, and the great ethical dilemma that its leaders had to face, was how far they wanted to take this civil disobedience and what risks they were willing to take for the people involved. Curiously, the two leaders of the Process, who have been at odds ever since, agreed on this issue and, given the state's reaction to the 1-O vote, chose not to create a situation that could provoke, in addition to a deep social fracture in Catalonia, greater evils.
Because today we know that a few dead bodies on the table wouldn't have changed anything, or perhaps they would, but for the worse for the Catalan side. The State was never on the ropes or willing to give in on an issue, that of territorial integrity, which is inherent to its existence. We also know that the European Union would never have lifted a finger to jeopardize the unity of one of its members. It could have pushed for a negotiated solution to calm tempers, as it did, but Spain could perfectly ignore this pressure, as it did, without suffering any consequences.
Ponsatí's 'bluff'
The problem with the Process, and what has made its subsequent management difficult for the separatists, is that it was never sold as what it was, an operation of civil disobedience to create a political crisis that would force the State to negotiate, but rather as a unilateral independence process that was impossible to carry out if the State, which has the monopoly on force, did not. It is the famous lantern who denounced Clara Ponsatí. This supposed masterstroke caused a portion of the Catalan population opposed to independence to panic and rush to withdraw their money from the banks, and also led a fraction of the independence movement to believe that with a simple political declaration in the Catalan Parliament, Catalonia would become independent as if by magic. But, above all, those who believed the threat most were a portion of the State, led by the judiciary, which has since refused to abandon the role it adopted as Spain's savior.
After the 1-O referendum, there was still a period in which attempts were made to make people believe that the State could be forced to hold the referendum from exile. This, along with the wave of solidarity with political prisoners, allowed the failure to be hidden for a good handful of years. But reality is stubborn and has finally prevailed. And the end result, beyond the general loss of credibility of the independence project, was the emergence of a Catalan far-right project fueled in part by the frustration caused by the Trial. Meanwhile, its leaders remain active and have yet to offer a convincing explanation of what the Trial was. One at least as clear as the one presented in this article.