Catalonia, future "vanguard" of the growth of the far right?

BarcelonaThe far right is sweeping the globe. The question is why it's growing, and that's what the debate organized by the Institut d'Estudis Catalans (IEC) and ARA, moderated by the newspaper's deputy director, Ignasi Aragay, aimed to answer. The key to the triumph of the radical right. Tuesday's event aimed to delve into the underlying reasons for this surge through the perspectives of experts.

"Why do people vote for clowns?" asked an attendee, citing the US president as an extreme example. Political scientist and head of research at the Institute for Self-Government Studies, Mireia Grau, responded: "Because of the 'effect' backlash"A rebound effect against the left and its policies in areas such as immigration and feminism, among others. The other speaker, Blanca Garcés, senior migration researcher at CIDOB, warned that Catalonia has "all the makings of becoming the vanguard of far-right vote percentages" and 10% of the vote.

Garcés's forecast for the Principality is emphatic: there are two radical right-wing formations, "Vox and Aliança Catalana," "with differences regarding the nation," which have "many of the elements" to grow within "the rural divide" context; the socioeconomic sphere as "a factor contributing to discontent," because Catalonia "has gone from 6 to 8 million without having resized public services," and this has strained "certain neighborhoods"; CUP, because it does not define itself in right-wing terms, and this ambiguity gives it much more room to maneuver."

Grau concluded by pointing out that it's necessary to see "what the picture looks like" and to what extent Vox and Alianza are competing. However, he warned that the backlash against feminism "won't have as much of an impact" at the "right now" as the backlash against the LGBTI community. In his opinion, "the question is whether they can form alliances beyond simply dividing up the voters."

The basic factors

The reasons for this growth are multifaceted, but Grau has outlined "the reaction" to a "sense of threat," in addition to changes in dominant values ​​and "the impoverishment" of regions that find themselves stagnant or without solutions. The crisis and austerity policies may have had an impact, as well as terrorist attacks, feminist policies, and climate change. However, as Garcés points out, there are several far-right groups—some more conservative and others more liberal—but "they all share an anti-immigration discourse." And here comes the "myth of Moor like the other one," who is singled out as a scapegoat, just as the Jews were for the Nazis in the last century.

But the fact that immigration is the central issue doesn't explain all the growth. "More immigration doesn't mean more far-right support," Garcés points out, noting that it has skyrocketed in Extremadura. She concludes that "for the far right, immigration is the scapegoat, but often for the rest of the political forces, it's the far right itself," and that part of its "success" stems from what "other parties have done or failed to do," from adopting its agenda or opting for "silence." The CIDOB researcher's prescription is clear: "The best response to immigration is to accompany it with social policies." And as for the speech, it should be positive, clearly outlining the shared project. Remember that the core of the far right is the "simple, emotional message with a promise of the future," which appeals to the surge in youth votes, and which takes advantage of "the moral superiority of the left, with this emphasis on the issue."