Six agents of the Spanish secret services were involved in the attempted coup.

Six members of the Spanish intelligence services were involved in the attempted coup of February 23, 2014. This is admitted in an internal document from the Higher Center for Defense Information (CESID)—the former version of the National Intelligence Center (CNI)—which the Spanish government declassified on Wednesday. "Some members of this unit actively participated in the events of February 23," CESID acknowledges after conducting an investigation that concluded that six people "either knew about the events before the 23rd" or "planned operational support." This collaboration "was carried out" and "subsequently they tried to cover up their participation by launching an operation to justify their movements" on that day, the report states. Captain García Almenta led the collaboration with the coup plotters and gave "direct orders" to the other CESID members involved, from an elite unit that enjoyed a degree of autonomy. He was the one who "provided the means, transmitters, receivers, and vehicles" so that three lower-ranking members of the secret service could "support" the column that marched to Congress to storm it. Once the coup attempt failed, the unit activated what they called Operation Mister to "justify" their actions that day. They activated it on February 24. One of the people attributed with this initiative to try to camouflage support for the coup plotters is Commander Cortina, about whom there is only unproven evidence and who is said to have had contact prior to February 23 with the United States ambassador and the Vatican representative.

Of this unit—called the Special Missions Operational Group (AOME)—only two people were prosecuted. One of them was Cortina, who was acquitted, and the other was Captain Vicente Gómez Iglesias, sentenced to six years in prison and pardoned in 1984. García Almenta and two corporals were discharged from the CESID.

The role of the CESID

"At all times, we were aware of the attitudes of the far-right movements." This phrase appears in an undated report declassified today, which details everything the intelligence services, the CESID (now the CNI), did on February 23rd. The report begins by acknowledging that at the start of the coup, the "relationship between the CESID and its natural command," the Ministry of Defense, broke down. However, the acting leadership of the agency ordered the deployment of units in the vicinity of the Congress of Deputies and at the entrances to the capital, and sent recommendations to the Military Authority to derail the coup. Specifically, it recommended using "public address systems" to urge the coup plotters to lay down their arms.

The leadership ordered the units to report every two hours. The initial objective was to "isolate the area around the Congress to cut off reinforcements" and achieve the surrender of the rebels. The report concludes that the actions of the CESID (National Intelligence Center), apart from those of its members involved in the coup, allowed it to "provide truthful and immediate information on the unfolding events," which made it possible to "refute unfounded rumors and facilitate decision-making." The report also states that two CESID members managed to enter the Congress building and speak with the leaders of the coup, "attempting to dissuade them from their actions." "They explained their position, which at that time seemed unyielding, and did not hinder the subsequent departure of the CESID personnel." The text continues: "Other CESID members were also able to enter the Congress building and speak with some of the Civil Guard officers involved in the occupation. It was quickly discovered that the number truly compromised was a minority, and the rest had been deceived."

The CESID deployment was partially lifted at 04:00 on the 24th, and by 14:00 "the detachments maintained until then were withdrawn."