Artur Mas: "The way to minimize Aliança is neither to ignore them nor to make deals with them, but to openly confront them."

BarcelonaArtur Mas (Barcelona, ​​1956) visits the ARA editorial office the same week he announced, from the Congress of Deputies, the filing of a complaint regarding Operation Catalunya. He still remembers the harshness of some of his comments during the commission of inquiry.

On Monday, you announced in Congress that you would file a complaint regarding Operation Catalunya. What makes you think it will be successful?

— There was one very clear case that didn't go forward, which was that of Sandro Rosell. He spent two years in prison and was later acquitted. This is a huge deal. I had my doubts, precisely because of that background, but in the end I was convinced for one reason: I don't want to give up the fight from the start. And, in fact, by the time this interview is published, I can tell you that the complaint will already be filed.

What does the complaint include?

— The lawyers' decision is to file a single complaint that combines two things: Operation Catalonia, therefore, all the false reports, the fraudulent use of public funds to alter the election results, etc. The state conspiracy. And then the espionage with Pegasus. And all of this goes together.

Have you reconstructed everything that has been done to you?

— There's no need to reconstruct it; I have it all in my head, as you'll understand. And now it's revealed that I was the first in the entire Spanish state to be spied on with Pegasus. Even globally, according to specialized Canadian laboratories, they say that after a Mexican journalist, I was the second infected by this program. And for these 10 years, I've lived with this situation: seizure of my apartment, financial harassment, political disqualification. Fine, but I'm not complaining.

But on Monday he did complain about something, and that is that those behind all this have not come forward.

— No. They've never given it. On the contrary. Now they're hiding. Nobody knows anything. No, nobody knows anything. Look... Given the recordings made by Mr. Villarejo, which are very...

Would you appreciate it if your facts were acknowledged?

— I even said it in Congress. Look, I don't understand why you all are so cowardly, because deep down, Mr. Villarejo says it clearly: I did this, first because I was told to, and second because I believed it and would do it again if necessary for the unity of Spain. All those who held very important positions, with a lot of power, they all hide, they all flee. I can understand it from a personal point of view because the penal consequence is very clear. But, look, faced with the alternative of assuming some consequences, as some of us have done, or saying "I'm hiding lest I get a little," you have chosen the latter, which means that what they call the Spanish gallantry, sometimes it is not such.

Do you think the PSOE will want to go all the way?

— I hope so. I think they've come forward for two reasons, and I would have liked them to come forward for a third, but I'm already more doubtful. The first is because this has directly affected the president of the Spanish government, therefore, his leader, his house. The second is because this is fodder for the PP. And the one I would have liked to see, and I don't know if it is or not, is for democratic principles, because it's clear that Operation Catalunya has seriously harmed Spanish democracy.

You say that Operation Catalunya, in some respects, achieved its objective.

— Yes, a very clear objective was to alter the outcome of the 2012 elections. If we had had an absolute majority in 2012, the process could have been carried out differently. We were severely influenced, especially by those who were in a hurry. And if you raised even the slightest doubt, you were accused of being a traitor. Well, we couldn't carry it out the way I think we should have, and it certainly would have been better. But be careful. Why didn't we have the majority we needed? Because there was a state operation that prevented it. There were other things as well. I've never denied it. We were in the era of cuts, but Operation Catalunya had that objective, which was to diminish us. And the first to celebrate it were them in Madrid.

Did you find the tone of Gabriel Rufián's questions on Monday unpleasant?

— I was disappointed, but knowing the character... Rufián's problem is himself; he's a prisoner of his character. And since the character needs to be the center of attention at any cost, he loses perspective on what's happening. You have an investigative commission in the Congress of Deputies that puts the Spanish state in serious trouble. And instead of understanding this, which is obvious, which is almost the first year of primary school, well, no, he turns it into a conflict between the Catalans. And I'll tell you that, as I saw it from the start, I never took the bait.

You've said that, had you had an absolute majority in 2012, the Process would have gone differently. How so?

— In terms of pace, we wouldn't have gone so fast. I myself pushed things too fast at some point, and I've admitted that was a mistake, but it was because I found myself in circumstances where I couldn't do what I thought I had to do. I was clearly at a disadvantage, because Mariano Rajoy had an absolute majority, and we had to beg for support every day from all sides to try to move the country forward.In retrospect, if things had been done differently, the results might also have been different.

And what would you have done differently in 2017?

