BarcelonaThe Catalan independence movement has tended to be reflected in Quebec. Its case is unique, with two referendums held, in 1980 and 1995, and two defeats. Even its clear agreement on independence was an example for the government of Pere Aragonès, which drafted an academic council to emulate. Now, there is another similarity in both cases: after the failed independence processes, nationalism has prioritized language and also the debate on immigration. To what extent is the same happening in both places, after the impasse of 1-O and the loss of the pro-independence majority in Parliament?
In conversation with ARA, Daniel Turp, professor at the University of Montreal, former pro-independence politician and president of the Research Institute on Popular Self-Determination and National Independence, assures that while the clamor for greater autonomy "has been a constant" across the board, after the referendums, "their culture, language and immigration." It had its first stop in 1991 with the agreement between Quebec and Canada on immigration and the admission of temporary newcomers in which the Quebec government was granted full powers in the selection of immigrants, after a decade of negotiations. A debate that has also been put on the table in Catalonia Together with the PSOE pact for the delegation of powers in immigration. And, regarding the language, Catalan has once again become a flag in the Principality as well: the entire independence movement (Junts, ERC, and the CUP) prioritizes its strengthening with demands such as the official status of Catalan in Congress and the European Union, which is still pending. At the same time, a new far-right movement has also emerged within the independence movement, the Catalan Alliance.
Following the transfer of the Canadian federation, the Quebec government was able to establish criteria for immigration selection, in addition to exercising a certain level of control. Turp himself comments on the points system used to prioritize knowledge of French. Hence the prioritization of French-speaking immigration. like Haiti and other former French colonies, as Marc Sanjaume, professor of political science at UPF and former president of the academic council of the Clarity Agreement, points out, emphasizing that they are "firm" on the language. After the second referendum, the process accelerated, and the current government, nationalist but not pro-independence—the Coalition for the Future of Quebec (CAQ)—has claimed "full power" over immigration to manage refugee policy. Throughout this time, this centrist coalition has competed on the immigration issue with the pro-independence Parti Québécois, which promises a new referendum and leads the polls for the 2026 elections.
Catalan Withdrawal
Sanjaume asserts that "there is a very clear parallel" in the "retreat" in identity and immigration in Quebec and Catalonia. "The Parti Québécois was left-wing and went from independence to a fixation on immigration and language. In 2000, there was an identity shift," he emphasizes, due to "the dynamics of clinging to power." This is a "photocopy" of what happened "around the Catalan Alliance." In 2013, the Parti Québécois attempted to approve the Charter of Quebec Values to ban religious symbols in the public sector, including Islamic ones, and the CAQ has become "obsessed" with immigration, language and Islam, sparking a legislative crusade since 2018, when it began governing.
UOC political science professor Ana Sofía Cardenal comments that "failure means you have to address new issues to keep the electorate mobilized and that connects with a more ethnic nationalism" that "connects with an existential theme about a possible disappearance of the Catalan nation." In fact, she maintains that it connects more with the nationalist vision of Junts or with Aliança Catalana, which has monopolized the immigration issue with the specific "Muslim internal enemy," than with ERC, which "bets on the civic nation," she believes. The Catalan withdrawal has increased in Catalonia in the post-process, according to Sanjaume, and is now seen with "the psychodrama" about the disappearance of the nation or the language, which he maintains affects Junts and ERC. He adds that "the parties are looking for issues –political issues–to mobilize the electorate" and "when everything is going well, it is catch all –broad spectrum–, but, if not, they go for the loyal base." In Catalonia, he sees that Junts has the competitor of the Catalan Alliance, while in Quebec, the Parti Québécois had the challenge of maintaining its electorate and then competed with the CAQ, keeping in mind that the country has a majoritarian electoral system. ~BK_SLT_L~
Turp points to the "importance of integration difficulties in immigration, more inclined to English" as one of the problems that the Quebec government has pointed out, clinging to the fact that "there is a perception that there is too much illegal immigration and too much to integrate"; but also that while 79% of Quebecers speak French as their first language, according to a 2024 government study, there is "concern" that among young people it is falling, to 74%, with a higher tendency to be bilingual or English at 26%.
This same year, a law on national integration was put on the table in Quebec in which the obligation to "full integration in French" - which is the only official and common language in the territory - is made clear, but also to "Quebec" and "democratic" values, with its own model that opposes the "mule." And in 2022, it made a law to reinforce the Charter of the French Language Adopted in 1977 "in the fields of justice or education, limiting the admissions capacity of English schools and universities," according to Turp.
All public services must be provided in French unless there is a very specific exception, which has caused the clash with the Canadian federal government. Another element of conflict was the 2019 secularism law, which established Quebec's "secular character" by banning religious symbols on public officials and in schools. Secularism and the latest language change are being challenged in the Supreme Court of Canada, sparking controversy with English speakers and Muslims respectively. In any case, Quebec Prime Minister François Legault wants to go further with secularism and restrict prayers to public spaces, where it highlights Islamic practices.
The flight of companies: a parallel?
The Quebec independence process was characterized by political and financial instability. In 1977, a year after the Parti Québécois won the elections with a referendum as part of its platform, a flight of large companies began: for example, the Bank of Montreal's base of operations left Toronto and has never returned. The threat of a referendum alone completely changed the financial sector, and other large companies moved to another Canadian province. They did not return, not even after the defeat of the "yes" vote in the referendums, nor during the governments of the anti-independence Liberal Party. This cannot be compared to Catalonia, where the headquarters of large companies and the financial sector also fled. However, under the non-independence government of Salvador Illa, Banco Sabadell , the la Caixa Foundation, and the investment arm CriteriaCaixa have returned, as well as other companies such as Cementos Molins . The Catalan economy has not slowed down since the referendum either, with sustained growth rates.
The role of the head of state in the flight of companies is also not very relevant, since Felipe VI was personally involved in pushing for the departure of companies . Nor is the call for referendums similar—Quebec has the capacity to call them and has been recognized by Canada as the right to self-determination, unlike Catalonia—nor the judicial persecution of its leaders—only Catalan political prisoners and exiles have resulted. Likewise, Spain is a state of autonomous regions, while Canada is federal, with greater powers over taxes, pensions, and foreign policy for Quebec, as well as language and immigration.
