

BarcelonaSince the 19th century, Catalonia has opted to structure itself through a territorial model that has oscillated between particularism, federalism, and independence. The first two are connected to Madrid; and the last, for obvious reasons, is unilateral. The influence of these three approaches and their corresponding responses are what, in part, has shaped the Spanish institutional framework. Roughly speaking, the second half of the 20th century and the first quarter of the 21st, we can agree that Catalonia has amply fulfilled its modernizing and, above all, democratizing functions, with the conduct of great men and women, whether from the streets, factories, or institutions. However, given the local and international political landscape, it is legitimate to ask whether this role is exhausted or whether, as President Illa often maintains, Catalonia still has much to contribute to Spain as a whole.
Apparently, one would say that the reactivation of the State-Generalitat transfers, after three decades without seeing, together with the announcement by the Speaker of the Parliament, Josep Rull, about the imminent publication of a "cartography" of legislative areas to "expand self-government," places Catalan politics in a dimension The Twilight Zone, is apparently very well known. The scenario that is drawn is a déjà vu which returns us not to the pre-Process era, but to the golden age of "fish in the cove": powers, infrastructure, and funding in exchange for political stability in Madrid and Catalonia. The alignment of Catalan socialism with the Spanish socialist movement, along with another former minister of the president of the Generalitat, also seems to be pulling in the same direction.
However, here, as in the American series, the new episode is quite disturbing. 2026 will not be 1996. It will be one of a global context hostile to minorities, of democratic regression and clear erosion of international norms, with an economy now too globalized in the eyes of many leaders and electorates. In this situation, politics becomes tough and unpredictable. The secessionist option tried in 2017 gains complexity, and "doing it again" loses traction, at least in the version of the right to unilateral decision.
At the same time, particularism and federalism are also not winning. The "fish in the horn" and potential expansions of self-government come up against the limits set by the Constitutional Court on a Statute designed to achieve the protection of powers and singularity. It is enough to remember that the political party that led the strategy to deploy the current autonomy no longer exists. For its part, the federalist option finds no defenders even among its own ranks. Today, the Catalan socialists quietly claim the Granada Declaration (2013) of the PSOE, a version light and watered down at best from the proposal of the Campalans Foundation, the PSC's think tank. Finally, political adventures in a Spanish key, let's say politically expansionist and so-called liberal, such as Operation Roca in Ciudadanos, certify that the partisan terrain is not and will not be very fertile for those who propose to reform Spain.
Therefore, a realpolitik which should be temporary. In whatever form, Catalonia will have to once again assert the pluralism that characterizes it, not as a weakness that fragments political options but as a virtue. A national project of its own that, for now, is not envisioned in any of the aforementioned strategies and can only be compatible with that of the State to the extent that it resolves the conflict that began in 2017, not by silencing the constitutional agenda but by building institutions and a democracy that bring progress. This is probably the meeting point that is difficult to reconcile for a large part of Catalanism today.