Now we no longer want to leave NATO
MadridMore than forty years have passed since the referendum on Spain's membership in NATO. The vote took place on March 12, 1986, when the former mayor of Barcelona, Narcís Serra (PSC), was Minister of Defense. In these last four decades, Spanish society has changed a lot regarding its knowledge of foreign policy and defense matters, and the majority perceptions about the commitments that membership in the Western world implies. It would now make no sense to reconsider the country's role in its contribution in this area.
One can discuss what proportion of GDP should be allocated to military spending, of course, but not our affiliation with the organization that was launched in 1949 to guarantee a collective defense system for its members. If any new event is putting the founding ideology of the North Atlantic Treaty into crisis, it is what is represented by the set of decisions and actions taken by the American administration since its leadership has been in the hands of President Donald Trump. For the Pentagon to now consider the hypothesis of suspending Spain as an NATO member in an email is absurd.
The pressure from the White House on its allies has not given its current occupant all the satisfactions he surely expected. This is another miscalculation among the many that Trump has made since coming to power. I have had the good fortune and privilege of accompanying several Spanish presidents on their trips to Washington to foster bilateral relations, from the time of Felipe González and Ronald Reagan. And a situation like the current one, characterized by the tension caused by the unfulfilled expectations that the American administration might have had about the Spanish government's subservience in international policy matters, has always been unimaginable.
Felipe González spoke at the beginning of his term about the Americans' psychological need to be understood worldwide, and attributed to Reagan a certain "childish" character in this regard. With George Bush Sr., it was also not very difficult. Spain had already overcome the complex test of the 1986 referendum. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Spanish government assured that it would allow the use of the Rota and Morón bases only to provide "logistical aid" to the American military. It was a way to satisfy Washington's requests without provoking massive rejection from domestic public opinion.
In a conversation held in February 1991, González confessed to Bush: "We have problems with our public opinion, with the press." He immediately added: "Despite this, you will not have problems with Spain." Bush (1989-93) did not have them, nor did his predecessor, Reagan (1981-89), even though the New York Times reported on March 12, 1981, that the previous day Felipe González – who was not yet the president of the Spanish government – had made statements in Oxford in which he considered "inexplicable in democratic terms the inhibition of the United States" in the face of the events of 23-F of that same year, the date of Tejero's attempted coup d'état.
The PSOE changes its position
The Americans quickly corrected the behavior that motivated that complaint. In fact, they worked thoroughly on the relationship with González, knowing that in all probability he would be the next Spanish president, as happened in October 1982, with an overwhelming victory at the polls – he obtained 202 out of the 350 seats at stake –. From that moment on, the PSOE had to perform contortions to turn its initial opposition to NATO into a determined commitment to remaining. In their first term, the socialists reversed their slogan from "NATO, no to start with" to "In Spain's interest, vote yes", a slogan they used in the 1986 referendum.
Felipe González gambled with the call and made it clear that he would resign if the 'no' won. Alfonso Guerra, his vice-president, also feared the result and even ironically proposed that the referendum question be "Would you accept Spain remaining in NATO with your vote against?" According to him, it was the only way to ensure that the 'yes' would win. In the corridors of the Ministry of Defense, it was explained that, on the night of the vote count, Lluís Reverter, head of Narcís Serra's cabinet, and some equally devout senior army officers locked themselves in an office near the minister's to pray the rosary, as a prayer for a good result. In part, what was at stake that day was to complete the country's incorporation into the European Economic Community (EEC) – now the European Union (EU) – under the best possible conditions, even though the accession treaty had already been signed in June 1985.
What was not understood in Europe or the United States was the position of the Spanish right-wing, led by Manuel Fraga, who advocated abstention in the referendum. The interview I had with Fraga was the first I did in Madrid. I will always be grateful to him for the headline he gave me, because it was what he repeated as the main idea the next day in the Cortes. "My gut tells me to vote no, but I will abstain out of responsibility", he said. The socialists were delighted with Fraga, because they believed he would never beat them, and for having transformed himself from Franco's minister to a conservative leader after being ambassador to London.
Regarding the United States, worse was the period of José María Aznar, due to his pact with George Bush (2001-2009) to intervene in the Iraq War. Aznar said his objective was to “get Spain out of the corner of history”, but he chose the wrong path. Now, Pedro Sánchez’s “No to war” is a firm position with internal effects and it does not mean leaving NATO or a suspension, an option that does not exist in the accession treaty. Pedro Sánchez could convey to Trump –in reality he already does– what González told Bush senior 35 years ago so that he would be calm: “You will not have problems with Spain”. In fact, Sánchez has now expressed it in another way, by saying that the North American administration knows that Spain is “a loyal partner” that fulfills its “responsibilities”.