— I've said it many times... So there were two possibilities. One was, after October 1st, to go all out but accept the consequences, which could be dramatic. And the other solution was to stop there, call a plebiscite election and say: listen, 40% of the Catalan population went to vote under dramatic conditions, the "yes" vote won, but now we want the entire society to ratify this result through a legal mechanism, which is an election. This was the other way, wasn't it? And a middle path was chosen, which was neither one nor the other, and then, well, it was as it was.

But the point is that many people went to vote on October 1st convinced that it would pave the way for independence, something that later proved unfeasible...

— I was no longer in charge...

But he was part of the Sanhedrin of the Trial...

— Yes, some things were discussed; not all the decisions were made there, but almost everything was discussed. And, indeed, the referendum was linked to immediate independence, within 48 hours. This was to try to show that this time it was serious, that it wasn't like 9-N, and it was a box or a belt. And, of course, it was later proven that the box or belt... We could have tried, I said, a first solution, which was to go all out. But the people who were making the decisions calculated that this, inevitably, entailed an extremely high risk of... Well, a major conflict in the streets, with the consequences this could have for people's lives.

A conflict that was not only with the State but also internal, between...

— Ultimately, a more, let's say, peaceful path was chosen. Within that peaceful path, I believe the option, then, was to call elections that would allow us to have a complete picture of the country. And depending on the result, follow one path or another. Another path was chosen, although I have never criticized it because I understand the enormous difficulties of making decisions at that time, but, well, it was what it was. We can't change this now, but we must learn from what happened.

And this has had consequences because a part of the population that believed unilateral independence was possible now feels frustrated, and this has given rise to far-right populist pro-independence groups like the Catalan Alliance.

— Yes, yes, all of this is indeed true, but notice that when you tell the Catalan Alliance, "Okay, fine, denounce, criticize, etc., but what do you propose to do? With what force and on what timescales, with what agreements with others?" then there's no response. With these types of groups, what you have to do is openly confront them. That is, not pretend they don't exist, not turn them into victims through sanitary cordons, but confront them directly and hold a mirror up to them. And then you come to the conclusion that these groups solve nothing and cover everything up.

What should Junts amb Alliance Catalana do?

— I made the mistake a few weeks ago of saying what I would do if I were running Junts. And I won't make that mistake again. I can explain what I think, which is that There are two ways to confront these movements that exist in much of the world. One, which has been put into practice so far, is to pretend they don't exist: sanitary cordons, no one can speak, etc. The other, which we have yet to experience, would be to say: these people are there, someone voted for them, and in a democracy we must openly confront them and hold a mirror up to them. The story of easy talk, that everything can be resolved with a total lack of understanding of reality and absolute ignorance of possible solutions in a complex society like ours, is over. And for that, what you need is not so much to deny the possibility of dialogue, but rather to move toward direct confrontation to expose them. And with one objective, which is to minimize them, not normalize them, but to residualize them, because they are not good anywhere. Vox is not good for Spain, nor is the Catalan Alliance for Catalonia, nor is the National Regrouping for France, nor is Donald Trump for the United States. That's why we must stop ignoring them and start confronting them to compare possible solutions.

There is another formula, which is the one the PP is carrying out with Vox, which is to reach an agreement on it.

— No, I don't think this is the right approach. It's one thing to confront her without refusing to engage in dialogue, and it's another to make a pact with her. I think this is different.

The PP is also failing to minimize Vox or residualize it.

— No, he has not achieved this through agreements.

Have you understood what happened with the vote of the Junts councilor in favor of the takeover bid?

— First, you have to keep a cool head. Because... what's the goal? For the takeover bid to fail. I want this: for the takeover bid to fail. And the first step on the ladder is the National Commission on Markets and Competition. This body has already done its job. And what's its job? Instead of making things easy, it's making them a little more difficult. That's already going well. And now comes the task of making things very difficult. And who should do that job? Well, the Spanish government.

Do you think Junts has already managed to represent what CiU was for the economic sectors of Catalonia?

— I believe steps are being taken in this direction, yes. Be careful, this shouldn't be confused with being, let's say, the party of businesspeople. That's not it, no. It's about being the party of companies, which is different. I believe that, indeed, the concept of business, which is ultimately what gives life to a country, needs to be well represented. And this has been frowned upon for many years.

I say this because business leaders have complaints about President Isla, precisely because they were somehow expecting a different kind of policy.

— Forgive me, but I think there's a touch of naiveté. What did you expect from President Isla if he made a pact with the Comuns and the Republican Left?