Six agents of the Spanish secret services were involved in the attempted coup.

Six members of the Spanish intelligence services were involved in the attempted coup of February 23, 1981. This is admitted in a document by the Higher Center for Defense Information (CESID)—the former version of the National Intelligence Center (CNI)—which the Spanish government declassified on Wednesday. "Some members of this unit actively participated in the events of February 23," CESID acknowledges after conducting an internal and "discreet" investigation that concluded that six people "either knew about the events before the 23rd" or "planned operational support." The document highlights the name of Captain García Almenta, who, according to the document, gave "direct orders" to members of an elite CESID unit—called the Special Missions Operational Group (AOME)—which had a degree of autonomy, to assist the coup plotters.

He was the one who "provided the means, transmitters, receivers, and vehicles" for three lower-ranking members of the secret service to "support" the column that marched to Congress to storm it. Once the coup attempt failed, the unit activated "an operation to justify its actions," called Operation Mister, to "try to cover up its participation," the report states. It was activated on February 24. One of the people attributed with this initiative to try to camouflage support for the coup plotters is Commander Cortina, of whom, according to the document, there is only unproven evidence, and who is said to have had contacts prior to February 23 with the US ambassador and the Vatican representative.

Only two people from this unit were prosecuted. One of them was Cortina, who led the unit and was acquitted, and the other was Captain Vicente Gómez Iglesias, sentenced to six years in prison and pardoned in 1984, who was Cortina's right-hand man. Despite the lack of criminal consequences, another report, which includes statements from those involved and other members of the AOME (Association of Military Officers), raises suspicions against both of them. Gómez Iglesias was a known friend of Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero. On the 23rd, he abstained from the action, claiming a kidney stone. The testimony of Corporal Diego Camacho, who is not included among those implicated, casts doubt on Cortina's actions. Camacho, who entered the Congress building that night, recalls being surprised that after informing Cortina that it was being said inside that the leader of the conspiracy was General Alfonso Armada, on the 25th he gave a speech exonerating the coup leader. He also recalls that another corporal involved in the events admitted to him that there were conspirators within the unit. However, none of Cortina's subordinates who acted on February 23rd were ever brought to trial. García Almenta and two other corporals were simply discharged from the CESID (National Intelligence Center), and other agents were removed from the unit. Most, however, continued their careers within the army in other units and postings.

The Role of the CESID

Beyond the conspirators within this unit, an undated report states that the CESID (Spanish Intelligence Service) "was at all times aware of the attitudes of the far-right movements." It details everything the intelligence services did on February 23rd. The report begins by acknowledging that at the start of the coup, the "relationship between the CESID and its natural superior," the Ministry of Defense, was severed, but that the acting leadership of the agency ordered the deployment of units in the vicinity of the Congress of Deputies and at the entrances to the capital, and sent recommendations to the military authorities to derail the coup. Specifically, it recommended using "public address systems" to urge the coup plotters to lay down their arms. The leadership ordered the units to report every two hours. The initial objective was to "isolate the area around the Congress to cut off reinforcements" and achieve the surrender of the rebels. The report concludes that the actions of the CESID (Spanish intelligence agency), apart from those of its members involved in the coup, allowed it to "provide truthful and immediate information on the unfolding events," which made it possible to "refute unfounded rumors and facilitate decision-making." The report also states that two CESID members managed to enter the Congress building and speak with the leaders of the coup, and "attempted to dissuade them from their course of action." "These leaders explained their position, which at that time seemed unyielding, and did not hinder the subsequent departure of the CESID personnel." The text continues: "Other CESID members were also able to enter the Congress building and speak with some of the Civil Guard officers involved in the occupation. It was quickly discovered that the number truly compromised was a minority and the rest had been deceived."

The CESID deployment was partially lifted at 04:00 on the 24th, and by 14:00 "the reinforcement teams maintained until then were withdrawn."