Let me tell you

Pedro Sánchez, an unlikely resignation

Sánchez during the appearance in which he explained Santos Cerdán's alleged involvement in corruption cases.
14/06/2025
4 min

MadridPedro Sánchez doesn't want to go down in history as a president who had to leave the Moncloa Palace with his tail between his legs, surrounded by corruption. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that he will resign. Whatever happens, he will bid as much time as he can. It is clear that the developments in the Ábalos-Koldo case leave Pedro Sánchez in an extremely difficult situation. The list of those implicated in alleged corruption crimes has been extended by Santos Cerdán, now the former secretary of organization of the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party), the very person who succeeded Ábalos in this position.

But Sánchez's first reaction was to immediately demonstrate a firm will to continue. Aside from repeatedly apologizing to the public in his appearance after the report by the Central Operational Unit (UCO) of the Civil Guard on the commissions received by some of his closest collaborators was made public, the socialist leader categorically ruled out calling early elections. This is hardly surprising. Had he done anything else, he would have revealed a previously unknown side of his personality. Sánchez has passed several tests of survival, and it's unlikely he will be the one to resign mid-term, of his own volition. This doesn't mean his resilience is limitless.

The most spectacular move would be to present, now, a vote of confidence in Congress. But that would entail a very high risk. It would be difficult for him to reunite his investiture supporters, in part because it would now be more difficult for him to pay for concessions and high prices. Sánchez wants to continue governing, but he won't be able to do so as if nothing had happened. Inside and outside Spain, his image has just suffered a substantial deterioration. It's not enough to appear contrite and repeatedly apologize to society and his voters in particular. With the expansion of the Ábalos-Koldo plot and the involvement of Santos Cerdán, Pedro Sánchez has lost a significant portion of the support he received in July 2023. Back then, his early election move paid off after the poor results of the municipal and regional elections in May of that year. And he also reaped benefits—indeed, great profit—from the rejection of an alternative government based on pacts between the PP and Vox.

The fact is that that alternative existed, as seen in the content of some of the agreements made in various autonomous communities, on immigration or historical and democratic memory, for example. But early elections would now take place in a very different environment. It's hard for a wounded politician to want to take the field, aware of his weakness and about to be defeated amid accusations of disrespect for the rules of the game, in this case, for the judges and justice in general. Sánchez had and has many reasons to be critical of certain judges and their lines of investigation, but these possibilities have now been greatly diminished by the overwhelming evidence provided by the Civil Guard report on the activities of the Ábalos brothers, Koldo, and Cerdán.

In his appearance, Sánchez asked that a distinction be made between one case and another. But the clarity of the recorded conversations between these protagonists in the plot will make any effort to demand nuanced analysis lose its chances of obtaining positive responses. Even if everything else is false or exaggerated—for example, about his wife's activities in her professorship at the Complutense University, or about the case of his brother and how he obtained a position in the Badajoz Provincial Council, or about the Attorney General and his alleged disclosure of secrets—the noise is now so strident that it makes any initiative of this kind very difficult. You see, I'm not talking about recovery—which is highly unlikely—but simply about stabilization. That's why I mentioned the hypothesis—more theoretical than real—of a question of confidence, recognizing the Socialists' limited room for maneuver and the precarious majority formed with their partners.

Winning votes is increasingly complicated.

Now, who could achieve a better result in early elections? Sumar, the pro-independence ERC and Junts, the good strategists of the PNV, or perhaps Podemos? The scenario is uncertain and dangerous for everyone. At the same time, none of them has much real chance of updating the agreements from the investiture debate. The effects of this corruption case are damaging to the PSOE and the Spanish government, but also to their allies. It will now be more difficult to muster majorities in each parliamentary vote. Sánchez can only hope for a certain amount of oxygen to finish his term after his performance as a man duped by corrupt officials he had never suspected. A version that has many weaknesses, after he removed Ábalos from the government but allowed him to continue as a deputy. The perverse aspect of the fight against corruption from the highest positions in government is that sooner or later it spills over into the net, both those who knew nothing or remained silent, and those who were unable to control the management of their subordinates. And Sánchez had the facts and reasons to have removed from his government and the PSOE long before those who could now bring him down.

That said, the legislature will most likely continue in this situation, where the country's overall performance is positive—we will see this with the tourist season—but with people increasingly disenchanted. The noise will continue; some days it will be deafening; disappointment with politics and politicians will increase, and if there is a change in the political cycle, it will be as a result of elections. There are many voices within the PSOE that support García-Page in his thesis that the general elections should take place before the municipal and regional elections, the opposite of 2023, to avoid a vote of punishment against the Spanish government. Meanwhile, Feijóo is right not to launch a motion of censure, which would likely be a repeat of his failed investiture debate, due to a lack of allies. The PP leader's opportunity will arise if Sánchez faces a real ordeal between now and 2026 or 2027, and if they can then present a solid alternative. But Vox won't make things easy for them either.

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