Twenty years of the Statute: we are where we were

The persistent inequalities created by globalization and technological changes, and the constraints of a welfare state suffering from an aging population, increased migration, and outdated infrastructure have led us to a new world order governed by political leaders as populist, anti-democratic, arbitrary, and corrupt as those of a century ago, who provoke wars, label their opponents as traitors, and blame foreigners for the economic chaos they themselves sow. In this context of vertigo, where internal politics are extremely polarized and tension dominates the suffocating scene with the unstoppable rise of the far-right, there seems to be never enough time – or will – to take stock of self-government and the degree of political decentralization in the State, an issue that seems to have taken a back seat to corruption or the possibilities of political alternation in the State. Undoubtedly, the twenty years since the approval of the Statute are an invitation to do so, even if the fatigue of these last years continues, motivated by the defense of a Statute disavowed by the TC and by the pain caused by the coercive response of the deep state following the referendum of 1-O.And that is because, despite the recognition by Pedro Sánchez's government of the existence of a political conflict – out of necessity or conviction – and the attempts at dejudicialization through amnesty and effective dialogue, the truth is that currently 61% of politicians have not been amnestied and 97.5% of police officers have, according to data from Alerta Solidària, and that regarding the fundamental issue, apart from an unborn proposal for financing improvement, it has not been discussed for some time: the possibility of resolving the future at the ballot box, with the necessary cadence, taking into account the unforced errors of the past and the perspective of patient but intransigent countries like Quebec or Scotland.

On the contrary, what dominates is a staggering lack of collective horizons that inspire after the blurring of the right to decide and the realization that an effective management of the statu quo has not triumphed as an alternative either. Precisely, having established this, we need new strategies that overcome the simplistic rejection of a referendum for considering it "divisive" or that are limited to offering us a stage oriented exclusively towards achieving good governance that unfolds the potential for social and economic progress of a federal government. More or less, we are where we were a quarter of a century ago. It is not for nothing that the reform of the 1979 Statute started from the majority finding that the autonomous model showed symptoms of paralysis due to its cultural and linguistic standardization, the lack of recognition of our national identity, the emptying of the Generalitat's powers, the slowdown in transfers, the lack of our own voice in the institutions of the State and the EU, and fair funding. With the aggravating factor that the refractory attitude of the major state parties – with a prominent place for the hostility of the right – was sealed by the TC with an adverse ruling, with a notable dogmatic and centralist bias.But if the Constitutional Court's ruling in 2010 set, outside of popular will, new limits on the autonomous State, twenty years later I dare say we have gone backwards. We are witnessing a growing administrative centralization of autonomy, as the state legislator – a kind of great Leviathan who can do anything – has unceremoniously intervened to regulate matters of traditional autonomous competence such as housing, consumption, and animal protection. And it has done so by taking advantage of the sedation of the 155 and the judicial proceedings against the promoters of the consultation, but above all with the excuse of the low-profile autonomist interpretation facilitated by the Statute's ruling, which certified the death of exclusive competences and the expansive potential of state bases within the framework of shared competences, leaving the Generalitat with no room to set its own coherent policies in areas of its competence.However, this balance would not be complete if it were not said that this has been accompanied by a lack of conflictivity stirred up by the Generalitat, whether due to the context of the de-escalation of the "Procés", the coincidence of political color in Barcelona and Madrid, or legitimate distrust in the Constitutional Court. The result is that we live in a kind of symmetric and managerial federalism in which, in the best of cases, Catalan deputies in Madrid strive to find some "particularist" solution that is very reminiscent of the dynamic of political Catalanism from the Restoration era, defending tariffs or civil law.